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It might be hastily assumed that the construction of a time-table of trains was 
likely to be as dull and dreary a task as the compilation of a calendar or the 
making of a ready-reckoner.  In fact, the making of railway time-tables is a 
complicated and fascinating business, which forms a whole-time occupation for a 
very large staff of experts specially trained for the work. 
 
Let us realize that a railway time-table is a most complicated and delicate 
structure pieced together with the greatest pains, and any – even the slightest – 
disturbance of it may have far-reaching consequences difficult to foresee. … A 
time-table is like a castle of cards, liable to be ruined by clumsy meddling with a 
single card. 
 
Williamson, 1938 
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Abstract 
 
Train Planning (also known as railway scheduling) is an area of substantial importance 
to the success of any railway.  Through train planning, railway managers aim to meet the 
needs of customers whilst using as low a level of resources (infrastructure, rolling stock 
and staff) as possible.  Efficient and effective train planning is essential to get the best 
possible performance out of a railway network.   
 
The author of this thesis aims, firstly, to analyse the processes which are used to 
develop train plans and the extent to which they meet the objectives that they might be 
expected to meet and, secondly, to investigate selected new and innovative software 
approaches that might make a material difference to the effectiveness and/or efficiency 
of train planning processes.  These aims are delivered using a range of primarily 
qualitative research methods, including literature reviews, interviews, participant 
observation and case studies, to understand these processes and software. 
 
Conclusions regarding train planning processes include how the complexity of these 
processes hinders their effectiveness, the negative impact of the privatisation of British 
Rail on these processes and the conflicting nature of objectives for train planning in the 
privatised railway.   
 
Train planning software is found not to adequately support train planners in meeting the 
objectives they are set.  The potential for timetable generation using heuristics and for 
timetable performance simulation to improve the effectiveness of train planning are 
discussed and recommendations made for further research and development to address 
the limitations of the software currently available.       
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Scope 
 
Railways, especially in Britain, are experiencing substantial growth in traffic volumes for 
the first time in many years.  In Britain volumes have grown steadily, with passenger 
traffic growth being particularly rapid in the late 1990s, with growth amounting to 40% in 
passenger kilometres in the ten years up until 2005.  Freight volumes in 2004 totalled 21 
billion tonne kilometres against 14 billion a decade earlier. Though not as much is being 
carried as then in absolute tonnage terms, what is being conveyed is travelling 
considerably further (Association of Train Operating Companies, 2005).   
 
Schmid and König (2008) describe railways as tightly coupled complex systems with a 
number of technical, physical, operational and organisational characteristics that 
interact.  This complexity leads to the concern that future traffic growth is potentially 
constrained by the ability of the industry to plan the use of the network effectively, with 
examples of problems appearing frequently in the railway press, for instance with 
shortage of capacity for additional trains on the Thameslink routes into London causing 
heavy overcrowding (Modern Railways 1999, 2).  The problems of success are not 
unique to Britain; the European Union is concerned over potential constraints imposed 
on growth and is undertaking work on path allocation where a key objective is to make 
best use of available capacity.  A key limitation is the ability of train planning processes 
to support that objective (European Union, 1998).   
 
It is therefore perhaps surprising that there is little published research on train planning 
processes or systems, other than papers describing the development of theoretical 
optimisation algorithms or packages.    
 
Documenting investigations into train planning processes and systems undertaken by 
the author over the last decade, this thesis to a limited extent fills this gap.  It is in two 
parts: in the first, the author looks at train planning processes (and the industry and 
organisational objectives that must drive them); in the second he addresses the software 
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that is needed to support the processes.  The motivation behind the train planning 
process research has not been just to fill a knowledge gap, but also to attempt to record 
and reflect (‘sense-make’) the problems faced by railway timetable practitioners, 
including the author, from the 1990s through to 2007.   
 
One of the conclusions reached by the author through his train planning process 
research is that software is needed to improve delivery of results that meet the 
objectives set for the train planning process.  Hence the second part of this thesis is 
used to investigate how promising software could deliver improvements.  A literature 
review of software development in the area led to the discovery of ground breaking work 
using heuristics by a team of researchers in The Netherlands (Kroon, 1998) and by 
Carey of the University of Ulster (Carey,1994 and 1995) that offered the potential to 
make a ‘step change’. An up to date set of references is provided in Chapter 8.  A 
chance conversation (if such a thing exists) with Grahame Cooper of Railtrack led to an 
invitation by Railtrack and AEA Technology Rail to review their ‘proof of concept’ 
simulated annealing approach to generating railway timetables.  In parallel to this an 
opportunity arose to work with Railtrack (and subsequently Network Rail) to find a way to 
better assess the robustness of timetables and, hence, it has been possible to evaluate 
two key areas where software can support train planning processes.   
 
Some selectivity in the areas investigated is inevitable, to keep the thesis within 
manageable bounds.  It would have been interesting to look in more depth at diagram 
optimisation systems and in fact TrainTRACS, the Leeds University train crew 
diagramming tool, and DISPO, a rolling stock diagramming tool from Hanover University 
have been evaluated less formally by the author for potential business use.  
 
There has been a strong focus throughout the research on the situation in Britain, a 
limitation that is justified again on the need to keep the research to a manageable size.   
 
Britain’s railway industry has continued to change as the research has been under way.  
This is most visible structurally, with the demise of Railtrack (replaced by Network Rail) 
and of the Strategic Rail Authority (with its functions taken over by the Department for 
Transport and Network Rail).  In addition the train planning processes have been 
evolving (as discussed in Chapter 4) and the systems that support train planning have 
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gradually improved.  The author has sought to ensure that in all cases the various 
strands of research present an up to date picture (i.e. up to 2007). 
 
1.2 Aims 
 
The author had three aims in undertaking this research:   
 
Firstly, he aimed to codify and analyse the processes which are used to develop train 
plans and the extent to which they meet the objectives that they might be expected to 
meet.   
 
Secondly, he aimed to understand the impact that privatisation of the railways in Britain 
has had on train planning processes. 
 
Thirdly, he aimed to investigate selected new and innovative software approaches that 
might make a material difference to the effectiveness and/or efficiency of train planning 
processes. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
 
Specific objectives have been: 
 
1. To describe train planning processes at a high-level and to discuss generic 
issues with these processes; 
2. To describe the timetabling processes as they existed in Britain prior to 
privatisation; 
3. To describe how the processes changed at the point of privatisation and to 
assess the issues that the new processes created; 
4. To describe how the processes have subsequently evolved and to assess the 
extent to which they are now ‘fit for purpose’; 
5. To understand the objectives that train planners should be attempting to 
meet; 
6. To understand what railway practitioners (timetablers and managers) think 
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needs to be done to improve train planning processes;  
7. To describe the current role of software in supporting timetabling processes; 
8. To understand the key gaps in software support;  
9. To investigate selected promising software avenues for making a material 
improvement to the quality of the efficiency and effectiveness of train 
planning.  
 
1.4 Publications and Use of Data Collected by Other 
Researchers 
 
A number of the chapters of this thesis contain material from papers by the author 
already published in academic journals or presented at academic conferences.  Details 
are provided in the introduction to each chapter and papers are referenced in the text 
where appropriate.   
 
The analysis of primary data collected by two other researchers, Anzir Boodoo and Ian 
Bradshaw, has formed an important part of two chapters.  Anzir interviewed a number of 
industry personnel in an EPSRC funded research project supervised by the author, to 
understand the objectives that timetable generation tools should be seeking to achieve 
(see chapter 5) and Ian, in a Railtrack funded research project, trained as a PTG user 
and ran PTG under supervision (see chapter 7).  In both cases the analysis and 
conclusions in this thesis are entirely those of the author. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the thesis 
 
Train Planning Processes
Ch 3: Process Description
Ch 4: The Effect of Privatisation
Ch 5: Objectives for Train Planning
Train Planning Software
Ch 6: Role in Supporting Train Planning
Ch 7: Use of Heuristics in Timetable 
Generation and Optimisation
Ch 8: Timetable Simulation Software
Ch 2: Methods
Ch 9: Conclusions
 
 
Chapter 2 describes in overview terms the methods used in conducting the research. 
Subsequent chapters describe, where relevant, the specific methods used in more 
detail. 
 
The main content of the thesis falls into two parts.  Chapters 3 to 6 are used to look at 
processes and Chapters 7 to 9 to look at systems. 
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Chapter 3 investigates train planning processes and then Chapter 4 looks at the effect of 
UK rail privatisation on those processes. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the high level objectives that the train planning processes should be 
focused on achieving, together with more operational objectives from railway managers 
and train planners.  The extent to which these objectives are being met is considered. 
 
Chapter 6 considers the role of software in supporting train planning before Chapters 7 
and 8 explore two specific areas of software development, the former the use of 
heuristics in timetable generation and optimisation and the latter timetable simulation 
tools. 
 
Chapter 9 draws conclusions and considers the overall value of the research 
undertaken. 
 
An Appendix and References follow. 
 
The provision of a Glossary of key railway terms was considered, but a perfectly good 
reference document is provided by Ford (2007), accessible via the World Wide Web.  
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2 METHOD 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The research undertaken by the author and reported in this thesis falls into the general 
category of management research, focusing on a key business process, the objectives 
that drive the process and the systems that support the process.   
 
There is on going debate amongst academics as to the research methods most 
appropriate to management research.  This chapter is used to set out the philosophical 
basis adopted by the author for the research and to explain the choices of method made, 
justifying their appropriateness within the constraints of time and resource inevitably 
imposed by the requirement to submit a thesis within a reasonable timescale. 
 
2.2 Philosophical Assumptions and Discussion of Possible 
Research Methods 
 
2.2.1 Key Texts 
 
Many PhD theses at this point set out in detail standard descriptions of different 
philosophical positions.  Rather than do this, readers are referred to a seminal text on 
this subject - Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), which the researcher was lucky enough to study at length under the 
tutelage of Dan Gowler, the social anthropologist, and to more recent texts providing 
overviews of the issues for researchers (Gill and Johnson, 2002; Easterby-Smith et al, 
2002; Remenyi et al, 1998).  In addition, the researcher’s Master of Philosophy thesis 
Towers and Turnover: an action research study of induction and socialisation in a 
voluntary organisation (Watson, 1982) briefly discusses ontological and epistemological 
issues in designing research.  
 
The following high level discussion is constructed around these texts. 
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2.2.2 Positivism vs. Relativism and Social Constructivism 
 
Positivism adopts the premise that “the social world exists externally, and that its 
properties should be measured through objective methods rather than being inferred 
subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  
These authors have combined the work of a number of writers (e.g. Comte, 
Wittgenstein, Pears) to provide the following list of factors that apply in positivist 
research: 
 
· Independence: the observer must be independent from what is being observed; 
· Value free: how and what to study can be determined by objective criteria; 
· Causality: the purpose of research is to identify causal explanations and 
fundamental laws; 
· Hypothesis and deduction (rather than using inductive reasoning); 
· Operationalisation: concepts need to be operationalised in a way which enables 
facts to be measured quantitatively; 
· Reductionism: problems as a whole are better understood if they are reduced 
into the simplest possible elements; 
· Generalisation: it is necessary to select samples of sufficient size to enable 
inferences to be drawn about the wider population; 
· Cross sectional analysis: regularities can most easily be identified by making 
comparisons of variations across samples. 
 
House (1970) provides further clarity as to the requirements of positivist investigation: 
· A priori hypotheses; 
· A priori criteria to measure the acceptability of those hypotheses; 
· Isolation and control of the variables under investigation; 
· Pre-determined methods of measuring and verifying the variables in the 
investigation. 
 
Positivist research favours quantitative data collection and statistically valid data analysis 
methods, with deductive reasoning to confirm hypotheses. 
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Relativism and Social Constructivism focus on the ways that people make sense of the 
world.  Research should focus on understanding why people have different experiences 
and different views.   
 
Typically research uses relativist, interpretive, qualitative methods and inductive 
reasoning (the reverse of deduction), moving from observation to explanation and 
theory, consistent with the view of Glaser and Strauss that explanation of social 
phenomena are relatively worthless unless they are grounded in observation and 
experience (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
 
Examples of positivist research methods are experiments in the physical sciences and 
large scale surveys in the social sciences, looking to produce statistically valid results. 
 
Examples of relativist research methods are ethnography, which uses modes of inquiry 
such as participant observation, very often used to explain social or behavioural issues 
rather than to understand process and seen as an alternative to surveys and 
experiments (see e.g. McGrath 1989) and action research, where the research no longer 
tries to maintain a separation from the thing that is being researched but actually tries to 
change outcomes as part of the research.  Rappoport (1970) explains that action 
research “aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate 
problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a 
mutually accepted ethical framework”.   
 
Methods such as these are good for looking at change over time and are often regarded 
as a natural rather than artificial way of gathering data - but there are serious issues to 
consider.  Data collection can take a lot of time and resource and data collection and 
analysis relies on interpretation by the researcher and therefore may be coloured by the 
researcher’s views.  Results are often ‘untidy’ because issues emerge during the 
research process that it is not possible to go back and investigate thoroughly.  Most 
seriously, the results may not be convincing to all interested parties due to their 
‘subjective nature’ and lack of statistical significance (making it difficult to generalise) – 
especially to those most comfortable with the positivist paradigm. 
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2.2.3 Case Studies 
 
Case studies are an important method of research, particularly for researchers 
investigating phenomena using a relativist framework.  Yin (1994) defines a case study 
as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.   He further notes that in general, 
case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context”.  Yin quotes Schramm (1971) 
stating that “the essence of a case study…is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of 
decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” and  
highlights that case studies are effective in organisational and management studies, 
amongst others.  Yin further notes that case studies “cope with the situation in which 
there will be many more variables of interest than data points and one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and as another result benefit from the prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analysis”. 
 
Case studies can be categorised as exploratory (pilot); descriptive  (what) , explanatory 
(why) (Yin 2003), with exploratory case studies being undertaken without clear expected 
outputs, typically as a pilot prior to undertaking more in depth studies with clear 
objectives, descriptive case studies seeking to explain what is happening and 
explanatory case studies seeking to explain why something is happening. 
 
2.2.4 Sequencing research 
 
A further dimension to be considered is whether the research is to be fixed ‘at a point in 
time’ or to be a longitudinal study – “a study that extends over a substantial period of 
time and involves studying changes over time”, Remenyi et al. (1998). 
 
Validity of results (‘warranty’ in the definition above) is a particularly important issue 
whatever research methods are employed – it is necessary to ensure that results are 
repeatable (or if this is not possible, then that there is reasonable evidence to suggest 
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that another researcher following the same research methods would produce similar 
results), rigorous (for most research, unfounded speculation should not form a significant 
part of the work) and without bias.  
 
Bechhofer observed that “the research process is not a clear-cut sequence of 
procedures following a neat pattern but a messy interaction between the conceptual and 
empirical world, deduction and induction occurring at the same time” (Bechhofer, 1974).   
 
Gill and Johnson further note that: 
· there is no single method which generates scientific knowledge in all cases 
· these methods may be inappropriate to the social world of management 
· knowledge generation is affected by the goals of managers and their ways of 
measuring success. 
 
2.2.5 Quantitative v Qualitative Research Methods 
 
Bryman (1988) suggests that quantitative and qualitative research are sometimes 
viewed as competing views about the way in which social reality ought to be studied.  
For other writers, they are simply different ways of conducting social investigation and 
are appropriate to different kinds of research question.  Bryman further notes that 
qualitative research presents a “processual view of life” whereas quantitative research 
provides a static account.  These thoughts lead to the idea of triangulation, that is to use 
a variety of data sources and methods to look at a problem from different directions, c.f. 
Ragin (1987), Gable (1994), Deacon, Bryman and Fenton (1998).   
 
Watson T (1997) notes that management research is widely regarded as 
multidisciplinary in nature, with therefore the potential to draw on a range of research 
traditions.  To a researcher this can be both a strength and a challenge.  It enables the 
researcher to select the methods that he regards as most appropriate but yet he faces 
the challenge (both self-imposed and by fellow researchers) that other methods might be 
more appropriate (Knights and Willmott, 1997; Brown 1997). 
 
A number of writers (e.g. Kuhn 1970, Giddens 1978) develop the above ideas to 
conclude that the choice of research method is contingent on the issue being studied – 
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and this is the view that has been adopted in this research.   
 
2.2.6 Positivism or Social Constructionism? 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, management research tends to pick and chose 
methods depending on the circumstances.  This has been the case in this research, with 
the emphasis less on positivist methods than social constructionism. 
 
The tabulation provided by Easterby-Smith et al. (2002), transcribed below, is 
particularly helpful in discussing the perspective to be adopted.  Each of these elements 
is considered in turn and the position of the researcher is set out. 
 
Table 1: Contrasting implications of positivism and social constructionism for research 
(Source: Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) 
  
Contrasting implications of positivism and social constructionism for research 
  Positivism Social Constructionism 
1. The observer must be independent is part of what is being 
observed 
2. Human interests should be irrelevant are the main drivers of science 
3. Explanations must demonstrate causality aim to increase general 
understanding of the situation 
4. Research progress 
through 
hypotheses and deductions gathering rich data from where 
ideas are induced 
5. Concepts need to be operationalized so 
that they can be measured 
should incorporate stakeholder 
perspectives 
6. Units of analysis should be reduced to simplest 
terms 
may include the complexity of 
'whole' situations 
7. Generalization 
through 
statistical probability theoretical abstraction 
8. Sampling requires large numbers selected 
randomly 
small numbers of cases chosen 
for specific reasons 
 
Looking at the first contrast, the researcher has not been entirely independent of the 
phenomena being investigated, particularly for the research reported in the chapter on 
the impact of privatisation in train planning (chapter 4) as he had a senior management 
role within Railtrack in the mid 1990s and more recently has acted as an advisor to the 
Strategic Rail Authority and then Network Rail.  Conversely the research has adopted an 
independent position in assessing train planning objectives and train planning software. 
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Human interests (point 2) are very much a feature of many elements of management 
and these are important in a number of chapters of this thesis – the views and objectives 
of managers and train planners during the privatisation process (chapter 4)  and 
subsequently (chapter 5) are personal things.  On the other hand, description of train 
planning processes and software are concrete, physical things. 
 
The complexity of the issues discussed has meant that demonstration of causality has 
been difficult and ‘cause and effect’ conclusions are only tentative.  An increase in 
general understanding has been achieved, as the social constructionist would require,  
but it has also been the intention of this research to go further than this, making 
recommendations for change, more the territory of the positivist.  Increasing general 
understanding is the purpose of the early sections of most of the chapters that follow; 
recommendations for change are provided at the end of each chapter. 
 
A mixture of hypotheses (positivism) and induction (social constructionism) has been 
used, with, for instance, a hypothesis made at the start of chapter 4 (regarding the 
impact of privatisation on train planning) whereas chapter 5 on the other hand uses 
induction to develop a set of objectives for train planning. 
 
Again we see in point 5 that the methodology adopted in this research crosses the divide 
between positivism and social constructionism.  Operationalisation of concepts is a key 
aim of this thesis, consistent with positivist methodologies, whilst incorporation of a 
variety of perspectives (e.g. managers, train planners) has been achieved too. 
 
Regarding units of analysis, complexity is a key facet of train planning and it has 
therefore proved difficult to reduce the analysis to simple terms. 
 
Theoretical abstraction has been the only method of generalisation possible, as 
statistically significant results either were not achievable due to the scope of the 
research (focusing on a single process in a single situation, effectively a case study) or 
not possible due to the resources that would have been required to achieve statistical 
significance (for instance considering the effectiveness of stochastic simulation to model 
reality). 
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The research has considered specific cases for specific reasons; sample sizes have not 
been statistically significant – one process in one railway, one or two case studies, 
interviews with the majority of people involved in a process but with this amounting to 
only a dozen interviews. 
 
It can be concluded from this analysis that this research does not naturally fit into either 
the positivist or social constructionism traditions but rather elements of both are used as 
the research considers appropriate. 
 
2.3 Data Collection 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
Specific research techniques used have included literature reviews (documented in each 
chapter), interviews undertaken by the researcher, use of interview data sets where the 
interviews have been undertaken by other researchers, informal interviews and 
discussions with academics, managers and train planners, discussions with software 
companies and formal ‘desk top’ comparisons of different software packages, process 
analysis and data flow workshops, hands on use of software packages, familiarisation 
visits to European railways and also Japan and Korea. 
 
The following sections provide further detail on key data collection techniques: 
 
· Reviews of internal railway documents; 
· Interviews with railway personnel (managers and train planners); 
· Participant observation by the author whilst working within train planning; 
· ‘Hands on’ experience of train planning tools has providing a ‘user’ view of the 
systems and enabling issues to be discovered by the author first hand. 
 
2.3.2 Internal railway documents 
 
Internal documents from Railtrack and Network Rail have been referred to extensively by 
the author in developing a full understanding of train planning processes, objectives and 
systems.   
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Some documents used by the author date back to before privatisation.  Willis (1992) 
reviews the train planning processes in place prior to privatisation and the Timetable 
Planning Strategic Development Group (1993) sets out the results of analysis aimed at 
designing new processes that were intended to function effectively in the privatised 
railway. 
 
A number of documents relating to train planning processes and systems during the 
period of rapid change from 1994 to 1999 have provided source material, including 
APlan 2 – User Requirements Specification, produced by Railtrack in 1994, which set 
out the system changes that would be required to enable the new train planning 
processes introduced at privatisation to work satisfactorily and The APlan Project – 
Lessons Learned Report, written by Johnson (1996) which set out why the system 
changes did not deliver as required.  Papers to Class Representative Committee (1996), 
and the Railtrack Timetable Project Control Group (1996) provide background to the 
process changes that were required to deliver timetables more effectively whilst Loose 
and Temple (1997) give insight into the internal problems that Railtrack’s train planning 
organisation had during this period.  Two documents from the Office of the Rail 
Regulator (1997, 1998) provide the only published evidence regarding the problems 
caused to train planning processes by privatisation, other than somewhat less 
considered comments in the press, c.f.  Daily Telegraph Editorial (1995) Timetable of 
Errors and the chapter on timetabling in Wolmar’s book The Great British Railway 
Disaster (1996). 
 
More detailed documents on train planning processes called on in the writing of this 
thesis include those developed by the author and endorsed by Sven Hjorth-Johansen, a 
Norwegian train planning practitioner, whilst working on the Gardermoen Railway Project 
(1998-9), the new railway from Oslo city centre to the airport at Gardermoen.  Key 
documents referred to relating directly to train planning in Britain are those produced by 
O’Brien (2002 and 2004), Project Director for Operational Planning Business Change for 
Railtrack from 2000 to 2002 and then Head of Access Planning at Network Rail from 
2004 until 2007, during a major review of train planning processes and systems 
undertaken by Railtrack and then Network Rail.   
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Training material used by Railtrack has also been referred to: Operational Planning 
Training (Level 1) Student Notes and Operational Planning Training (Level 2) Student 
Notes, Railtrack (Railtrack, 2000).   
 
2.3.3 Interviews 
 
Two sets of semi-structured interviews have been drawn on in this thesis. 
 
The Author supervised an EPSRC-funded research during 2001 and 2002.  The primary 
purpose of this research was to document train planning processes and objectives that 
train planning should seek to meet.  The data collection exercise undertaken by Boodoo 
consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the railway 
timetabling process in the UK.  The interviews included management from passenger 
operators from the former Inter City, Network South East and Regional Railways groups 
(GNER, West Anglia Great Northern and Arriva Northern respectively), Railtrack/ 
Network Rail, a Passenger Transport Executive (West Yorkshire), the Strategic Rail 
Authority (SRA) and the Office of the Rail Regulator.  The interviewees held various 
positions, from timetablers working on the mechanics of the timetabling process to 
management and strategic roles.  Questions asked and areas explored were: 
 
· Objectives for timetabling; 
· Timetabling process (details of the process and fitness for purpose); 
· Timetabling constraints; 
· Defining a ‘good’ timetable; 
· Conflict resolution; 
· Success criteria for timetabling. 
 
Boodoo produced a full transcript of the interviews undertaken. 
 
In addition to providing insights into objectives, the transcripts revealed contentions and 
conflicts within the current processes and also wider issues regarding the industry 
structure in the UK.  Practitioners revealed how they overcame the problems they faced 
and highlighted the practical differences between the theory and practice of the 
timetabling process.  Outputs included process charts validated by interviewees (e.g. 
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Timetable Development Outline charts produced in August 2001) which provide more 
detailed description than is incorporated in this thesis, and which support the analysis 
contained in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
 
The author undertook a series of semi-structured interviews in April 2005 focused on 
train planning processes.  This gave the opportunity to cross check the findings of 
Boodoo and ask some further questions.  The interviewees were George Muir (Director 
General, ATOC), Mark Phillips (Operations Director, ‘one’ Railway) , Nicola Shaw 
(Director, Strategic Rail Authority), Julie Rickard (Demand Forecasting Manager, 
Network Rail), Andrew Haines (Managing Director, South West Trains) and Mark 
Leadbetter (Train Planning Manager, Freightliner).  Subjects discussed were: 
 
· The effectiveness of the annual timetable development process; 
· The degree of discipline in the process; 
· The need for the bid and offer process described in chapter 4; 
· The split of work between NR and TOCs; 
· The effectiveness of short term planning processes (and how they could be 
improved); 
· The effectiveness of strategic access planning. 
 
2.3.4 Participant Observation 
 
The author worked in the railway industry until 1997 (for British Rail and then Railtrack); 
during this time he had the opportunity to learn about train planning processes and 
systems as a manager of the train planning function.   
 
Since 1997 he has worked for the railway industry (in the UK and Scandinavia) as a 
management consultant, in parallel to undertaken research into train planning 
processes, objectives and systems.   
 
All of the positives and negatives of undertaking research whilst being directly involved 
in the object of the research inevitably apply.  In particular the author has throughout this 
period been very aware of the risk of lack of objectivity due to commercial and financial 
priorities.  It is believed that this risk has been minimised through peer review of many 
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sections of this thesis prior to publication in journals or presentation at conferences and 
by back-checking the conclusions with train planning practitioners (e.g. with Godfrey 
Willis, who has reviewed and provided comments on the completed thesis).  
 
2.3.5 ‘Hands on’ Experience of Train Planning Systems 
 
The author has had ‘hands on’ experience of some of the systems assessed in chapters 
7 and 8; in addition he was able to gain understanding and views from other users of the 
systems from Railtrack and the software supplier in the preparation of the paper on 
timetable generation presented in Berlin (Watson et al. 2000) and the papers on 
simulation referenced in chapter 8. 
 
Time did not permit ‘hands on’ experience of all the systems discussed and so this has 
been supplemented by ‘desk top’ comparison. 
 
2.3.6 Justification of methods used 
 
The primary factors in the choice of methods were suitability for understanding the 
subject matter and the availability of time and resource. 
 
The complex and often undocumented nature of train planning has led to the author 
using whatever data he could find, with internal documents being employed to a 
considerable extent, with this data corroborated and embellished through semi-
structured interviews. 
 
Given more time, more interviews would have been undertaken giving greater reliability 
to the conclusions drawn, more ‘hands on’ investigation of software would have led to 
less reliance on considering research already undertaken by others and some of the 
recommendations for further work would have been undertaken by the author, rather 
than being left for others to follow up at some point in the future. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
 
Gill and Johnson (2002) state that “research methodology is always a compromise 
between options in the light of tacit philosophical assumptions, and choices are 
frequently influenced by the availability of resources”. 
 
This chapter has sought to avoid the pitfall of keeping philosophical assumptions tacit, 
whilst highlighting that management research often, as here, uses both positivist and 
relativist/social constructionism methods, as appropriate. 
 
Availability of resources has constrained the methods of research that could be adopted 
and the preceding section has set out these limitations. 
 
For the purposes of clarity, each chapter has it own ‘methods’ section describing the 
specific research techniques employed. 
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3 TRAIN PLANNING PROCESSES 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the author describes train planning processes.  Key terms are defined, 
time horizons for train planning discussed and a detailed description is provided.  
Various issues and complexities are then discussed and a brief comparison provided 
with manufacturing process scheduling. 
 
The primary research significance of this chapter is that it sets out a detailed description 
of train planning processes in a form that can be readily used by researchers and 
educators.  It provides an essential building block for the rest of this thesis. 
 
Elements of the early sections of this chapter have been published in the Handbook of 
Transport Systems and Traffic Control (Watson, 2001); in addition the section on 
iteration was presented to the Second International Conference on Managing 
Enterprises (Watson and Humphries, 1999). 
3.2 Method 
 
This chapter takes the limited literature on this subject and combines it with unpublished 
work on the processes that existed within British Rail prior to privatisation, e.g. Willis 
(1992), Timetable Planning Strategic Development Group (1993).  To this is added 
material from internal Railtrack documents produced during an attempt to fully map the 
processes in 2000 and 2001, c.f. O’Brien R. (2002), and from the direct investigation of 
the processes by the author.   
 
Terms used by train planners have been defined and these definitions tested with them 
to ensure they convey the intended meaning.  Similarly the process steps have been 
discussed with train planning practitioners to ensure that they are accurate. 
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3.3 Literature 
 
A number of published papers that are predominantly about computer scheduling 
provide an outline of train planning processes (cf. Caprara et al 1997).  Outlines have 
also been provided in the context of more general descriptions of railway processes 
(Ford and Haydock 1992, Ferreira 1997).  Each of these gives an explanation of the 
stages of the train planning process and the methods (e.g. graphing) used by train 
planning.  
 
It is necessary to go back some considerable time to find detailed, published, 
descriptions of train planning processes.  Three books from the 1930s have been found, 
each of which has a chapter on train planning.  The process description and 
accompanying commentary is still relevant, 70 years on. 
 
Railways To-day (Williamson, 1938) in a book describing all key elements of the railway 
system (route, gauges, track, locomotives etc.) has chapters on operating passenger 
traffic, operating freight traffic and traffic control.  Two quotations follow that relate to 
train planning: 
 
“It might be hastily assumed that the construction of a time-table of trains was likely to be 
as dull and dreary a task as the compilation of a calendar or the making of a ready-
reckoner.  In fact, the making of railway time-tables is a complicated and fascinating 
business, which forms a whole-time occupation for a very large staff of experts specially 
trained for the work. 
 
Let us realize that a railway time-table is a most complicated and delicate structure 
pieced together with the greatest pains, and any – even the slightest – disturbance of it 
may have far-reaching consequences difficult to foresee. … A time-table is like a castle 
of cards, liable to be ruined by clumsy meddling with a single card.” 
 
Williamson then describes in detail how to develop a train graph and considers rolling 
stock and planning the use of staff. 
 
 
 33
Practical Railway Operating (Hare 1930?), a supplement to British Railway Operations 
(Hare 1930), provides an in-depth analysis of capacity utilisation, how to measure it and 
how to make more capacity available and then goes on to discuss how to plan the 
timetable and people as efficiently as possible (a topic that has very much re-emerged 
today as the number of train services operated increases). 
 
British Railways To-day (Fenelon, 1939) has a chapter entitled ‘Some Problems of 
Railway Operating’ and within this a section on ‘The Working Time-table’.  Fenelon starts 
by saying: “in arranging the train services, many considerations have to be taken into 
account, including the convenience of the public, the timing of the trains, provision of 
rolling stock and locomotives, and the duty rosters of guards and drivers.  All these 
involve special consideration, and they have often to be balanced against each other 
before the arrangements can be completed.”   
 
Descriptions of working timetables and timetable graphs are followed by pertinent words 
about the importance of developing a timetable that enables trains to run punctually.  A 
discussion of efficient planning of trains and people concludes the section on the 
working timetable. 
 
Whilst only of peripheral interest to the research topic of this thesis, Pachl (2002) 
provides a good primer on railway operation and planning from a technical rather than 
process perspective (e.g. looking at how to calculate running times and how to measure 
capacity) and Pachl (Ed.) (2008) covers similar ground but with more depth and with 
input from a number of leading academics in this area. 
3.4 Key Terms in Train Service Planning 
 
Wren (1996) provides definitions for a number of commonly used terms, in particular 
scheduling, timetabling and rostering.  The term train planning will be used here in a 
manner that matches with Wren’s wider definition of scheduling; one that is also familiar 
to train planning practitioners across Europe.  Train Planning will be taken to cover: 
 
· Timetable planning (accommodating train services on the railway network, 
subject to the constraints imposed by the physical characteristics of the network 
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and the need to maintain and renew it); 
· Locomotive/rolling stock planning (usually called ‘rolling stock diagramming’); 
· Train crew planning (usually called ‘train crew diagramming’); 
· Train crew rostering (a rotating linking of the train crew diagrams to spread the 
work between members of staff to meet predefined rules). 
 
These last three stages are often known collectively as resource planning. 
 
Some definitions are now provided, constructed by the author from his researches: 
 
Railway Scheduling or Train Planning is the process by which the ‘demand’ for rail 
transport  (passenger and freight) is brought together with ‘supply side’ constraints (such 
as available infrastructure capacity, rolling stock and staff) to produce timetables and 
resource plans that meet the demand at an appropriate level of cost.   
 
Timetables show how trains travel over time and usually take the form of 'tables' or 
'time-distance graphs'. 
 
Resource plans map rolling stock and staff to the trains that are in the timetables, 
taking into account all the operational, legal and trades union rules that need to be 
applied.   
 
Schedulers or planners are the railway personnel who put together timetables and 
resource plans.  For very small railways (for instance a city centre to airport rail-link) 
there may be just one or two planners, responsible for the whole process; major 
railroads and national railways will have up to several hundred train planners, with 
different groups of staff responsible for timetabling and resource planning and individual 
staff specialising in particular tasks within the process. 
3.5 Time Horizons 
 
Train Planning is undertaken at different times for different reasons.  
 
Strategic Planning.  This is where changes to the infrastructure are being considered 
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and ‘what if’ questions are being asked, typically looking 2 to 10 years ahead.  This is 
also known within the UK railway industry as Advanced Timetable Development and 
Capacity Planning.  ‘Back of an envelope’ assessments are undertaken, e.g. what train 
service could be operated if some extra trains were leased or what train service could be 
operated if extra tracks were provided?  As these ideas become firmer, detailed 
timetables are produced to assess the likely performance of revised infrastructure 
layouts (perhaps with additional platforms or a new passing loop to let fast trains 
overtake slow trains) and to confirm the additional rolling stock required to operate a 
proposed future timetable.  
 
Network Rail has now centralised this activity in a ‘Strategic Access Planning Unit’. 
 
Tactical Planning.  This is train planning over a time horizon where the infrastructure 
tends to be fixed, but the mobile resources (rolling stock and staff) can be varied in 
quantity, quality and intensity of operation.  Tactical planning is often split into ‘long term 
planning’ and ‘short term planning’.  Long term planning produces the timetables and 
resource plans that are to be in operation typically for up to a year in the future; short 
term planning makes the changes to this plan that are always needed to a greater or 
lesser extent to cope with supply or demand fluctuations, from a few weeks to a few 
days ahead of operation.  An example of a supply fluctuation is a shortage of train crew 
due to sickness; examples of demand changes are Statutory Holidays and special 
occasions, such as major sporting events.  The long term plan is produced over a 
number of months and, particularly for passenger railways, has to be completed some 
weeks or months before the new timetable comes into operation, to allow for publication 
of new timetables for passengers and transmission to reservation and customer 
information systems.   
 
Up until 2003, each region of Britain had its own ‘Train Planning Unit’ undertaking this 
stage of the timetabling process.  The 7 units that existed at that point have now been 
reduced to 3 (plus the Strategic Access Planning unit), reducing overheads and 
interfaces. 
 
Operational Planning and Control.   However good the tactical planning process, real 
time perturbations are an inevitable feature of transport operations.  Rescheduling 
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ultimately takes place ‘real time’ to accommodate last minute changes in demand 
(usually from freight customers), train failures and delays, infrastructure reliability 
problems and staff sickness.  Train make up, freight wagon routing (decisions about 
which wagons go on which trains) and yard operation decisions are made at this point.   
 
On Britain’s main line railway, ‘short term planning’ (up until about 24 hours before the 
trains run) is undertaken in the Train Planning Units; after that any ‘very short term 
planning’, together with reacting to problems ‘on the day’, is undertaken by regional 
Control Offices. 
 
Figure 2: Planning Time Horizons (Source: Author) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the planning horizons described in the above paragraphs and also 
highlights that as the time horizon reduces the degrees of freedom reduce.  During 
strategic planning, most elements of the railway system can be changed, e.g. the 
number of tracks can be increased, signalling can be enhanced, the number of train sets 
in use can be increased or new trains purchased with different characteristics, but these 
gradually become fixed as planning horizons reduce, due to the long lead times that are 
inherent in significant capital expenditure.  The only exception to this logic is that 
shortfalls in availability (e.g. due to a major infrastructure failure) might require major re-
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planning very close to the day of operation.   
3.6 Process Description  
3.6.1 Overview 
 
Train planning in all three time horizons defined above follows a similar high level 
process, as set out in Figure 3 and described below. 
 
Figure 3: Train Planning Process (Source: Author) 
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3.6.2 Base Data 
 
The base data provides the ‘building blocks’ on which train plans are built. 
Some additional terms, seen is this figure for the first time, need to be defined. 
1 Infrastructure characteristics (number of tracks, where trains can pass each 
other, speeds trains can travel at). The timetable planning process in most 
countries works to a simplified view of the railway.  This simplified view (known in 
the UK as the 'planning geography’) works at a level of detail that matches with 
the variables at play during planning.  Hence all junctions and stations are 
included in the planning network created, but individual switches and signals are 
not.  The author has seen exceptions to this in visits to Germany and Denmark, 
where a more detailed view of the ‘geography’ is used, modelling the 
infrastructure down to individual signals and track circuits (in Germany the state 
railway uses its own ‘Rute’ system, in Denmark the ‘TPS’ system developed by 
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HaCon of Germany is used).  The TPS system is due to be implemented by 
Network Rail during 2009 as its ‘Integrated Train Planning System, following 
customisation to accommodate the larger network and greater number of train 
operating companies in Britain; 
2 Infrastructure availability (in practice often a statement of when the infrastructure 
is ‘unavailable’).  This indicates the constraints placed on when trains can run, 
usually because the infrastructure is being maintained, renewed and enhanced.  
These are sometimes known as engineering requirements.  Typically, in Britain 
this is achieved by allowing the engineer access to the track for a limited time 
each night and for an extended period over a number of weekends.  In mainland 
Europe, greater flexibility in signalling systems and different working practices 
allow much more work to be carried out ‘between trains’ during the week and the 
weekend service is much less disrupted.  These requirements will typically be 
stated in the form of a maintenance ‘window’ – a period of hours on a daily, 
weekly or occasional basis when trains are banned.  In more limited 
circumstances, it may also not be possible to run trains because signalling staff 
or other key operating staff are not on duty; 
3 Resource characteristics - whether particular rolling stock can run on particular 
routes (limitations include gauge, curvature, weight or signalling interference) and 
the performance characteristics of particular rolling stock on particular routes (in 
particular the 'timings': the time it takes particular rolling stock to travel over every 
leg of the planning ‘geography’); 
4 Resource availability (rolling stock numbers, numbers of staff, locations). 
3.6.3 Business Specifications 
 
A key input to the train planning process is a business specification, setting out in 
general terms the train service that is required.  This comes at a high level from the 
funders of the railway network (e.g. from the Department for Transport), who specify a 
service level to be provided in the franchise agreements made with train operators.  At a 
more detailed and more frequent level, the marketing departments of the train operating 
companies (or internal marketing department for an integrated railway) produce a train 
service specification on the basis of past performance of services plus market research 
to assess latent demand for rail services.  This typically sets out the general service 
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pattern required (e.g. a stopping train every 15 minutes, a fast train every hour, stopping 
only at specified stations). 
 
It is normal for several, potentially conflicting, business specifications to be produced - 
these specifications come from the differing requirements of customers of the railway.  
Within unified state railways, specifications come from the different business units - 
usually some combination of International, Inter City, Suburban, Regional and Freight; 
for railways where there are a number of separate train operating companies competing 
for access to the infrastructure, each will provide its own requirements. In either case 
high level train service specifications (sometimes called ‘service plans’) will be produced, 
indicating the general level of service required (e.g. number of trains per hour, the type 
and stopping pattern of these trains).  These specifications take into account the level of 
resources (particularly rolling stock) available. 
 
These specifications will have been put together to take account of overarching 
objectives from stakeholders, in particular national and local government (in Britain 
through the franchising process).  The nature of these objectives is discussed in chapter 
5. 
 
Other factors taken into account are: 
 
Market Research 
 
For all railway services, it is essential to understand what your customers and potential 
customers are prepared to pay for.  Market research techniques vary substantially 
depending upon the nature of the rail business, but they all feed into the service 
specification stage. 
 
Anticipated rolling stock availability 
 
Rolling stock availability provides a finite cap on the service that can be offered.  This 
needs to take account not only of the number of physical units of rolling stock that will be 
in the possession of the railway when the timetable comes into effect (this can be quite 
difficult to predict with uncertainties about the delivery of new stock and possible 
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accident damage reducing the total fleet) but also the anticipated maintenance regime 
and reliability. 
 
Previous timetables and resource plans 
 
Previous timetables are more often than not the basis of future timetables.  This is partly 
because demand does not usually change radically over the space of months or even a 
few years and partly reflects the limitations on train planning resources that prevent 
frequent ‘recasts’ of the timetable.  Customer acceptance is also an issue - often 
overlooked in Britain - where people become accustomed to particular service patterns 
and are disorientated by change and react negatively, even where in principle the 
changes are beneficial.  Note the parallels here with the changes in 1998 to the BBC’s 
Radio 4 schedules (BBC, 1998) and the discontinuation of Grandstand (The Times, 
2006). 
 
Rolling stock and train crew planning is also a complicated process and, where some 
considerable time has been spent developing an efficient and reliable plan, rational 
managers look to reuse it where possible. 
3.6.4 Timetable Planning 
 
Timetable Planning is sometimes known as Timetable Development or, in Britain, 
Access Planning or, confusingly, as this term is also used to describe real time planning, 
Operational Planning. 
 
The train service specifications are passed to the timetable planners, whose task is to 
produce timetables that are ‘conflict free’. This characteristic ensures that if the timetable 
was worked to exactly in practice, no train would be delayed by any other. 
  
Figure 4 provides an overview of the timetable development process; each stage is now 
described. 
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Figure 4: Timetable Development Process (Source: Author) 
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Creating detailed train schedules. The times provided in the business specifications are 
turned into detailed schedules, accurate to fractions of a minute, taking account of the 
details of the infrastructure and characteristics of the trains.  
 
Previous timetables.  Previous timetables provide valuable input to the schedule creation 
task.  It may be that some schedules are identical; alternatively some may be the same, 
but offset in time.  Previous timetables may also be of value to the conflict resolution 
stage - these solutions may be applicable again, with perhaps minor changes. 
 
‘Graphing’ schedules.  The next stage towards producing a timetable is to draw the 
schedules on a time-distance graph, either using a computer package or graph paper 
and pencil.  Once all schedules are drawn on the graph, it is possible for the skilled train 
planner to judge whether there are ‘conflicts’ between train schedules.  Conflicts exist 
where there is not sufficient distance and time between trains on the same track going 
the same direction (the ‘headway’ between trains), travelling in opposite directions on 
single track or travelling on tracks which cross (the ‘junction margin’, being the time 
between trains across a junction).  A simplified example of timetable graphing is given in 
Figure 5 and a sample from a train planning system is provided in Figure 6.  For a more 
detailed exposition see Ford and Haydock (1992). 
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Figure 5: Simplified Timetable Graphs (Source: Author) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Timetable Graph (Source: Screen shot from DeltaRail commercial software) 
 
 
Figure 6 is a timetable graph showing train services between Birmingham and 
Shrewsbury for a period of a weekday.  Each line represents a train, with the different 
colours distinguishing different train operators and groupings of services.  It can be seen 
 
Graph A - conflict Graph B - conflict resolved
Station A_ Station A_
Station B_ Station B_
Station C_ Station C_
Station D_ Station D_
Time Time
Notes: 
Single track with passing loops at stations
Train 1 Fast train non-stop from station D to station A
Train 2 Slow train stopping at stations C and B
Train 3 Fast train non-stop from station A to station D
In graph A, Train 3 conflicts with Train 2 on the single track between A and B - conflict resolution required 
In graph B, Train 2 is held at station B to 'cross' Train 3 
Train 1 
Train 3 
Train 2 
Train 1 
Train 3 
Train 2 
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that the railway between Birmingham and Wolverhampton is very busy, with far fewer 
trains between Wolverhampton and Shrewsbury.  The shaded area behind each train 
shows the time required before another train can travel on the section of line.   
 
An alternative approach to producing graphs is to print out the schedules in tabular form 
and to check for ‘headway’ or ‘junction margin’ deficiencies by comparing the times of 
schedules at key locations. 
 
Conflict resolution.  Once conflicts have been detected, it is necessary to ‘resolve’ them.  
In Britain the jargon ‘flexing’ has come to be used to describe the process whereby the 
planner moves the schedules on the graph to achieve a conflict-free timetable, whilst, as 
far as practicable, achieving the requirements in the business specification.  Inevitably 
on busy routes compromises are required; very skilful planners are required to achieve 
satisfactory ‘paths’ (the term used to describe a train schedule once it has been put on 
the graph) to meet all the business requirements.  Sometimes this simply is not possible. 
 
Resolution rules.  There are rules about what represents a satisfactory solution - not only 
must the basic infrastructure headway and junction margin rules be obeyed, but a set of 
rules will apply regarding the extent to which it is acceptable to, say, increase the overall 
journey time of an Inter City train to give a reasonably fast schedule for a freight train 
Practice varies but typically in continental Europe, it is not acceptable to increase the 
journey time of a passenger train at all to improve the journey time of a freight train 
(unlike in North America where, outside the North East corridor from Washington to 
Boston, freight trains for the most part get priority).  In some circumstances, these rules 
may be formalised in a document that has been agreed between the infrastructure 
company and the train operators.  In Britain these generally applicable rules are included 
in a document that was called at the point of privatisation the Track Access Conditions 
(Railtrack, 1995) and which is now called the Network Code. 
 
Finalised Timetable.  Once the resolution process has been completed, the timetable 
can be fed into the rolling stock scheduling process and also into the timetable 
publication process. 
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3.6.5 Timetable Production  
 
Once timetable development is complete, documentation can be produced for 
passengers (known in Britain as the ‘public timetable’ or National Rail Timetable) and 
staff (a ‘working timetable’, giving much more detail than the public timetable).  Other 
formats for specific purposes can also be produced, e.g. station ‘simplifiers’ for station 
staff and station posters for passengers.   
 
It is ever more important to provide timetable information in electronic form, for potential 
passengers to access direct via the various timetable search engines, for telephone 
enquiry bureau, reservation systems and to feed various ‘real time’ systems, again for 
use by passengers and also for staff. 
3.6.6 Rolling Stock Diagramming   
 
All the services in the timetable have to be allocated to rolling stock ‘diagrams’.  A 
diagram is a listing of the services that a notional item of rolling stock will undertake 
during a day.  It is constructed by ‘associating’ (linking) the end of one service with the 
start of another to form a continuous string.  There are rules regarding associations that 
have to be followed, e.g. the end of one service must be in the same location as the start 
of the next, unless an ‘empty stock’ or ‘relocation’ service is added, and the start of the 
next service to be linked must start at least a certain number of minutes later than the 
end of the previous service.  The rolling stock schedule is complete once all the services 
have been allocated to diagrams: it is then possible to be certain how much rolling stock 
is required to operate the timetable.  This might be different from the input resource 
availability.   
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Figure 7: Rolling Stock Diagrams (Source: IVE, Hannover commercial software DISPO) 
 
 
Figure 7 gives an example of a set of rolling stock diagrams from a commercial 
diagramming system.  Each row sets out the work that a specific train set will undertake.  
For instance the first train set (formed of a class 156 unit) starts at Ntng (Nottingham) at 
0544 working the service with headcode 2W01.  The final service it operates finishes at 
2212 by which time it has travelled 505 km. 
3.6.7 Train Crew Diagramming 
 
All the rolling stock diagrams have to have matching train crew diagrams, although this 
will usually not be a 'one to one' match,, taking into account how many crew are 
required, the various rules regarding train crew working hours and knowledge and 
including various ancillary tasks that have to be performed, such as reporting for duty 
and being briefed on any particular safety or operational issues - known as 'signing on', 
handing in cash at the end of the shift, training, etc..   
 
The second part of the train crew scheduling task is to produce rosters.  This involves 
putting the diagrams together in sequences to produce ‘links’ such that when a named 
member of staff is allocated to that link, it provides for him or her a series of diagrams 
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that make up a working week (or number of weeks) that matches with the various rules 
on working hours.  When put together, the overall roster must be made up of links that 
cover all of the work to be undertaken.  If this scheduling work has been done as part of 
tactical planning, once the roster has been put together and, usually, agreed with the 
staff representatives or union, it is then possible to allocate people to the links.  This is 
typically done some weeks in advance (unlike rolling stock which is often only allocated 
to diagrams ‘on the day’), to give employees some knowledge of their forward working 
hours. 
 
Figure 8: Train Crew Diagrams in preparation (Source: SISCOG commercial software 
CREWS) 
 
 
Figure 8 gives an example of a train crew scheduling task in progress.  The top half of 
the figure shows rolling stock diagrams that have still to be allocated to a train crew 
diagram; the bottom half shows train crew diagrams that have already been constructed 
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(e.g. 12E is a completed ‘early turn’ (morning) diagram.  Time of day runs from left to 
right (hours over 24 are on the next day, e.g. 25 is one o’clock in the morning), numbers 
such as 30772 and 8234 represent the train diagrams to be ‘covered’ by that train crew 
diagram; the * indicates a meal break.  
3.6.8 Operations Planning and Control  
 
Once these stages are complete, the timetable and resource plans can be handed over 
to the day to day operational managers, who will make changes as required to deal with 
day to day perturbations. 
3.6.9 Planning Timescales 
 
The term planning timescales mean here the time taken to produce a plan rather than 
the planning horizon. 
 
At the strategic planning stage, two extremes are to be seen: (i) There are the ‘back of 
an envelope’ assessments undertaken, often within the marketing department.  These 
are very much of the ‘what if’ type of question, e.g. what revenue would we get if we 
could run from London to Manchester in 2 hours or what if we wanted to run 2 trains per 
hour from London to Leeds rather than one?  (ii) At the other extreme there are detailed 
timetable development and simulation projects which look at the likely performance of a 
revised infrastructure layout and revised timetable, using tools that work at a very 
detailed level - often down to individual signals for the whole route being examined.  In 
theory, where this latter approach is adopted, the quality of the plan at this stage can be 
very good. 
 
The long term plan is produced over a number of months and usually has to be 
completed some weeks or months before the new timetable comes into force, to allow 
for publication of the new passenger timetable and transmission to reservation and 
customer information systems.  Although a considerable length of time is taken over 
producing a long term plan, the complexity of the task can lead to imperfections.  On 
occasion it has been necessary to make short term plan changes in the weeks after a 
new long term plan has been put into effect, to deal with particular performance 
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problems caused by deficient planning. 
 
The short term plan is produced some weeks before it is needed.  In Britain, the industry 
has been going through a process of quality improvement, with the objective of ensuring 
that all passenger service short term alterations are agreed and promulgated at least 12 
weeks before the train runs, to give good quality information and reservation capability 
nearly 3 months in advance.  Although considerable effort is put into short term planning, 
the quality of the result is usually less good than long term planning.  To understand why 
this is the case, it is necessary to look at the size of the task.  Small modifications can 
take little time to plan but large scale amendments (e.g. to accommodate line closures 
for engineering work) can amount to a complete replanning exercise - something which 
the long term planners would have a number of months to undertake.  Clearly, the 
quality will suffer if this has to be done quickly. 
 
Operations planning is undertaken predominantly ‘real time’ and quality is a matter of 
experience of the controller and chance. 
 
It should be noted that the nature of logistics and freight distribution is such that detailed 
planning typically can only start relatively close to the time that the train service starts.  
This creates an uncomfortable mismatch between planning horizons, with the widely 
held view that freight suffers some disadvantage, having to accept ‘what is left’ after the 
passenger services have been planned. 
 
The effort expended and quality of output in developing train plans at different planning 
timescales is shown diagrammatically in Figure 9.  During strategic planning, train 
planning input (and the quality of the outputs) can either be very high level, e.g. 
considering strategic timetable options using simple spreadsheets, or very detailed, e.g. 
when reviewing proposals for infrastructure enhancements, where analysis looks at the 
location and characteristics of individual points and signals.  A considerable amount of 
work is involved in creating the long term plan and the quality of the output reflects this.  
As changes are made to the plan to reflect short term or operational changes the 
amount of input reduces and the quality of the resulting train plan is reduced. 
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Figure 9: Amount of input and quality of output v. timeframe (Source: Author) 
 
3.7 Further Investigation: Iterations Improve the Solution 
 
The process described in the above section is sequential, with the exception of some 
parallel activity required for defining business specifications and also with timetable 
documentation being produced in parallel with detailed resource planning.  
 
In the quest for the ‘best’ solution, reality is however different.  As the process is followed 
through sequentially, problems arise.  Detailed analysis of the processes adopted by 
train planners has been undertaken by the author based on the outputs from workshops 
and interviews with train planners (see chapter 2 for details) shows that ‘iteration’ takes 
place to correct problems and avoid inefficiency.  Some of the most frequently found 
iterations in practice are shown in Figure 10 below. 
 
The explanation of some of these feedback loops is as follows: 
 
1. When putting the timetable or the rolling stock plan together, the planners 
may discover that there is insufficient capacity to meet all the requirements in 
the business specification.  Feedback is provided to the service specifiers, 
who modify their requirements and resubmit; 
2. It may be that the business specification includes running trains at a time of 
day or week when the engineers intend to dig up the track.  Dialogue will take 
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place to reach a compromise and the engineering requirements may be 
changed; 
3. It may be found that a small ‘tweak’ to the timetable would save a train set.  
This will be fed back from the rolling stock planners to the timetable planners 
to see if this is possible. 
 
Figure 10: Feedback Loops in Train Planning (Source: Author) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is apparent that, to produce an acceptable solution to the overall train planning 
problem, requires that account be taken of the interaction between the different stages of 
the business process.  This is achieved by feeding back problems to an earlier stage in 
the process. 
 
Train planners state that very often they only have time to produce a workable solution 
rather than a resource-efficient solution.  Little time is available for iteration as 
predetermined timetable implementation dates have to be met and the solution that 
results is therefore inevitably sub-optimal. 
 
A ‘second best’ solution 
 
In theory, producing a ‘first best’ train plan would be achieved by optimising across the 
whole process, probably using some form of constraint based programming to automate 
the process.  Constraints on network capacity, engineering requirements and rolling 
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stock and train crew availability would be set against the business requirements and an 
optimum solution (or something close to it) would be found.  To date, no attempt has 
been made to undertake this, even in the relatively simple area of city-specific mass 
transit scheduling programs, due to the complexity of the task.  This issue is discussed 
further in the chapters on software support for train planning processes (chapter 6 
onwards). 
 
What is clear is that it is currently only practical to solve each stage in the process 
separately, often with the objective solely being to produce an operable solution, rather 
than a good or ‘optimal’ solution.  Iteration is therefore the only way available to take 
account of the impact of the solution of one stage on another stage and to enable 
amendments to be made as necessary.  Close co-operation between the parties 
involved in the various stages is essential, together with appropriate organisational 
structures and internal procedures. 
3.8 Further Investigation: Complexities   
 
This research has discovered that there are a number of complexities that make train 
planning difficult: 
 
1. Railways have a ‘single degree of freedom’ - forward and backwards 
(whereas road based transport has two degrees of freedom and air 
three).  Because of this all ‘overtaking’ of trains or ‘meeting of trains’ (on a 
single track) or ‘crossing of trains’ (at junctions) has to be planned in 
detail if delays are not to result; 
2. A further complexity of the train planning problem, similar to that of other 
scheduling problems, is the need to consider infrastructure and resource 
efficiency alongside robustness and time taken to produce a solution;   
3. The complexity and inter-linked nature of railway networks leads to the 
timetable planning process of necessity requiring a network solution.  
However, given the scale of the task and the need to develop a solution in 
a reasonable time it is usually divided between a number of different 
people and often between different locations; 
4. The congested nature of many rail routes, either through infrastructure 
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rationalisation to reduce cost, or growth in traffic volumes leads to 
timetable planners having difficulty finding solutions that meet all the 
business requirements, if indeed such a solution exists at all; 
5. Additional complexity has been introduced into the processes by the 
current trend towards separation of infrastructure management and train 
operation, leading to no one organisation or individual being in a position 
to decide between possible compromises if no solution meets the 
requirements of all the companies involved; 
6. The relatively limited software support available to train planners. 
 
Most of these are intrinsic factors that must be taken account of, rather than being 
susceptible to change.  Points 5 and 6, however, are definitely not intrinsic and are 
discussed in later chapters covering (5) how privatisation has impacted on timetable 
processes and (6) the extent to which better software support could be provided. 
3.9 Further Investigation: Comparison with Manufacturing 
Process Scheduling 
 
Train planning is regarded by railway personnel as a specialist activity and practitioners 
tend to consider that they are performing a task that no one else does.  In order to 
understand whether this is true or not, the following section is used to undertake a brief 
comparison with scheduling in manufacturing plants.   
 
The railway infrastructure is a network on which trains move.  This has distinct parallels 
with the ‘infrastructure’ of process industry plants: tracks replace pipes; storage tanks for 
raw and finished materials translate in railway terms into depots and sidings; it is only 
possible to have one material at one point in any pipe at any one time in the same way 
that it is only possible to have one train on any one piece of track at any one time. 
 
Trains and train crew can again be paralleled with the materials that flow through a 
process plant: in the case of railways, the ‘mix’ of materials that is required is defined by 
the train service specification and the various rules that apply to train crew.   
 
A brief review of manufacturing scheduling literature confirms the great similarity in the 
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nature of the problem.  Sanmarti et al (1998) characterise chemical batch production 
plants as having a ‘high degree of flexibility’ and ‘a large number of variables’ that have 
to be taken into account, including ‘unit assignments, product and/or task sequencing 
and tasks timing’.  Further similarities are revealed by Das et al (1998) who list a number 
of batch process constraints, starting with ‘most processes are non-pre-emptive, that is, 
it is not possible to start a new activity unless the previous activity has been completed’.  
The reader will note that this exactly matches with the resource constraints that apply to 
rolling stock and train crew.  The overall scheduling problems that result are 
‘combinatorially complex’ (Artiba and Riane 1998) and tend to have location or 
organisation-specific features (Loos and Allweyer 1998), matching with comments about 
railway problems from Cordeau et al.  In manufacturing, typical constraints might include 
machine capacity, raw material delivery times, maintenance periods, union rules, legal 
work limitations, and staff capability (ILOG 2007).  For railways the first two translate into 
infrastructure capacity and rolling stock availability, the rest being exactly the same. 
 
Whilst the close match outlined above does not necessarily mean that detailed 
comparison will provide valuable analysis, Loos and Allweyer discuss how conflicts 
within processing plants are solved interactively and how functions should not be treated 
in isolation but seen as part of the overall business process, matching closely with the 
points made earlier in this chapter. 
3.10  Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the writer has set out the train planning processes and then considered 
some of the issues and complexities that challenge train planners.  It can be concluded 
that train planning is always going to be complex in nature but that analysis can help by 
explaining some of this complexity and by pointing towards areas for process 
improvement (such as taking account of the iterative nature of the process) and also to 
the potential for comparative analysis with other similar processes (e.g. manufacturing 
processing scheduling). 
 
The conclusion that there can be benefits from undertaking process analysis is 
applicable to other processes and process analysis.  In addition it is possible to 
generalise that there will usually be similar processes in different settings that can be 
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used for comparative purposes or to ‘cross fertilize’. 
 
This analysis now provides the basis for investigating train planning across several 
different dimensions in the chapters that follow.   
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4 THE EFFECT OF PRIVATISATION ON TRAIN 
PLANNING PROCESSES IN BRITAIN 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Organisational change can be expected to impact on processes and, in this chapter, we 
consider the effect of rail privatisation on train planning processes in Britain.  
Discussions with railway personnel, together with direct involvement in the process of 
change, led the author to want to evaluate the following hypothesis: 
 
That the new structure imposed on the industry in Britain by the Railways 
Act 1993 hinders the development of effective timetables and resource 
plans by creating artificial boundaries in the middle of what needs to be a 
seamless process. 
 
He aims to do this analysis by bringing together train planning and privatisation policy, 
documenting an important part of the railway restructuring jigsaw - that of the 
development of new train planning processes to accommodate the fragmentation of 
responsibility for train planning.  The extent to which the new processes adopted met the 
needs of the evolving industry is then considered, with an appraisal of what went wrong 
and why. 
 
The work presented pertains specifically to the British situation, primarily because it is in 
Britain that the division between infrastructure operator (responsible for the 
management, control and improvement of the track and signalling) and the train 
operators (responsible for running the train services on the infrastructure operator’s 
network) first became reality (although Sweden had already made moves in this 
direction) and hence the impact can be best described.  Future work by other 
researchers will no doubt consider the position as it develops in other countries and 
compare and contrast that with the developments in Britain. 
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The understanding developed in this chapter is of importance for two key reasons: 
 
1. Growth in the use of rail (both passenger and freight) relies on the ability of 
the railway industry nationally and internationally to provide punctual train 
services that meet the available demand, maximise the use of available 
infrastructure capacity and be resource-efficient.  An effective timetabling 
process is needed to achieve this; 
2. European Union pressure to separate infrastructure management from train 
operation (see for instance European Union, 1991) means that lessons that 
can be learnt from the situation in Britain are potentially of great value to 
continental railways that are required to restructure; the opportunity also 
arises for the EU to understand and address some of the problems that its 
policy in this area will cause. 
 
Substantial sections of this chapter were published in Transport Reviews (Watson 2001). 
4.2 Method 
 
This chapter has been developed using a number of research techniques.  
 
Firstly, a range of secondary material, both published and working documents, has been 
reviewed, c.f. Timetable Planning Strategic Development Group (1993), Class 
Representative Committee (1996), Railtrack Timetable Project Control Group (1996), 
Loose W. and Temple G. (1997), Office of the Rail Regulator (1997, 1998);.   
 
Secondly, retrospective participant observation was employed, with personal 
recollections from being Head of Access Planning for Railtrack (from 1995 to 1998) 
being documented during 1999 in the preparation of the Transport Reviews paper 
(Watson 2001) when memories were relatively fresh and many personal papers (for 
instance, notes of meetings) were readily accessible. 
 
Thirdly, informal discussions with a range of industry personnel have been used to fill 
gaps in understanding.  These had to be informal because most of these individuals 
were and still are attempting to work within the structure created and did not wish to 
 57
prejudice their careers by being quoted. 
 
There is no separate literature review in this chapter – references are woven into the 
story as it unfolds. 
4.3 British Rail 
4.3.1 Background 
 
The railway system of Great Britain was originally built as a patchwork of railway lines 
operated by private, often local, railway companies.  Over the course of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries these amalgamated or were bought by competitors.  The entire 
network was brought under government control during the First World War and in 1923 
the remaining companies were grouped into what became known as the ‘Big Four’, the 
Great Western Railway, the London and North Eastern Railway, the London, Midland 
and Scottish Railway and the Southern Railway companies. The ‘Big Four’ were public 
companies and they continued to run the railway system until the end of 1947, at which 
point, desperate for investment following the Second World War, they were nationalised 
to form British Railways (usually known as British Rail). 
 
During the 1960s the network was substantially rationalised, with route miles reduced 
from 17,830 (BRB, 1963) to 10,304 in 2008 (Department for Transport, 2007).  
Modernisation of the remaining network took place in parallel, with major infrastructure 
enhancements (including the first long distance main line electrification in the U.K., of the 
West Coast Main Line) and introduction of container trains and ‘merry go round’ to 
improve the efficiency of freight operations. 
 
The remaining network continues to serve a number of different markets – commuting in 
the South East (and to a more limited extent into cities other than London), long distance 
business and leisure passenger travel, freight services in ‘trainloads’ (most of the 
‘wagonload’ services had disappeared by the mid 1980s) and, where lines were not 
closed, for political reasons rather than economic, inter-urban and rural passenger 
travel. 
 
Throughout this period British Rail was organised in much the same way as it had been 
pre-nationalisation, with geographic ‘regions’ that were for the most part closely aligned 
with the ‘Big Four’ networks and functional organisations within the regions keeping 
engineering separate from operations and marketing. 
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4.3.2 Management and Structure 
 
British Rail, from when it came into existence in 1948 (then known as the British 
Railways Board), underwent a number of reorganisations.  However, from 1948 until the 
1980s, train planning had been affected relatively little, with the work being undertaken 
through a regional structure of train planning offices, where the regions matched quite 
closely with the pre-nationalisation railway companies.  During the 1980s the pace of 
change quickened, with ‘Sector Management’ being introduced.  All traffic flows were 
allocated to one of five business sectors (Inter City, London and South East, Other 
Provincial Services, Freight and Parcels) and, through the 1980s, decision making was 
gradually transferred from the existing functions (operations, civil engineering, etc.) to 
the new ‘Sectors’.  ‘Matrix management’ was an inevitable consequence of this process, 
with many managers pulled in different directions by their functional superiors and the 
new sector managers (Cochrane 1992).  The final stage of the transition to business 
management was undertaken under the banner of ‘Organising for Quality’.  With the new 
organisation that came into effect in 1993, just a year before privatisation, the functions 
were finally subsumed in the Sectors, with matrix management replaced by ‘contracts’ 
(in truth internal agreements rather than legally binding contracts, as all the Sectors were 
still part of British Rail).  Gourvish (2002) provides a very detailed review of this whole 
period.  
 
Much discussed during the late 1980s, railway privatisation only became a serious topic 
on the political agenda in the early 1990s.  Several potential new industry structures 
were considered, including privatising British Rail as a single entity (rather as British Gas 
had been some years before), splitting the railway into regional monopolies (harking 
back to the situation that existed prior to nationalisation), selling the newly formed 
Sectors separately or dividing the railway into an infrastructure provider, competing train 
operating companies and supply companies (owning the rolling stock, maintaining and 
renewing the track and so on).  For reasons discussed by Preston (1996), Harris and 
Godward (1997), White (1998), Kain (1998) and others, the latter option was adopted, 
with an Act of Parliament becoming law in 1993 and 1st April 1994 being set as the date 
for implementation of the first phase of the restructuring process - setting up Railtrack as 
a separate ‘GoCo’ (Government Owned Company) responsible for maintenance, 
renewal and operation of the infrastructure.  ‘Sectorisation’ had brought some changes 
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to the train planning processes, but the chosen method of privatisation was to have a 
much more significant impact.   
4.3.3 Timetabling Pre-Privatisation 
Prior to restructuring, the timetable development process started a little over a year in 
advance of the commencement date for the timetable with the engineering requirements 
being defined.  Within the constraints these impose (typically in Britain limiting overnight 
trains and Saturday night/Sunday trains) business specifications were then produced. 
 
Train service specifications were given to the timetable planners, who, as described in 
detail in the preceding chapter, produced detailed train schedules, taking into account 
the exact details of the infrastructure and characteristics of the trains, accurate to 
fractions of minutes whereas the specification may be rounded to five or even fifteen 
minutes.  These were then put onto a ‘graph’, that is to say they overlaid the schedules 
on a graphical representation of the railway network to assess whether they were 
mutually compatible.  The timetable was complete once all the train schedules had been 
put on the graph and the graph had been made ‘conflict free’, that is to say that no train 
would be delayed by any other if there were no external perturbations - e.g. points 
failures or locomotive breakdowns.   
 
A key principle in the un-restructured railway was that of ‘first on the graph’.  Long 
distance passenger ‘Inter City’ trains were treated as top priority, local services had to fit 
around them, and freight trains fitted into whatever space was left.  This principle 
simplified the planning task, as it substantially reduced the number of permutations that 
had to be considered.  Despite this, considerable complexity still existed.   The timetable 
planning responsibility for British Rail was split across a number of geographic offices, 
with substantial interface issues for the planning of services that passed through a 
number of these. 
 
Once all the services were ‘on the graph’ then they had to be allocated to rolling stock 
‘diagrams’.  A diagram would be made up of a listing of the services that a notional item 
of rolling stock undertakes during a day.  It would be constructed by ‘associating’ 
(linking) the end of one service with the start of another to form a continuous string.  
Various rules regarding associations had to be applied, e.g. the end of one service must 
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be in the same location as the start of the next, unless an ‘empty stock’ service is added, 
and the start of the next service must be at least a certain number of minutes later than 
the end of the previous service. 
 
Once all the services had been allocated to diagrams, it was then possible to overlay this 
with a train crew plan (known in the UK as ‘train crew diagrams’).  All the rolling stock 
diagrams had to have matching train crew diagrams, taking into account how many crew 
are required, the various rules regarding train crew working hours and route knowledge 
and various ancillary tasks that had to be performed (such as signing on and off, 
handing in cash, training).  This part of the train crew plan development was complete 
when all rolling stock diagrams had been covered by the appropriate train crew 
diagrams.  The second part of the train crew planning task was to produce train crew 
rosters.  This involved putting the diagrams together in sequence to produce ‘links’ such 
that, when a named member of staff is allocated to that link, it provides a series of 
diagrams that make up a working week (or number of weeks) that matches with the 
various rules on working hours.  When put together, the overall roster must be made up 
of links that cover all of the work to be undertaken. 
 
This process produced workable timetables and resource plans.  However, it is 
worthwhile noting that internal British Rail documents of the time (including a survey of 
internal users and customers) indicated a number of dissatisfactions (Willis, 1992).  
Those responsible for services that were not ‘first on the graph’ felt, with some 
justification, that their business was being adversely affected.  This was particularly the 
case for the freight profit centres, which often had little opportunity to run daytime trains.  
The linear nature of the process, whilst ensuring delivery of timetables, took little account 
of the efficiencies that could be achieved by looking at resource utilisation as part of the 
timetabling equation.  Robustness of the timetables produced was mostly a matter for 
the professionalism of the train planners and, without technical support, this occasionally 
led to major problems when untested new timetables were put into operation.  Where 
minor operators crossed a number of train planning boundaries, their services tended to 
take a low priority - the Cross Country profit centre, running trains from Scotland and the 
North of England to the South Coast and South West of England, felt particularly 
aggrieved by this.  Finally, the process was felt to be unduly costly, with 1000 members 
of staff involved full time in tactical train planning. 
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4.4 Privatisation 1993-1999 
 
In 1993 it became apparent to senior management within British Rail that privatisation 
was actually going to happen and preparations started to be made.  A committee known 
as the ‘Timetable Planning Strategic Development Group’ had been in existence for 
some time, with responsibility for improving the quality and effectiveness of train 
planning.  It was made up of staff responsible for train planning and those who could be 
regarded as the ‘customers’ of the train planners - those tasked with producing the 
business specifications and accepting the output of the process. 
 
The work already undertaken to understand the weaknesses of the existing process was 
put together with an assessment of the best view available at the time, of the needs of 
the privatised railway to produce a synopsis of the key issues to be addressed.  It was 
accepted that the known problem of the train planning process being inflexible and time 
consuming would become even more critical with privatisation, as new operators sought 
to compete and innovate.   
 
Much has been written about the then government’s objectives for privatisation of the 
railways, cf. Harris and Godward (1997); Shaw et al. (1998); Kain (1998); Welsby and 
Nichols (1999).  This literature supports the view taken within British Rail that the 
Conservative government regarded competition as the most effective way of achieving 
improvements in services.   Indeed the Regulator’s objectives were explicitly framed to 
focus his attention on achieving competition between rail services.  It was therefore a 
‘given’ for the new train planning process that it should accommodate competition 
effectively.  This was taken to imply that, in addition to permitting competition, the 
process should be fair and it should be confidential.  There could no longer be train 
operators who had rights to be ‘first on the graph’; neither could there be expected to be 
discussion between operators in advance of their ‘bidding’ for access to the network.  
Indeed it was suggested that such discussions would amount to collusion and 
contravene competition law.   
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Figure 11: Privatised Industry Structure (Source: Harris and Godward, 1997) 
 
Figure 11 gives an outline of the industry structure after privatisation.  Central to this new 
structure were a new regulator, the Rail Regulator, and access agreements between 
train operators and the infrastructure manager, Railtrack.  The Rail Regulator was to be 
responsible for determining the fair and efficient allocation of the capacity of ‘railway 
facilities’ (track, stations and maintenance depots), which he would do through approving 
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or ‘determining’ access agreements where he felt it appropriate to change the proposed 
agreement.  The access agreements would set out how much capacity the train operator 
was permitted to use, the conditions which he must observe, the obligations of Railtrack, 
how much was to be paid for the access, and what was to happen if things went wrong.  
It was expected that, for the most part, a train operator would agree the terms of the 
access agreement with Railtrack.  Once agreed, the agreement would be sent to the 
Regulator for his approval, which he could give with or without modifications - or he 
could reject it, if he felt that the access agreement was unfair in some way (e.g. to 
another operator) or made inappropriate use of capacity.  If an agreement could not be 
reached between the Train Operator and Railtrack, the operator could ask the Regulator 
to force Railtrack to enter into an access agreement.   
 
The Regulator is required by the Railways Act 1993 (as subsequently amended by the 
Transport Act 2000) to have regard to “considerations beyond the commercial wishes or 
interests of the facility owner [Railtrack] and the prospective user, and to consider 
whether the proposed access contract is in the overall public interest….. In doing so, he 
consults other users and prospective users of the railway facility in question, the 
Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and other funders, and other interested parties” 
(Shaw,1998).  
 
Access agreements were only to set out an ‘envelope’ of times within which train 
operators could bid for paths and Railtrack had to offer them, with new timetabling 
processes needed to facilitate this ‘bid and offer’ process.  
4.5 Devising a new Train Planning Process 
 
It was anticipated that the private sector would demand great flexibility, with frequent 
service changes to match perceived demand and to deal with competitive threats and 
with the government, through the Office of Rail Passenger Franchising, interfering as 
little as possible, setting only minimum service levels through ‘Passenger Service 
Requirements’.  Major timetable changes had previously been restricted to once per 
year (the start of the Summer timetable in late May/early June) or, if really essential, e.g. 
if new rolling stock deliveries required it, twice per year, with less substantial changes at 
the start of the Winter timetable in September.  It was considered that this would be 
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wholly inadequate for the private sector and that something more akin to the bus 
industry norm would be required, with a gestation period measured in weeks rather than 
something around a year and an opportunity to amend the timetable every few weeks. 
 
Finally it was anticipated that the new processes would have to be documented as 
contractual terms, as the new structure of separate legal entities would require a process 
that was clear, precise and enforceable. 
 
It was against this background, one of acceptance of the need for substantial process 
change and improvement, that the group developed a revised process. 
 
A series of workshops explored the objectives that the revised process had to meet and 
‘minimum change’ options were explored.  The most straightforward approach was to 
continue with the existing ‘twice a year’ timetable, with the train operators responsible for 
business specification and resource planning and Railtrack responsible for the other 
functions.   
 
This had the attraction of simplicity but had a number of disadvantages when judged 
against the high level objectives set to the working group, including: 
 
1. No additional flexibility to make changes to the timetable; 
2. No positive impact on staff costs; 
3. No positive effect on quality of timetables produced; 
4. Difficult for Railtrack to produce a timetable that was resource-efficient as well 
as network-efficient; 
5. Difficult for the train operators to judge whether Railtrack had produced the 
best plan possible as the train operator’s requirements would only be input to 
Railtrack in general terms, leading to substantial potential for dispute. 
 
In addition the Railtrack representatives saw that this approach would move a 
substantial number of train planners into an organisation (Railtrack) that was intended to 
be ‘lean’ (Foster and Castles, 2004).  A much more radical proposal was therefore put 
forward which was intended to much more closely meet with the high level objectives 
and, at the same time, reduce the resources Railtrack would need to undertake its part 
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of the process. 
 
The crux of the new proposal was that the timetabling element of the train planning 
process would be split between train operators and Railtrack.  Figure 12 (see following 
page) highlights where boundaries between organisations were to be introduced.  Each 
train operator would be required to produce an internally consistent detailed timetable for 
its services, where internally consistent meant that, if it existed on its own, it could be 
operated successfully without amendment; detailed meaning that all the necessary en-
route timings would be provided.  These would be transmitted electronically as ‘bids’ to 
Railtrack who would ‘stack them up’ and deal with any conflicts (i.e. trains from different 
train operators who were planning to be on the same track at the same time) by ‘flexing’ 
those trains to run a few minutes earlier or later to achieve a ‘conflict free’ timetable.  
Revised times where necessary would then be ‘offered’ back to the train operators.  This 
bid and offer process would be repeated a further 4 times, with the timetable gradually 
being refined over this period, as train operators ‘accepted’ the offers made or rejected 
the offer and re-bid.  There would be 6 timetables per year, with each of the timetables 
having 5 ‘iterations’ of bids and offers.  The identity of bidders would be kept secret until 
the timetable was published.  To achieve an overall process length no longer than 
previously, the bid and offer periods would be restricted to 4 weeks each, whereas 
previously there had been approximately 16 weeks to stitch together the business 
specifications alone.   
 
This proposal had a good fit with most of the high level objectives but implied a much 
greater workload in train planning offices to deal with multiple iterations running in 
parallel rather than a single iteration in series and required data transfer where 
previously none had existed.  Substantial new software would be required in a short 
timescale to make this proposal workable. 
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Figure 12: Train Planning Process Introduced at Privatisation (Source: Author) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reservations were expressed by the train planning professionals involved at the time 
regarding the feasibility of delivering suitable software but concerns were buried in the 
need to meet the requirements of the Department of Transport for solutions that met with 
the objectives.  A cross-industry conference endorsed what became known as the 
‘Peterborough Process’ (because that is where it was conceived) in the Autumn of 1993, 
subject to rapid implementation of improved software to reduce processing time and to 
facilitate data transfer (Timetable Planning Strategic Development Group, 1993). 
 
A comparison of the timescales and stages for the new and old processes is set out in 
the Figure 13.  It can be seen that the old process has considerably less parallel 
processes and fewer timetables to deliver. 
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Figure 13: Comparison of processes before privatisation with that initially proposed 
(Source: Author) 
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It will be seen immediately that the revised process was considerably more demanding 
than the old process.  This was understood by the group that developed the proposals.  
They concluded that ‘extensive information systems support’ would be required, but that, 
given an immediate start, this would be deliverable in the time available.  Funding was 
sanctioned and so, by late 1993, the systems division of British Rail had set about 
developing a package to enable data transfer between the train operators and Railtrack.   
In parallel, the lawyers started to put together a set of legally binding rules to enforce the 
process.  These subsequently became part of the ‘Railtrack Track Access Conditions’ 
(Railtrack, 1995), a document tied in to the Track Access Agreements between Railtrack 
and the Train Operators which deals with a number of multi-party rather than bi-party 
arrangements.  ‘Decision Criteria’ were set out to provide Railtrack with guidelines on 
how to be impartial between bidders and an appeals process was put in place to enable 
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‘case law’ to be created. 
 
Looking back at the issues raised earlier in the chapter, it can be seen that some but not 
all had been addressed.  In particular, the complexity of the new process meant that 
there was not expected to be any improvement in the overall length of the process, 
although bids could be made in one of the later ‘iterations’ if desired.  In addition there 
were considerable concerns that the new process would require more people rather than 
less to operate it.  Overall, however, it appeared that a smooth transition to the new 
process would be achieved when restructuring took place on 1st April 1994. 
4.6 Assessment of the new Process 
4.6.1 What to judge against? 
 
Two assessments are made: 
 
1. Firstly, a consideration of the fit of the process with the high level objectives 
set by government and described above; 
2. Secondly, a review of what happened when the industry attempted to work to 
the processes. 
 
Note that a fuller discussion of the objectives for train planning is provided in the 
following chapter. 
4.6.2 The new process compared with high level objectives 
 
Competition 
 
The new process was required to be fair.  This was achieved, on the face of it: The 
process required Railtrack to treat all bidders equally, subject to certain rational 
constraints, such as the bidder having or being in the process of negotiating a track 
access agreement.  
 
The new process was required to be confidential.  This was achieved only up to a point.  
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To enable train operators to bid where space was available on the network, during the 
later iterations it was deemed necessary to advise all train operators of offers that had 
been made.  This could be done without divulging the name of the operator but, in 
practice, it would usually be self-evident who the bidder was.  In any event, the 
Regulator’s processes for the approval of access rights required comments from 
interested parties, so competitors had to show their hand early anyway.  
 
Innovation 
 
The process was required to enable operators to make frequent service changes.  Even 
before the new processes had been tried in practice, this had been substantially watered 
down.  In reality there were still to be only two opportunities to make changes each year.   
 
Cost reduction 
 
The process was to deliver more efficient solutions, i.e. producing more resource-
efficient solutions so that less rolling stock and staff were required for a given output, 
and require less train planning staff.  At the time it was envisaged that the software 
improvements underway would produce benefits in both of these areas.  In retrospect 
this was clearly never going to be the case.  The software enhancements that were put 
into development merely supported the transfer of data in the bid and offer process.  No 
additional help was being provided in the traditional train planning tasks and the multiple 
parallel iterations suggested substantial additional work in checking offers and preparing 
re-bids.  
 
Improvements to quality of service 
 
Better quality timetables were to result.  As for cost reductions, nothing in the revised 
process could reasonably be expected to bring about better punctuality or faster journey 
times.  
 
Retention of ‘network benefits’ 
 
Retention of effective connections between services from different operators was a 
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necessary condition of the new process.  The new process militated against achieving 
this objective, as bids for erstwhile connecting services would come to Railtrack in 
different iterations and there was, hence, no chance to co-ordinate them.  A ‘network 
benefits’ objective (that is the ability to use a number of different train operators’ services 
to efficiently complete a journey) conflicts with the competition objective, of course.  At 
the time the process was being put together, the facilitation of competition was 
dominant. 
 
Split of infrastructure management from train operations 
 
The process facilitated this, and it was thought that it met Railtrack’s objective of 
minimising staff numbers. 
4.6.3 Problems in practice 
 
By late summer of 1994, it was clear that the software development was not going to be 
ready in time for development of the timetables in 1995.  Hence, dispensation was 
sought from the Railway Regulator, who had the responsibility for overseeing the new 
railway industry and with express powers set out in the Access Conditions to reduce the 
number of bids in the first few years, if considered necessary, to enable the new 
processes to bed in, to have only two timetables in 1995 and to have only two bids for 
the summer timetable and one bid for the winter timetable. 
 
The first timetable to be prepared using the ‘bid and offer’ process, but without any 
additional software support, was thus that for Summer 1995, with preparation starting 
soon after the formal split of the industry in 1994.  Problems were evident: bid quality 
was considered by Railtrack to be inadequate from some Train Operators, with 
suggestions that either they lacked the necessary staff to undertake the work or because 
they misunderstood what was required.  However, the restructuring process had used up 
so much management time that there were relatively few service changes in the 
Summer 1995 timetable and so the process, whilst creaking, delivered a public timetable 
that was not noticeably worse than previously.  Much overtime was worked and 
comments from practitioners indicate that corners were cut, 
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The Winter 1995 timetable was a different matter.  Winter timetables in the UK 
traditionally contain rather more data than Summer timetables.  They cover a longer 
period (eight months against four) and the bulk of the engineering work–related weekend 
alterations are contained within the Winter period.  Focusing on customer information 
priorities, some train operators and Railtrack train planners sought to include the vast 
majority of changes in the bid and offer process, rather than dealing with them later as 
had been more generally the practice.   
 
Poor quality bids were delivered late by these train operators due to lack of time to 
prepare them; Railtrack in turn had insufficient time or resource to return adequate 
offers.  Preparation of the public timetable documentation was therefore only partially 
complete when it had to go to press and the scale of the inaccuracies was known to only 
a few junior staff.  Lack of management information meant that, by the time Railtrack HQ 
knew about the scale of the problems, a damage limitation exercise was all that could be 
hoped for - the passenger timetable was already on sale and the only way forward was 
to produce an extensive supplement to provide corrections.  For two weeks the national 
press were full of articles highlighting the difficulties (e.g. ‘Timetable of errors’ - Daily 
Telegraph Editorial, 1995, ‘timetable disaster’ Wolmar, 1996). 
 
Analysis of the cause of the problems 
 
On the basis of comparison of the new and old processes undertaken by the author, 
evidence provided by the new railway companies to the Railway Regulator as part of his 
review of train planning processes (Office of the Rail Regulator, 1997 and 1998) and 
discussions with key staff involved at the time, there were deficiencies in a number of 
areas.  These are now considered. 
 
Firstly the range of issues to be addressed by the introduction of the new process was 
over-ambitious and also contradictory in several ways.  It was assumed that a step 
change could be made in the effectiveness of the process.   In retrospect this appears 
over-ambitious when it is considered that, despite a considerable amount of 
management attention, only modest change had been achieved over many years.  In 
addition, there was insufficient management time available at this time due to the scale 
of the overall restructuring task. 
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In terms of being contradictory, the issue of the trade off between staffing levels and 
output has already been alluded to.  It was decided that no additional staff would be 
employed as a result of restructuring and, indeed, in some areas staff were allowed to 
retire early.  This was despite the extra workload implied by the new processes.  A 
further problem that caused strain was that, whilst the process had been set up to 
facilitate competition, the government required (if rather as an afterthought)  that 
‘network benefits’ should be protected.  On the one hand the process had to be 
confidential so that competitive advantage could be maintained and, on the other, 
sharing proposals was necessary to ensure that travellers that needed to use the 
services of several train operators would get good quality journeys.  Inevitably this led to 
confusion, irritation and differing practices. 
 
More fundamentally, it can be argued that the split of responsibilities between the 
infrastructure operator (Railtrack at this time) and the Train Operators worked against 
the development of efficient integrated resource plans.  The total train planning ‘problem’ 
was no longer any one organisation’s responsibility and, hence, inevitably, Railtrack 
concentrated on efficient network utilisation and train operators on efficient resource 
utilisation. 
 
The outcome of these inconsistencies was uncertainty and substantial differences within 
Railtrack and the Train Operators about what to do with substantial arguments about 
priorities. 
 
How did this come to happen?  Firstly, there have been many who suggested that the 
government’s thinking was muddled and inconsistencies abounded (c.f. Welsby, 1999).  
It was hence inevitable that some of these inconsistencies would appear in process 
change.  The urgency to implement the restructuring forced on British Rail did not give 
time to contemplate and debate what were often seen as minor irritations that would 
have to be lived with to meet the government’s implementation targets. 
 
Secondly, there were substantial problems with software development.  The second half 
of this thesis concentrates in detail on software for train planning.  The intention here is 
to deal with software issues only so far as they impacted on the ability of the processes 
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to deliver.  Train planning software, in common with most scheduling software, is 
complex.  The detail associated with mapping the infrastructure and then overlaying the 
characteristics and constraints of the rolling stock and personnel that run the services 
over that network cannot be over emphasised.  As Wren (1995) points out (in this case 
in the parallel, but simpler context of bus scheduling): ’the constraints on schedule 
construction vary greatly….as do the “shapes” of the underlying bus schedules’.  
 
Prior to privatisation, bespoke software developed in-house by B.R.’s computing division 
was widely used to support train planning.  This software was used predominantly to 
document solutions since timetables were often drawn by hand onto graph paper in the 
first instance.   Little of the development work on automated scheduling undertaken at 
universities had found its way into production use although Wren had been involved in 
some initial work on driver scheduling.  This software had evolved slowly over a number 
of years, gradually providing more support to the users. 
 
What was now required, however, was a step change in the functionality provided.  Most 
critically, the software now had to be capable of supporting the ‘bid and offer’ process by 
passing detailed train schedule information backwards and forwards between the train 
operators and Railtrack.  This requirement was understood and the work put in hand in 
late 1993 to develop the necessary software. The other ‘new’ task that the bid and offer 
process demanded was the assessment of changes made by the other party.  
Railtrack’s planners needed to know, down to the smallest detail, if a train operator had 
amended its bids.  Similarly, the train operators needed to know what changes Railtrack 
or other train operators had made.  This requirement became known as ‘version 
comparison’, which was added to the specification in late 1994.  After various problems 
along the way, some of which reached the specialist computing press and national 
papers (Harper, 1995, Moore, 1995, Collins, 1996), this functionality finally came into 
partial use only in 1996. 
 
This functionality eliminated much of the additional work caused by the split of 
responsibilities between Railtrack and the train operators, but did nothing to reduce or 
automate the workload to allow for the fact that the new process also required the ability 
to ’turn round’ bids and offers in four weeks rather than as previously.  
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In summary, the software development programme was under-specified to meet the 
needs of the new processes and yet, even as specified, it was over-ambitious given the 
time available.  The reasons for the size of the gap between expectation and delivery are 
not clear.  A combination of poor specification due to a lack of formal process analysis 
(see below) and an unjustified belief in the ability of software developers to produce 
software rapidly without a good understanding of the process to be supported appear to 
be key contributory factors. 
 
Thirdly, there had been a lack of formal ‘process analysis’ (the documentation and 
assessment of a process in terms of its inputs, outputs and flows, physical and 
information).  This would almost certainly have revealed that the software was 
substantially under-specified to meet the needs of the revised process and would have 
raised serious questions about the operability of the process. 
 
Process analysis could and should have been undertaken prior to signing off of the new 
process.  So why was there so little analysis?  Urgency to meet preordained dates in the 
privatisation process appears to be one reason; a belief in the practicability of rapidly 
delivering new software to support the new process was another; a third was a belief 
that train planners were/are as a breed pessimists and that their views, negative as they 
were to the new process, should therefore be discounted. 
 
Finally, the lack of process analysis led inevitably to a lack of procedures, documentation 
and training - at the time when the substantial changes and the formality of the new 
industry structure required this. 
 
Put these four factors together and disaster, in retrospect, was almost inevitable. 
4.7 Conclusions 1993-1999 
 
The train planning process evolved slowly up until 1994, at which point substantial 
changes were made in an attempt to accommodate the policy objectives and revised 
structure imposed on the UK railway industry by the then Conservative government.  
The author has so far described the process that was in use prior to restructuring, looked 
at the changes made and then considered why the new process did not work effectively.  
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It is now time to consider the ‘lessons learned’. 
 
A lack of clarity in the government’s policy objectives created substantial difficulties in 
the development of new processes. For instance, was the introduction of competition 
paramount? To what extent was integration of services to provide the best overall 
package to customers to be encouraged?  Clear, compatible policy objectives would 
have provided a much better basis for the development of a new process. 
 
As Adamson et al note (1991), “co-ordination [is] inherent in the timetabling process, 
which in practical terms is impossible to replicate through market mechanisms”.  Whilst 
one might object in principle to such an absolute rejection of market forces in this area, 
practical experience in working a competition orientated process suggests that train 
planning is not easily adapted to work within a competitive environment.  Policy 
decisions need to be worked up on the basis of what is practically possible.   
 
Timescales for railway privatisation in the UK appear to have been driven in part by the 
then Conservative government’s desire to have the process completed before the next 
General Election.  Industry sources and politicians of the time (e.g. Roger Freeman, 
Channel 4 interview, 2001) indicate that this ‘time-boxed’ the implementation process to 
such an extent that there was little time for process analysis, with many key processes 
only developed at a very high level at the point that Railtrack was split from British Rail.  
Not giving enough time to develop processes in detail before decisions on future 
responsibilities are agreed leaves the risk that it will not in practice be possible to 
produce workable detailed processes and procedures that match the sketched out high 
level proposals.  Adequate time needs to be available to enable proposed new 
processes to be assessed and tested properly. 
 
Software development is very often an essential precursor to implementing change. It is, 
in retrospect, not surprising that a realistic assessment was not made of the size of the 
development task to produce software to support complex under-specified new 
processes.  If essential supporting software cannot be made available with certainty by 
the required date, then implementation must be delayed.   
 
Some problems with the process emerged later.  The ‘Passenger Service Requirements’ 
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that formed the minimum service specification that passenger train operators must 
deliver, whilst providing some protection against service reductions, to some extent 
‘ossified’ the timetable.  Whilst this perhaps kept the train planning task to more 
manageable proportions, questions were subsequently to be asked as to whether the 
optimum timetable resulted.  The continued use of British Rail’s internal revenue 
allocation system (ORCATS, ‘Operational Research Computerised Allocation of Tickets 
to Services’) to divide revenue between the passenger train operators also appeared to 
be interfering with the train planning process - with trains being planned to ‘raid’ revenue 
from ORCATS rather than to best meet customer needs.  
 
Passenger and freight traffic volumes have grown since privatisation, despite the issues 
discussed.  However, it was clear that there was a very real need for further changes to 
be made to train planning processes and systems to enable resources, especially track 
capacity, to be used as effectively as possible, otherwise objectives for further growth 
and performance improvement would not be met. 
4.8 Further Problems and Process Changes 1999-2003   
4.8.1 Process changes 
 
Railtrack proposed and implemented, with industry agreement, a series of changes to 
the timetabling processes in an attempt to remedy the problems described in the last 
section, reducing the number of timetable changes back to pre-privatisation levels and 
introducing a ‘timetable conference’ each year, modelled on continental European 
practice for international trains.  At this timetable conference the timetable plans of the 
various train operators for the following year are shared, conflicting demands for 
capacity discussed and preliminary solutions found, for subsequent working up in detail.  
The major benefit of the conference approach in Britain has been that competition and 
confidentiality in timetabling have been substantially replaced by collaboration.   
 
Despite these changes, problems continued to arise.  A number of specific cases are 
now described and then the issues raised are discussed. 
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4.8.2 Case Study A: Overselling available capacity – Cross Country 
service improvements 
 
Some of the franchises required the franchisee to do little more than efficiently manage 
current operations, whilst others required major investment (Harris, 1999).  British Rail 
had operated a number of ‘cross country’ services focused on Birmingham and offering 
an hourly service pattern to the South West, South Coast, North West and North East. 
These were offered as a new "Cross County" franchise, and Virgin's bid promising to 
double the service frequency with a new fleet of trains was a clear winner. 
 
The procurement and supply of the new trains went relatively smoothly, despite the 
introduction of technically advanced new diesel electrical multiple units, some of which 
had ‘tilting’ technology to allow higher speeds round curves, but obtaining the necessary 
paths for the extra services did not.  Railtrack had the task of providing paths for these 
extra services across the network whilst working within the access agreements of other 
operators and with the constant risk of being accused of being unfair to these operators.  
The challenge was to produce a new timetable with two trains per hour on the ‘core’ 
sections of route from Birmingham to York, Crewe, Reading and Bristol and with an 
hourly service extending beyond these points.  Overall, Cross Country’s services passed 
across the territory of 18 of the 25 franchised passenger operators.  After nearly ninety 
timetable iterations over two years of planning, Railtrack produced a timetable which met 
the rules of the plan and had the reluctant agreement of other train operators (who 
remained concerned about the implications for their revenue and for the performance of 
the network).  The new service was introduced in Autumn 2002 and within a few weeks it 
was clear that it would not work.  Punctuality plummeted.   
 
What went wrong?  Discussions with industry insiders indicate that Railtrack had set out 
to please everyone – partly because of constraints placed on it by the access 
agreements it was committed to and partly because it lacked the level of analysis 
necessary to convince train operators (or the Regulator) that it could not achieve all that 
it was being asked to do. 
 
The net effect was too many trains on certain sections of the network, particularly major 
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'pinch points' at stations and junctions, leading to knock on delays that persisted through 
the day. In addition, turn round times for many services were insufficient to allow for late 
running, compounding delay or leading to station stops being missed out to make up 
time.  To make matters worse, junction upgrades considered necessary for the new 
service were delayed, and, whilst it was assumed the new trains' power and speed 
would enable them to recover from delays and regain timetable slots, this rarely 
happened in practice.  A Virgin Trains spokesman confirmed the problems, saying ‘the 
timetable worked in theory, but if a couple of trains were late, then it had an impact’ 
(Knight, 2003). 
4.8.3 Case Study B: Overselling capacity – West Coast Main Line 
 
Virgin Trains provided a compelling bid for the West Coast franchise too, promising 
better services through a major upgrade of both infrastructure and trains.  A profit 
sharing deal with Railtrack was signed whereby the infrastructure would be upgraded to 
permit 140mph tilting trains to run services from London to Birmingham, Liverpool, 
Manchester and Glasgow. 
 
Railtrack underestimated the cost of the infrastructure works but also, after persuading 
the Regulator to approve its access agreement with Virgin Trains, found that the 
combined access rights of all operators on the route could not be met even after the 
upgrade.  It was a widely held view amongst industry insiders that Railtrack simply could 
not meet its commitments on the West Coast route and indeed Railtrack had been 
unable to meet the terms of an enforcement notice placed on it by the Regulator (Office 
of the Rail Regulator, 1999).  Railtrack was potentially in breach of contract with a 
number of train operators and, had the government not intervened in 2001 by putting 
Railtrack into receivership, this could potentially have bankrupted the company. 
 
One example of the problems with Railtrack's contract with Virgin Trains was the 
planned separation of services on the West Coast Main Line between London and 
Rugby, where the fast lines were to be used exclusively by Virgin Train's 140 mph tilting 
trains, with up to 14 trains an hour. Other passenger and freight services also use these 
tracks, and analysis ,undertaken after the contract had been signed, demonstrated that 
there was not sufficient capacity on the slow lines for all other services to be taken off 
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the fast lines.  In addition, local train franchisee Silverlink, running between London and 
Northampton, had access rights over the fast lines, to which a number of solutions were 
suggested, including 140mph express trains from London to Northampton.  A further 
problem, only understood after the contract had been signed, was that station stops 
were required for the Virgin trains at Watford Junction and Milton Keynes Central, both 
major traffic generators.  On other high speed railways worked to this intensity, such as 
the French Lignes à Grande Vitesse and the Japanese Shinkansen, the author has seen 
through visits to these railways (several visits to French railways, a study tour to Japan 
in 2002) that trains stop in platform loops so they can be overtaken by the following non-
stop train.  See also O’Brien (2001) for a review of Japanese high speed line planning 
and operation.  Such infrastructure was not part of the West Coast plan. 
 
Many of these problems were the result of timetabling work undertaken by Railtrack 
being inadequate.   
4.8.4 Case Study C: Open Access 
 
Anglia Railways sought 'open access' access rights (that is access rights outside its 
franchise commitments) to operate a new service from East Anglia round north London 
and through to Basingstoke and Southampton.  South West Trains, seeing the revenue 
risk from this service, managed to agree paths with Railtrack that prevented most of the 
paths that Anglia Railways wanted from being deliverable.  Anglia Railways therefore did 
not get the access rights and hence the paths it required to operate a coherent service.   
 
The outcome does not appear to have been the best possible for either operator or for 
the passenger: Anglia Railways did not get a sufficiently frequent service to provide good 
journey opportunities and attract passengers and withdrew the service; South West 
Trains has until recently (December 2005) been running an additional service each hour 
which was not needed to meet demand and which impacted adversely on the 
performance of the network overall. 
4.8.5 Case Study D: ORCATS Raiding 
 
Most tickets can be used on any operator on a route and, since it would be prohibitively 
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expensive to do more than a small sample count of which passengers use which trains, 
some allocation mechanism is required.  ORCATS was developed by British Rail to help 
understand passenger decisions and therefore offer the best overall service.  It was the 
only available system to allocate revenue between operators and has been used since 
privatisation to allocate revenue between train operators running along the same route. 
Since ORCATS was not designed to ensure rational competition decisions would be 
made by train operators, an important perverse incentive exists resulting in what is 
known by railway insiders as the ‘ORCATS raid’.   
 
By understanding how the ORCATS algorithms work, it is possible for train operators to 
adjust their timetables so as to get the maximum revenue allocation, without necessarily 
offering any extra passenger benefits.  See Doe (2003) for a brief example of the 
problem. 
 
From a network capacity point of view, these extra trains mean extra congestion and 
hence extra delays and industry insiders say that there were often insufficient passenger 
benefits from the extra services, as many were designed to increase revenue allocation 
rather than provide better journey opportunities. 
 
Again, better processes within Railtrack should have enabled arguments to be made to 
prevent perverse actions being permitted. 
4.8.6 Analysis 
 
Analysis of the case studies set out above suggests that there were a number of 
weaknesses within the access regime as formulated at privatisation and the timetable 
process as implemented.  In particular, mechanisms to ensure that the best overall 
capacity usage was achieved were not in place, with train operators encouraged by the 
low marginal cost written into the access agreements to run extra trains even where 
there was insufficient overall benefit (case studies C and D), and with no mechanism in 
place to take off services that had a smaller benefit than the new service proposed (case 
studies A and B) to ensure performance remained at acceptable levels.  However, this 
must be seen in the context of a network that was not considered to be congested  and 
where industry players for the most part did not fully understand the extent of the 
 81
performance reduction that would result from the additional trains they proposed to run. 
 
In retrospect, train operators should have used the appeals mechanism permitted by the 
Access Conditions and, if necessary, the right to appeal to the Rail Regulator, rather 
than acquiescing to Railtrack’s proposals.   
 
On the positive side, it should be noted that the access regime allowed a significant 
number of extra services to run that were worthwhile and these additional services have 
contributed, along with fare rises that were below inflation levels initially and the buoyant 
performance of the UK economy, to passenger numbers and freight volumes growing 
substantially since privatisation. 
4.8.7 Remedying the deficiencies 
4.8.7.1 Network Rail replaces Railtrack 
 
It is a widely held view that Railtrack was a dysfunctional organisation (c.f. Wolmar 2005) 
with inappropriate processes and poor leadership, not only in the area of train planning.  
The more general problems came to a head following the derailment near Hatfield on 17 
October 2000 in which 4 people were killed.  It was not the accident itself which caused 
the demise of Railtrack, rather the way in which the senior management had a corporate 
‘mental breakdown’ in the following hours, imposing draconian speed limits across the 
network because they felt that they could not be certain that a similar accident was about 
to happen somewhere else on the network.  Railtrack had few engineers on its staff, with 
the process it had devised at its inception being to rely on its contractors to identify work 
required.  There was of course a direct incentive for Railtrack to minimise renewals as 
this reduced payments to the contractors and an important indirect one too as when 
‘possessions’ of the track were granted to contractors to carry out work Railtrack would 
have to make payments to the train operators to compensate them for the loss of 
revenue as their trains had been cancelled or diverted.  Whilst this provided an 
appropriate commercial incentive on Railtrack not to take unnecessary possessions, if, 
as proved to be the case, Railtrack did not have appropriate expertise to judge when 
work was essential then it could postpone work which was safety-critical: the renewal of 
the faulty rail at Hatfield was postponed by several months to avoid higher compensation 
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payments to the train operators.   
 
The implication for Railtrack of imposing speed limits across the network was massive 
compensation payments to the train operators.  It later compounded this outflow of cash 
by throwing money at the contractors to improve the condition of the track.  Railtrack 
went ‘cap in hand’ to government on several occasions asking for grants to cover this 
extra expenditure.  Railtrack appeared to government and others to be ‘out of control’ 
and, on 7th October 2001, the government decided to use a mechanism set up as a ‘last 
resort’ in the Railways Act 1993 (and intended for use with train operators in difficulty 
rather than Railtrack) – Railway Administration.  In a speech to the House of Commons 
the following week, Stephen Byers, Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government 
and the Regions, set out how the government intended to replace Railtrack (Hansard, 
2001): 
 
“We shall be proposing to the Administrator that a private company limited by guarantee 
be established to take over Railtrack's responsibilities. Any operating surplus it makes 
would be re-invested in the railway network itself.  Such a company would have the 
needs of the travelling public and other users as its priority. With no shareholders we 
would remove the conflict between the need to increase shareholder value with the 
interests of rail passengers. The company we propose would have responsibility for 
operations, maintenance and renewals. It would have a small professional Board of 
executive and non-executive directors. Performance targets would be set linked to levels 
of service, safety and value for money. A Board working on commercial lines but 
focused solely on delivering a safe well-maintained rail network that is fit for the 21st 
century.” 
 
Network Rail took over Railtrack in 2002 and immediately started to get the organisation 
and its activities back ‘under control’.  How it did this and the extent to which it 
succeeded will no doubt in time be recorded by other researchers.  Turning to train 
planning, the first formal position statement by Network Rail appeared in its March 2003 
Business Plan, in which Network Rail accepted that there were problems – as it 
describes them, ‘historical shortcomings’: 
 
1. “inadequate understanding of future traffic patterns, whether arising from 
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existing commitments or changing customer requirements; 
2. gaps in our modelling and strategic access planning systems capability; 
3. outdated rules and standards used in timetable construction; 
4. late availability of engineering access requirements and short notice 
change requests; 
5. a labour intensive and inefficient timetabling process; 
6. failure to meet the required timescales for notification of timetable 
changes (Informed Traveller); and 
7. validation of train paths only partially completed prior to operation.” 
 
In the Business Plan it also set out what it intended to do: 
 
“Over the next two years we have identified priority actions to deliver our goals: 
1. working closely with the SRA (Strategic Rail Authority) to support its 
Capacity Utilisation Policy and to develop Route Utilisation Strategies 
which optimise capacity usage and clarify future requirements; (discussed 
in the text below on the SRA); 
2. completing development and implementation of a suite of Strategic 
Access Planning tools and systems to ensure the impact of changing 
capacity and traffic patterns is understood prior to timetable development; 
(see chapter 6); 
3. continuing review of the rules on which timetables are developed, in 
conjunction with the SRA; (see chapter 4); 
4. national coordination of regional Integrated Planning Units to ensure the 
improvements in engineering planning also benefit the timetabling 
process; (a restructuring to reduce the internal interfaces; in addition, 
Network Rail set up a ‘Strategic Access Planning’ unit to focus its forward 
capacity planning activities in a single team); 
5. begin a comprehensive overhaul of our timetabling systems and tools, 
which is scheduled to continue until 2007 (see chapter 6); and 
6. contribute to an industry-wide recovery plan to meet the Informed 
Traveller timescales, through improved engineering planning and cutting 
process cycle time“.  (‘Informed Traveller’ was a project to ensure that 
passenger information systems and reservations systems were up to date 
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10 to 12 weeks before the day the train ran – following Hatfield forward 
information, particularly for weekends, had deteriorated to the position 
that sometimes the changes were only notified by Railtrack/Network Rail 
to the train operators a few days before the day the trains ran). 
 
“In addition, we will implement EU Directive requirements to move to a single annual 
timetable change each December” (this was to bring all EU countries into line to 
simplify the timetabling of trains crossing national boundaries – this of course has 
very little impact on the UK). 
 
4.8.7.2 The Strategic Rail Authority 
 
The Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) came into being on 1 February 2001, following the 
passage of the Transport Act 2000, after running in ‘shadow mode’ for a period of time 
before that.  It was set up to “create a clear, coherent and strategic programme for the 
development of the railways and provide a single body accountable to the Secretary of 
State for strategic planning, co-ordinating and supervising the activities of the rail 
industry and for the disbursement of appropriate public funds” (SRA, 2003,1).   The 
formation of the SRA was seen as necessary to ensure that the overall direction that the 
railway industry took was focused on meeting government objectives, particularly its 
‘Ten Year Plan’ for transport (Department for Transport, 2000), as the government, even 
before the Hatfield accident, was aware that strategic direction was lacking. 
 
Of particular importance to this thesis is that the SRA was required to “develop a policy 
for the utilisation of network capacity” (Directions and Guidance to SRA from the 
Secretary of State, SRA, 2001).  The Directions and Guidance go on to say that “in an 
ideal world sufficient capacity would be available for all users. Much more can be done 
to optimise the capacity of the existing network and the SRA should work closely with 
Railtrack and the industry to identify measures to achieve this. Where this is not 
possible, for instance where physical locations are constrained, hard choices may have 
to be made to identify priorities where operators’ aspirations may conflict with one 
another”.  
 
From the beginning of 2002, the SRA studied how it could achieve better capacity 
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utilisation.  It published several documents which set out its position: its Capacity 
Utilisation Policy consultation (SRA, 2002), Statement of Principles (SRA, 2002,1), 
Network Utilisation Strategy (SRA, 2003, 2) and its first route-specific study, the Midland 
Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy (SRA, 2004,1).  In addition, it published its Strategic 
Plan (SRA, 2002, 2003), setting out its wider objectives and plans and its Appraisal 
Guidelines (SRA, 2003, 3), which set out how different options would be judged.  The 
SRA reviewed how much freedom it gave franchisees to set their own timetables and, to 
control their activities in this area, new franchisees were required to get the SRA’s 
approval before seeking access rights or bidding for specific paths.  This was done to 
enable the SRA to work towards more effective use of network capacity. 
 
Returning to the case studies, the SRA was able to use its power (as funder of the 
industry and specifier of the franchises) to put right some of the problems caused.  For 
the cross country services (case study A), the SRA worked with all operators to produce 
a coherent service pattern, agreeing reductions in service levels with other operators 
(e.g. Central Trains) where duplication existed and where benefits were exceeded by 
costs, particularly performance disbenefits.  For the West Coast (Case Study B), a 
Strategy was developed and published (SRA, 2004), setting out a rational set of 
infrastructure enhancements focused on cost-effectively meeting the needs of the many 
users of the route – this proposal being based on detailed timetabling analysis.  140mph 
running was ruled out, at least for the short term, as the capacity and performance 
problems that this higher speed creates have been judged to outweigh the benefits of 
shorter journey times.  The problems of case studies C and D have to some extent been 
resolved by restricting franchised operators’ freedom to bid for additional or varied paths 
– franchise agreements now require any train operator seeking to vary its access rights 
or paths to get the SRA’s permission first.  However it was not possible for the SRA, or, 
since the demise of the SRA, the Department for Transport, to control Open Access 
operators.  Although the Office of Rail Regulation does take account of effective network 
utilisation when considering requests for access from open access operators in the 
same way as it does for access requests from franchised operators, issues have re-
emerged more recently (see the discussion in the following section regarding Grand 
Central). 
 
Two further examples demonstrate how capacity utilisation was improved through the 
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SRA working with train operators.  The first related to a proposal put forward in 2002 by 
First Great Western, the train operator running franchised services from London to the 
West Country and South Wales (First Great Western, 2002).  By restructuring the 
timetable between London and Reading and changing the types of trains used, the train 
operator found that it would be possible to increase the number of peak hours seats by 
30% and, at the same time, improve performance.  The second example is the work 
undertaken to develop the Midland Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy, in which it was 
found that extra peak hour seats and extra inter-urban services could be provided 
without a material performance impact through the introduction of longer trains and 
restructuring the timetable to reduce knock-on delays. 
4.9 Conclusion 1999-2003 
 
Structural and process change during this period led to a focus on ‘capacity utilisation’ 
rather than material change to the timetable process itself.   
 
The SRA’s approach appeared to get all industry organisations focused on improving 
performance and on better matching capacity to demand and there appeared to be a 
common view that effective use of the available capacity is an essential element of a 
successful rail industry.  Richard Bowker, then Chairman of the SRA, highlighted that 
unless the rail industry could demonstrate that it is using what it has now effectively, 
there was little justification for funding of further major enhancements (SRA, 2003).   
There also appeared to be an acceptance at the time that the SRA had a key role to play 
(Modern Railways ‘Railtalk’ 1999).   
 
Discussions with Network Rail and train operator personnel suggest that the changes 
described above were successful in improving capacity utilisation and that doing this 
helped the timetable process to work more effectively, as some of the hardest to resolve 
conflicts between the aspirations of different operators have already been resolved.   
 
It was recognised that more needed to be done, particularly to understand how different 
capacity utilisation impacts on demand and on train running performance.  The SRA and 
ORR recognised this and, in a ‘concordat’ (ORR, 2002), stated that “the ORR and the 
SRA will work together to develop better measures of network capacity, and a better 
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analytical toolkit for informing decisions on the allocation of capacity between different 
types of passenger and freight flows”. 
 
In addition, as set out in Network Rail’s business plan, work started to improve the 
systems used in the timetable processes.  More is said about these in later chapters. 
4.10   2003-2007 
  
4.10.1  Demise of the SRA 
 
The most important structural change to the industry in this period was the demise of the 
SRA.  The government’s proposals were set out in its White Paper ‘The Future of Rail’ 
published in July 2004.  In his foreword to this document, Alistair Darling, the then 
Secretary of State for Transport, commented that privatisation had led to “inefficient and 
dysfunctional organisation coupled with a failure to control costs”.  In particular the 
Secretary of State had been persuaded that the SRA was not adding sufficient value to 
justify its existence and that a stronger Network Rail and more direct control by the 
Department for Transport would yield better results more quickly. 
 
The White Paper stated that the existing public-private partnership structure of the 
industry would remain and set the rail industry’s key priorities as to “control its costs and 
live within the level of public funding available to it, and to improve its performance for 
passengers and freight users”.  It gave the ORR an expanded role, taking on safety 
regulation as well as economic regulation.  It brought back into direct government control 
the task of setting the strategy for the railways including determining the level of public 
expenditure and the key outputs to be delivered.  Responsibility for franchising 
passenger services also passed to DfT.  A DfT-Network Rail “binding arrangement” was 
to be created setting out the outputs required of Network Rail, with a licence obligation 
enforced by ORR as the mechanism to ensure that these outputs were delivered.  
Network Rail was to have overall responsibility for operating the network and its 
performance including “leading industry planning, setting timetables and directing 
service recovery”.   The number of franchises would be reduced and more closely 
aligned with Network Rail’s regional structure.   It also provided for the devolved 
governments in Scotland and Wales and regional and local funders (Passenger 
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Transport Executives and Transport for London) to have an increased role in specifying 
and funding services.   
 
The direct impact on train planning was minimal, as Network Rail already had the 
responsibility for ‘setting timetables’, although there was some discussion about whether 
the ‘leadership’ role meant that Network Rail could or should be more prescriptive.  An 
indirect impact was that Network Rail took on responsibility for overall capacity utilisation 
and development of route utilisation strategies. 
 
Network Rail now has a rolling programme for the development and update of Route 
Utilisation Strategies and has expanded their coverage to include a longer timeframe 
and possible enhancement options, whereas the SRA focused much more on making 
best use of the available capacity (see Network Rail, 2007) 
 
4.10.2  Further Minor Process Change 
 
The Network Code has continued to have minor changes made to it to improve the day 
to day working of the timetabling process.  The author has had access to internal 
industry documents, c.f. O’Brien (2005), Freeman (2005), and the following key points 
have been extracted from these. 
 
Some of these are a natural extension of the work previously undertaken by the SRA to 
better understand capacity utilisation – changing the Decision Criteria to recognise the 
concept of maximum capacity allowed, ensuring that timetabling decisions made by 
Network Rail are consistent with the Route Utilisation Strategies and matching the 
timetabling processes to EU legislation (European Union, 2001) which sets out a 
process for infrastructure managers, such as Network Rail, to identify ‘Congested 
Infrastructure’ and propose how this congestion is to managed or remedied.   
 
Recognising the reality that timetable evolution is the norm rather than complete 
‘recasts’, the Network Code is being changed such that the train operators are only 
required to notify Network Rail of any changes in the rights they intend to exercise, 
rather than having to notify Network Rail of all of the services they wish to run.  
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In an attempt to ensure that changes being requested by operators (or flexing by 
Network Rail) are beneficial overall, it will in future be necessary to accompany any 
proposal for change to the timetable with a reasoned explanation. 
 
Network Rail is considering establishing mechanisms to accredit, where appropriate, 
train operators’ train planners to undertake timetable planning on Network Rail’s behalf, 
with Network Rail providing assurance of their work and ensuring that there is no 
discriminatory behaviour.  It is intended that this enables the interface between Network 
Rail and train operators to be more flexible (for instance, the train operators’ train 
planners resolving conflicts between the trains of different operators in advance of 
submitting their bids to Network Rail).  This could have the benefit of improving the 
understanding by train planners of the end to end process and lead to better decisions 
being made. 
 
4.10.3  Open Access Timetabling Issues Reappear 
 
A new open access passenger operator – Grand Central - spent several years getting 
access to the rail network and in Spring 2006 finally achieved its ambition to get 
approval to run services from Sunderland to London.  The ORR granted access rights in 
the face of considerable opposition from Network Rail, who argued that the capacity did 
not exist and Great North Eastern Railways, the then operator of the East Coast main 
line passenger franchise, who argued that it would abstract considerable amounts of 
revenue from their services.  
 
Although Network Rail undertook high level capacity analysis (Network Rail, 2005), it is 
clear that this was substantially inadequate to support their position and hence the ORR 
was not persuaded that adequate capacity did not existed (ORR, 2006).  The conclusion 
that must be reached from this outcome is that there is still a considerable amount of 
change required before timetabling processes and systems can be regarded as ‘fit for 
purpose’. 
 
4.10.4  Development of Systems to Support Train Planning 
 
Network Rail launched a major project to improve its train planning systems in 2006.  No 
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outputs are yet available for review; time will tell whether a step change is to be 
achieved.  The nature of the changes needed and the possible improvements that could 
be made are discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
4.11  Conclusions 
 
Evidence has been presented suggesting that the restructuring and subsequent 
privatisation of British Rail had an adverse effect on the output achieved from the 
timetabling and resource scheduling processes.  There are several possible factors at 
play: 
1 Management attention may have been diverted from day to day issues to the 
major reorganisation task;  
2 Key personnel may have been displaced or retired; and/or 
3 It may be that the nature of the restructuring undertaken was not conducive to 
effective train planning. 
 
Undoubtedly, the first two factors have played a part; it can be argued that these have 
had an effect across the industry - ‘when we reorganise we bleed’ as Fiennes’ said in his 
book on running the railways in the 1960s (Fiennes, 1967), quoted for instance by Peter 
Snape MP in Parliament (Hansard, 1st May 2001).   
 
This thesis is focused on processes and systems, however, and attention has therefore 
been concentrated on the effect of the third factor.  It has been shown that the new 
structure imposed on the industry in Britain by the Railways Act 1993 has hindered the 
development of effective timetables and resource plans by creating an artificial boundary 
in the middle of what needs to be a seamless process.  The hypothesis set out at the 
beginning of this chapter has been proven, within the level of certainty possible using 
qualitative research methods.   
 
It is further concluded that, whilst the changes made since the initial process introduced 
at privatisation have improved the timetables delivered, there is still much to be done 
before the process can be considered as truly ‘fit for purpose’.   
 
Overall it is evident that better planning prior to privatisation, together with more realism 
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as to what was practically possible, could have made the transition far less traumatic 
than it was.  This conclusion is of considerable importance to governments and other 
railway administrations that might be planning railway privatisation – if other railways 
start from the same position and make the same mistakes the same difficulties can be 
expected. 
 
The case specific nature of the research presented in this chapter means that attempting 
to make generalisation outside railways requires caution.  Having said this, the 
conclusion that serious problems are likely to result from poor planning and rushed 
implementations, with processes not redesigned to match with new organisational 
structures, is a conclusion that is not surprising and the general lessons are transferable 
to other sectors and other circumstances. 
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5 OBJECTIVES FOR TRAIN PLANNING 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of any process is to deliver objectives.  In this chapter the author reviews 
and assesses the objectives that impact on and/or influence railway timetabling.  
Inevitably, the structure of the industry will impact on objectives in a variety of ways and 
this chapter is focused solely on objectives in the privatised railway in Britain.  After 
setting out the data collection and analysis methods used and a brief review of the 
literature on objectives, the business objectives of the key organisations within Britain’s 
railway industry are documented and discussed (focusing down on train planning), then 
the views of railway managers and timetablers.  An attempt is made to categorise these 
objectives in a structured manner.  This analysis will be returned to in a later chapter as 
it forms the basis for timetable generation software development.  Finally conflicts 
between these objectives are considered and the extent to which these objectives are 
being met is assessed. 
 
What value is intended to be gained from the analysis in this chapter?  Firstly the author 
seeks to assess alignment in objectives, as to the extent these are not aligned, there will 
be tension and, for some, non-achievement.  This could facilitate realignment of 
objectives.  Secondly he seeks to consider the extent to which the processes adopted 
are appropriate for the achievement of these objectives.  This could highlight changes 
that need to be made to the processes.  Thirdly, the analysis in this chapter could be 
used as an input to researchers and suppliers to the rail industry who are working on 
operational research techniques and associated software to support timetabling 
processes through automating the development of timetables that meet these objectives.  
Finally this work will be of interest to researchers looking at scheduling in other 
industries, as typically they have diverse and conflicting objectives too. 
 
Some of this chapter (much of the section on management and train planner objectives) 
has been published in the paper ‘Prospects for computer aided railway scheduling: 
perspectives from users and parallels from mass transit’ (Watson, 2000); other elements 
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were included in a peer reviewed paper to the 2nd International Seminar on Railway 
Operations Modelling and Analysis, Hannover, March 2007 (Watson, 2007).  A short 
paper on key issues was presented at a Passenger Transport Networks seminar in York, 
UK (Watson and Boodoo, 2002). 
5.2 Methods 
 
The methods adopted to investigate organisational objectives and their impact on 
timetabling have been a combination of the study of written material published by the 
organisations and interviews with railway personnel.  Some interviews were undertaken 
directly by the author.  Other interviews and some preparation of the data from these 
interviews was undertaken by an EPSRC funded researcher during 2001-02.  Initial 
findings were published jointly in a conference paper in October 2003 (Boodoo et al., 
2003). 
 
The data collection exercise undertaken by Boodoo consisted of a series of semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders in the railway timetabling process in the UK.  The 
interviews included passenger operators from the former Inter City, Network South East 
and Regional Railways groups, Railtrack/Network Rail, a Passenger Transport Executive 
(PTE), the SRA and the Rail Regulator.  The interviewees held various positions, from 
timetablers working on the mechanics of the timetabling process to management and 
strategic roles.  In addition to providing insights into objectives, the transcripts revealed 
contentions and conflicts within the current processes and also wider issues regarding 
the industry structure in the UK.  Practitioners revealed how they overcame the problems 
they faced and highlighted the practical differences between the theory and practice of 
the timetabling process   Boodoo produced a data set from these interviews which has 
been drawn on in the analysis undertaken in this chapter.   
This analysis has been reviewed with industry players to ensure that it accurately 
reflects their understanding of their organisation’s objectives. 
 
The sections on managerial and train planner objectives also use data built up over a 
number of years working with Britain’s train planners in a management capacity, with a 
Scandinavian railway as an advisor on train planning process improvement and software 
development, c.f.  Gardermoen Railway Project (1998-99), together with a survey of 
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senior views within Britain’s railway industry undertaken in April 2005.  This analysis 
focuses on ‘tactical’ objectives for the timetabling process rather than the over-arching 
objectives set out in the previous section. 
5.3 Literature on Objectives 
 
Objectives in the context of organisations can be defined as “specific results that an 
organisation seeks to achieve in pursuing its basic mission” (David 2005) or, more 
bluntly, “an objective is a statement of what is to be achieved” (Byars et al. 1996). 
 
Drucker (1954) pointed out that “objectives are needed in every area where performance 
and results directly and vitally affect the survival and prosperity of the business”.  He 
highlighted that in any organisation there is no one objective – to search for one is ‘not 
only likely to be as unproductive as the quest for the philosopher’s stone; it is certain to 
do harm and to misdirect’.  He stressed that each job within an organisation must be 
focused on the success of the whole – managers are not automatically focused on a 
common goal, with a number of facets of organisations working against common goals -  
specialised work, where professional objectives may dominate over organisational 
objectives, hierarchical structure, with goals getting diffused or distorted between top 
and bottom, and differences in vision between different parts of an organisation.  
 
Byars et al. highlight that objectives can be categorised by the timeframe for 
achievement, that is, short range (less than a year) or long range, with writers and 
investigators sometimes also adding an intermediate timeframe – typically one to three 
years.  Objectives can also be classified according to their breadth of influence, whether 
they are corporate or organisational, divisional  functional and by their focus, for instance 
profitability, service to customers, employee needs and well-being, social responsibility.   
Variants on these categorisations are used later in this chapter as a method of codifying 
train planning objectives. 
 
A different stream of literature looks at the ‘fit’ between objectives at different levels of 
the organisation.  David (2005) highlights that in all but the smallest organisations there 
is a split in responsibility between objective setting and objective delivery and he notes 
that “managers and employees are motivated more by perceived self-interests than by 
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organisational interests, unless the two coincide”.  Byers et al. note that there will be 
bargaining amongst the conflicting interests within the organisation and further note that 
objectives should be cascaded down, to ensure that there is consistency.  However, 
Cyert and March (1963) found that organisational objectives at different levels in the 
organisation are rarely consistent, often for perfectly good reasons.  For example the 
objective of manufacturing to keep unit costs down by long production runs is likely to 
conflict with the objective of marketing to satisfy customers with urgent orders.  Gee 
(1969) found that, in the long run, there did tend to be internal consistency in behaviour 
with reference to objectives in successful organisations, but noted that, in the short term, 
‘satisficers’ could be prioritised ahead of achievement of objectives, just to ‘get by’.  The 
level of ‘fit’ between objectives for train planning will be discussed in a later section of 
this chapter. 
5.4 Business Objectives of Key Organisations 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
The objectives of each of the major players in the privatised railway industry are now set 
out, focusing on how they impact on train planning.  The extent to which they are 
consistent with each other and being achieved is then discussed. 
5.4.2 Government 
 
The government department responsible for rail policy is the Department for Transport.  
The policy for rail needs to be seen in the context of the government’s 10-year plan for 
transport which sets the government’s objectives as follows (Department for Transport, 
2000): 
 
“Our vision is that by 2010 we will have a transport system that provides: 
· Modern, high quality public transport, both locally and nationally. People will have 
more choice about how they travel, and more will use public transport; 
· More light rail systems and attractive bus services that are fully accessible and 
integrated with other types of transport; 
· High quality park and ride schemes so that people do not have to drive into 
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congested town centres; 
· Easier access to jobs and services through improved transport links to 
regeneration areas and better land use planning; 
· A modern train fleet, with reliable and more frequent services, and faster trains 
cutting intercity journey times; 
· A well-maintained road network with real-time driver information for strategic 
routes and reduced congestion; 
· Fully integrated public transport information, booking and ticketing systems, with 
a single ticket or card covering the whole journey; 
· Safer and more secure transport accessible to all; 
· A transport system that makes less impact on the environment.” 
 
More specifically for rail, the Department for Transport sets out its objectives as follows: 
“The 10-year plan aims to increase rail passenger numbers by delivering a high 
quality, reliable and efficient railway network. We are also working to develop a 
stronger customer focus, improved punctuality, increased capacity, reduced 
overcrowding, growth in freight and enhanced safety throughout the industry.” 
[Department for Transport, 2000, http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/ 
dft_railways/ documents/sectionhomepage/dft_railways_page.hcsp ] 
 
Analysis of these objectives by the author suggests that it is possible to synthesise the 
statements in the 10 year plan into a set of high level objectives for rail, as follows: 
· Support growth of the economy; 
· Reduce road congestion by achieving modal shift; 
· Minimise environmental impact/support achievement of Kyoto objectives; 
· Improve reliability, provide faster and more frequent services; 
· Improve accessibility; 
· Do the above at an acceptable cost to the Treasury. 
 
Although government does not explicitly state its expectations for the train planning 
processes, it is reasonable to assume that it would expect them to help to plan the use 
of the network at a strategic level to deliver train services that support the higher level 
objectives. 
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5.4.3 The Strategic Rail Authority 
 
The SRA’s responsibilities were in 2005 passed to DfT (Rail Directorate) and Network 
Rail, with the SRA being ‘wound up’.  The section that follows therefore sets out the 
position prior to 2005.  The objectives that are discussed have been largely passed back 
to DfT, although some change of emphasis is emerging, particularly a higher priority 
being given to reducing the cost of the railway. 
 
The SRA’s primary functions were set out by government in ‘Directions and Guidance’ 
(SRA, 2001).  These refer back to the Transport Act (2000) as follows: 
 
“Section 205 of the Act sets out the Authority's purposes as: 
1. To promote the use of the railway network for the carriage of 
passengers and goods; 
2. To secure the development of the railway network; and 
3. To contribute to the development of an integrated system of transport 
for passengers and goods. 
 
Section 207 of the Act requires the Authority to exercise its functions with a 
view to furthering its purposes and it must do so in accordance with any 
strategies that it has formulated with respect to them. In so doing the 
Authority must act in the way best calculated: 
4. To protect the interests of users of railway services; 
5. To contribute to the achievement of sustainable development; 
6. To promote efficiency and economy on the part of persons providing 
railway services; 
7. To promote measures designed to facilitate passenger journeys 
involving more than one operator (including, in particular, 
arrangements for the issue and use of through tickets); 
8. To impose on operators of railway services the minimum restrictions 
consistent with the performance of its functions; and 
9. To enable providers of rail services to plan their businesses with a 
reasonable degree of assurance.” 
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Later in the Directions and Guidance are set out the objectives that flow through from 
through from the government’s 10 year plan:  
 
“The Government's key targets for the railway are set out in Annex 2 to the 10 
Year Plan, and include the following: 
1. To increase rail use in Great Britain (measured in passenger 
kilometres) from 2000 levels by 50% by 2010, with investment in 
infrastructure and capacity, while at the same time securing 
improvements in punctuality, reliability and safety; 
2. To reduce overcrowding in London to meet SRA standards by 2010; 
3. A significant increase in rail freight's share of the freight market by 
2010. The Government believes it ought to be possible to increase 
market share resulting in an increase of up to 80% in rail freight by 
2010. 
 
Other relevant targets set out in the 10 Year Plan, to which the railway will 
contribute, include: 
1. To reduce road congestion on the inter-urban network and in large 
urban areas in England below current levels by 2010; 
2. To improve air quality by meeting National Air Quality Strategy 
targets; and 
3. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5% from 1990 levels, and 
move towards a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2010. 
 
Specific outcomes which the railway is expected to achieve (including the targets 
set out above) are: 
1. A 50% increase in passenger journeys overall; 
2. More frequent services, faster journey times and an 80% increase in 
patronage on inter-city lines; 
3. More frequent services on commuter lines; 
4. Better cross-country network connections; 
5. Increased reliability and punctuality; 
6. Better integrated information for customers; 
7. Improved levels of customer satisfaction with the quality of services 
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and of stations; 
8. An increase in rail's share of the freight market to around 10%, 
equating to an additional 15 billion tonnes-km of rail freight a year; 
9. A more efficient and competitive service from rail freight. 
 
And in addition 
 
Since the publication of the 10 Year Plan, the performance of the railway, in 
terms of the punctuality and reliability of services, has declined. The Authority is 
required, as an equal primary objective, to work with the rail industry to achieve 
substantial lasting improvements in performance.” 
 
The key objectives can be summarised as: 
· 50% growth in passenger km by 2010; 
· 80% growth in freight km by 2010; 
· Reduced levels of ‘Passengers in Excess of Capacity (PIXC)’ where PIXC is 
defined as when peak hour loadings in the South East exceed a tolerable level of 
overcrowding, this level being set dependent on journey time ; 
(these first three were often described by SRA personnel in short hand as the 
‘50-80-PIXC target’) 
· A substantial improvement in train running performance; 
· Achieving modal shift (road to rail) and working towards Kyoto pollution 
objectives; 
· Demonstrating VFM and using private sector funding wherever possible. 
 
It is worth noting here potential contradictions between these objectives, e.g. growth may 
well be most easily achieved by generating additional long distance leisure travel rather 
than diverting from road shorter distance commuter journeys (cutting across the modal 
shift objective) and by providing services that encourage commuters to live further from 
where they work (cutting across pollution objectives). 
 
In the Appendices of the Directions and Guidance, further detail is given of the SRA’s 
objectives in the area of ‘capacity planning’.   
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“To secure increases in the capacity of the railway to accommodate the expected 
growth in passenger and freight traffic. Primary responsibility for the network 
rests with Railtrack, with whom the Authority should work closely to identify 
priorities for investment. Proposals for franchise replacement may include 
specific measures to increase capacity. The Authority may wish to finance 
capacity enhancements directly where to do so would achieve value for money 
and the investment would otherwise not be made. 
 
To develop a policy for the utilisation of network capacity. In an ideal world 
sufficient capacity would be available for all users. Much more can be done to 
optimise the capacity of the existing network and the Authority should work 
closely with Railtrack and industry to identify measures to achieve this. Where 
this is not possible, for instance when physical locations are constrained, hard 
choices may have to be made to identify priorities where operators' aspirations 
may conflict with one another. The Authority's policy should be designed to 
inform operators and to assist the Regulator in his consideration of proposed 
access agreements.” 
 
Assessment of these stated objectives (alongside interview responses) leads to the 
deduction of the following SRA objectives for the train planning process: 
· Best possible use of existing capacity (Capacity Utilisation Policy); 
· Facilitate the provision of extra train services at the right times going to the right 
destinations to permit growth targets to be met; 
· Facilitate the provision of extra train services to reduce ‘PIXC’; 
· Develop timetables that support punctual train running ‘on the day’ to achieve 
improved train running performance; 
· Do all this without significant extra government funding – i.e. as far as possible 
without the need for investment in additional infrastructure. 
 
5.4.4 The Office of the Rail Regulator (until 2004 – now the Office of 
Rail Regulation) 
 
The Rail Regulator set out his aims and objectives as follows (ORR, 2003,2): 
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“Aims 
 
Through independent, fair and effective regulation to create and maintain the 
incentives and conditions necessary to achieve the continuous improvement of a 
safe, well-maintained and efficient railway which meets the needs of its users, 
and facilitate investment in capacity to satisfy the demands of growth in 
passenger and freight traffic at the time it is needed. 
 
In all their work, ORR staff aim to provide a service to the rail industry that is 
thorough, constructive, timely and fair. 
 
Key objectives: 
 
· To ensure the monopoly infrastructure provider’s effective and efficient 
stewardship of the national rail network; 
· To ensure the fair and efficient consumption of rail capacity, and promote 
effective and efficient working relationships between players in the rail 
industry 
· To prevent anti-competitive agreements and practices in the rail industry 
and promote competitive markets for the benefit of users of the railway.” 
 
From this can be synthesised one key objective for the train planning process: 
 
· To ensure the fair and efficient consumption of rail capacity 
 
The Rail Regulator undertook a detailed review of and consultation on the timetabling 
processes.  Following this review, the Regulator made the following statement regarding 
what the objectives for the timetabling process should be (ORR, 1998): 
 “(a) facilitating the development and operation of train services which best meet 
the needs of passengers and freight customers and encouraging innovation in 
the provision of train services; 
(b) optimising the sharing of capacity on the network in accordance with the 
public interest criteria as defined by the Regulator's statutory duties, and 
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encouraging cooperation between train operators, and between train operators 
and Railtrack, to improve overall service to passengers and freight customers, 
and provide overall service patterns and connections which meet the needs of 
users; 
(c) preserving and developing network benefits, ensuring that connections 
between services (both passenger and freight) are maintained and improved; 
(d) enabling delivery of accurate and timely information about train services; 
(e) achieving stability, efficiency and responsiveness in operation of the 
processes, and an efficient deployment of industry resources; 
(f) facilitating the effective maintenance, renewal and development of the 
network; 
(g) facilitating the development of an appropriate level of competition as a 
stimulus to better services, whilst ensuring that adequate mechanisms are in 
place to prevent behaviour detrimental to the public interest; 
(h) recognising the obligations on passenger train operators to meet their 
franchise agreement commitments to the Government and Passenger Transport 
Executives, and also the needs of freight operators to meet the developing needs 
of their current and potential customers; and 
(i) recognising that the objectives are more likely to be achieved if they are linked 
to commercial incentives on operators and Railtrack.” 
 
In the same way as government objectives cascaded to SRA to be delivered, the above 
set of objectives must be delivered by Network Rail with the support of Train Operators.  
More guidance is provided to the industry in the form of Decision Criteria, set out in the 
Access Conditions and Network Code: 
 
“The Decision Criteria consist of the necessity or desirability of the following 
(none of which necessarily has priority over any other): 
(a) sharing the capacity, and securing the development, of the Network for the 
carriage of passengers and goods in the most efficient and economical manner 
in the interests of all users of railway services having regard, in particular, to 
safety, the effect on the environment of the provision of railway services and the 
proper maintenance, improvement and enlargement of the Network; 
(b) enabling a Train Operator to comply with any contract to which it is party 
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(including any contracts with their customers and, in the case of a Train Operator 
who is a franchisee or franchise operator, including the franchise agreement to 
which it is a party), in each case to the extent that Railtrack is aware or has been 
informed of such contracts: 
(c) maintaining and improving the levels of service reliability; 
(d) maintaining, renewing and carrying out other necessary work on or in relation 
to the Network; 
(e) maintaining and improving connections between railway passenger services; 
(f) avoiding material deterioration of the service patterns of operators of trains 
(namely the train departures and arrival frequencies, stopping patterns, intervals 
between departures and journey times) which those operators possess at the 
time of the application of these criteria; 
(g) ensuring that, where the demand of passengers to travel between two points 
is evenly spread over a given period, the overall pattern of rail services should be 
similarly spread over that period; 
(h) enabling operators of trains to utilise their railway assets efficiently and 
avoiding having to increase the numbers of railway assets which the operators 
require to maintain their service patterns; 
(i) facilitating new commercial opportunities, including promoting competition in 
final markets and ensuring reasonable access to the Network by new operators 
of trains; 
 (j) avoiding wherever practicable frequent timetable changes, in particular for 
railway passenger services; and  
(k) taking into account the commercial interests of Railtrack and existing and 
potential operators of trains in a manner compatible with the foregoing. 
In its consideration of paragraph (d) of this Condition D4, Railtrack shall not be 
entitled to determine that its possessions of any part of the Network shall be as 
contemplated by any relevant maintenance contract by reason only of the terms 
and conditions of that contract. In this paragraph, "relevant maintenance 
contract" is a contract which Railtrack shall have entered into, or shall intend to 
enter into, with any person for the maintenance, renewal or the carrying out of 
any other work on or in relation to the Network.” 
 
It should be noted that these objectives are to some extent conflicting.  The ORR has 
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made it clear that specific circumstances need to be taken into account and has left the 
industry to create ‘case law’. 
5.4.5 Network Rail  
 
Network Rail’s ‘corporate goals’ (Network Rail, 2003) are to: 
 
· “Improve safety. To reduce the number of accidents; 
· Improve service performance. To enable greater punctuality and reliability of train 
services; 
· Increase system capability. To facilitate achievement of the SRA’s Strategic Plan 
and increase passenger and freight capacity; 
· Improve customer and stakeholder relationships. To increase the satisfaction of 
passenger and freight rail users and other stakeholders; 
· Improve financial control. To increase our financial efficiency and maximise what 
we can deliver for each pound spent; 
· Improve asset stewardship. To take better care of the infrastructure and deliver 
greater value for money; 
· Improve business performance. To make the most of our people’s skills and 
effort.” 
 
Interviews with Network Rail personnel broadly supported this set of goals, but added to 
it the important role of meeting the Rail Regulator’s expectations.   
 
The Business Plan provides more detail on train planning (which Network Rail calls 
Operational Planning): 
 
“Operational Planning is the process which translates customer requirements for 
access to the network into detailed plans for the provision of safe and reliable 
train paths.  Delivering these requirements ensures that we are compliant with 
our network licence and the cross-industry Track Access Conditions in respect 
of: 
1. The production of the National Rail Timetable (Licence Condition 3); 
2. The timetabling process (Access Condition D); and 
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3. The Informed Traveller process (Licence Conditions 3 and 9). 
 
Approach 
 
The Operational Planning process must ensure at every stage that there is an  
appropriate balance between the requirements of train operators to provide train 
services and the need to maintain, renew and enhance the network. Also, a 
proportion of capacity must remain unoccupied to enable recovery from any 
disruptions to the plan. 
 
Our goal is to implement an efficient and effective Operational Planning process, 
with three key components: 
1. Robust capacity planning over a 10 year horizon to ensure that plans 
for provision of network capacity and plans for train services which will 
consume that capacity are synchronised and are aligned with 
customer and stakeholder expectations; 
2. Annual access planning which produces the “permanent” timetable, 
published as the National Rail Timetable (NRT), which provides a 
sound basis for delivering train paths safely and reliably; and 
3. Efficient daily access planning which incorporates temporary changes 
into the timetable to meet short-term traffic demands and 
requirements for engineering works on the network, while ensuring 
that the timetable remains robust. 
 
The final output of the process is the detailed plan which is used by our front-line 
production staff and train operators to deliver the real-time operation of the 
railway on each individual day.” 
 
Interviews revealed a more detailed and extensive list of objectives: 
· Meet contractual agreements - Train Operating Company/Freight Operating 
Company access rights (schedule 5), Access Conditions/Network Code 
(timescales/decision criteria), Regulatory / Licence requirements; 
· Sufficient (low cost) Engineering Access for maintaining & renewing the network 
(ROTR); 
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· Maximise Performance – to minimise Schedule 8 (penalty) payments to train 
operators; 
· Reduce Cost of producing a timetable; 
· Risk Mitigation – ensuring that the timetable does not import safety risk into the 
railway; 
· Customer Satisfaction: Train Operators/Freight Operating Companies, 
maintenance and renewal contractors, SRA, passengers, freight customers. 
5.4.6 Franchised Passenger Train Operators 
 
The TOCs are private sector organisations, focused on commercial objectives – profit, 
growth and, ultimately, survival.  At a high level these objectives are achieved by 
keeping their franchises (to keep the revenue stream intact in the short term), make 
profits for shareholders (by making the most of opportunities within the terms of their 
franchises) and winning future franchises (to keep the profit stream going for the long 
term).  It is outside the scope of this thesis to investigate the extent to which these 
particular motivations apply to particular train operators at particular times in their 
existence.  A number of TOCs have however moved from profit and growth to survival 
as the key objective – and several have not managed to survive at all (e.g. Prism, 
rescued by National Express Group) or have left the rail franchising market place (e.g. 
Connex, losing one franchise in a re-bidding competition and having its other franchise 
taken away from it due to poor financial performance (see National Audit Office, 2005).   
 
In summary franchised passenger operators have the following objectives: 
· Retain franchise; 
· Improve profitability during franchise period; 
· Grow revenue as a route to improving profitability; 
· Manage costs down; 
· Win bidding competitions for franchises. 
Train Operators have not made public statements of their objectives for train planning.  
The following objectives have therefore been deduced from interviews (in particular 
detailed analysis of the structured interviews undertaken by Boodoo) and are focused on 
how train planning processes can influence the profitability and growth potential of train 
operators: 
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· Fulfil Franchise Commitments (which might coincide with revenue objectives or 
might have social benefits – e.g. additional evening or Sunday services); 
· Maximise ‘Fare Box’ (from passengers rather than subsidy from SRA) Revenue 
by:  
o Optimise frequency 
o Optimise journey times 
o Optimise connections (these three objectives taken together are 
sometimes described as looking to optimised ‘generalised journey time 
(GJT)’; 
· Optimise loads and matching demand; 
· Performance - punctuality (minutes delay) and reliability (cancellations); 
· Consistency and simplicity (for customer understanding), including ‘clock face’ 
(i.e. departing at the same minutes past each hour) and regularity (e.g. a train 
every 15 minutes); 
· Minimise Resource Cost by: 
o rolling stock diagrams (the number of trains required) 
o rolling stock maintenance 
o crew diagrams (the number of crew required) 
o catering rosters (the number of staff required) 
o Getting performance right (to reduce ‘spare’ contingency resources 
needed); 
· Achieve Customer/Stakeholder Satisfaction Levels: 
o Passengers 
o Regional and Local Authorities, Passenger Transport Executives, Rail 
Passenger Councils (regional consumer-protection organisations) 
o external pressure groups. 
 
This list can be summarised as: 
· Service specification improvements – to increase revenue; 
· Service specification improvements – to reduce costs; 
· Performance improvements; 
· Customer satisfaction. 
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5.4.7 ‘Open Access’ Passenger Operators 
 
There are a small number of ‘open access’ passenger operators (Hull Trains, Grand 
Central, Wrexham Shrewsbury and Marylebone Railway, Heathrow Express and 
Eurostar being the open access operators who run regular passenger services) and 
whilst it might have been interesting to explore their views, no interviews have been 
undertaken with them so that the author could concentrate on key issues for train 
planning processes.  Perhaps the most significant difference is that Open Access 
operators rely on the train planning process to get paths for their services, whereas 
franchised passenger operators to a very large extent have paths pre-existing in the 
timetable when they take over a franchise.  Of course those objectives related 
specifically to franchising do not apply to open access operators. 
5.4.8 Freight Operators 
 
These operators are ‘open access’ operators with no commitments to SRA or 
government other than grants for a small proportion of their services. 
 
Discussions with representatives of these operators suggest that their objectives are: 
· Retaining existing business; 
· Growing revenue; 
· Reducing costs. 
 
For the timetabling process, the stated objectives were similar to those for the passenger 
operators, although customer satisfaction was always considered most important (due, it 
is suspected, to the small number of customers on which these operators depend): 
· Customer satisfaction; 
· Service specification improvements – to increase revenue; 
· Service specification improvements – to reduce costs; 
· Performance improvements (to give better service to customers and to reduce 
costs. 
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5.5 Train Planning Objectives for Railway Management and 
Train Planners 
5.5.1 Priorities for Railway Management 
 
High on any management action list will be the improvement of the efficiency of the 
organisation’s operation.  In railways, this can be split between the efficiency of use of 
the infrastructure (the ‘network efficiency’) and the efficiency inf the use of the resources 
that run on the network (‘rolling stock planning’ and ‘train crew planning’).  Network 
efficiency can be considered as having three main facets: capacity, reliability and cost 
effective maintenance.  Usually the overall capacity is fixed over the timescales under 
consideration since modifications to the infrastructure take an extended period to plan 
and implement.  Capacity and cost effective maintenance are closely linked - it is 
necessary to move all the traffic on offer and, at the same time, to enable all necessary 
maintenance to be undertaken in a cost effective manner.  This sets a ‘minimum’ 
condition on any timetabling solution.  Management expect that this will be achieved 
whilst also achieving increasing service reliability, giving a ‘target’ - to produce a 
timetable that minimises the effect of perturbations.   
 
Different railway managements have different objectives for rolling stock planning.   
Some railways (including several of the larger European state railways) have ample 
rolling stock in many areas: the requirement here is simply to match the rolling stock to 
the required services.  This minimum condition is more often now supplemented by a 
target to use the smallest number of rolling stock units possible, especially where 
expensive new trains have been or are being purchased.  An alternative, and in some 
ways more sophisticated, target for passenger rolling stock is to maximise the mileage 
run by the fleet available, employing the logic that making more train-miles available 
gives more journey opportunities and (if properly targeted) increases revenue.   
 
Objectives for personnel are often more complex.  There is typically a basic objective to 
minimise staff numbers.  More appropriate, however, is to look to minimise the total staff 
cost, taking into account likely overtime payments and any other enhancements that 
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labour agreements dictate.  Further management objectives for staff planning revolve 
around flexibility (coping with changes in demand - e.g. special trains and changes in 
supply - e.g. sickness) and staff/union satisfaction, e.g. meeting union agreements and 
having appropriate mixes of duties to meet the aspirations of different individuals. 
 
Railway managers indicate that they want simple solutions to these often complicated 
questions.  They want timetables and schedules that use their network, rolling stock and 
staff efficiently, achieving the minimum level of resources consistent with achieving the 
required level of reliability.   They want solutions quickly and they want to minimise the 
number of staff involved in the train planning process.  They are prepared to spend 
money on software if it can be shown to achieve an improvement in the achievement of 
some or all of these objectives – but bitter experience has made them sceptical of that 
benefits can be achieved quickly from new software.  Finally, they want a ‘no-hassle’ 
solution.   
 
Many managers can cite examples of where train planners have, in their view, frustrated 
change or been unable to undertake the process in a way which gives a satisfactory 
outcome: examples include the Virgin Cross Country timetable introduced and then 
within a matter of weeks amended because it did not work (Ford,  2003), Stagecoach’s 
actions to reduce driver numbers in the early days of its operation of South West Trains 
(Haskel, 1997),with the train planners being blamed for not being able to properly assess 
the number of drivers that would be needed, and, more recently, the inability of Network 
Rail timetablers to assess the performance impact of new Open Access requests for 
paths on the East Coast Main Line (Office of Rail Regulation, 2006). 
 
A small number of railway managers suggest that train planners have a reputation as 
trouble makers and pessimists.  ‘Black box’ solutions that offer the possibility of reducing 
the need for train planners are attractive to these people.  These managers cite 
examples of where train planners have rejected new business specifications as 
unworkable, with the managers asserting that this was not based on proper assessment 
but on an unwillingness to consider new ideas or laziness.  There is not the space to 
explore these cultural and motivational issues here, suffice to say that train planners do 
not agree with this view!   
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Pulling together current views of train planning, as stated by British railway management 
and setting them alongside stated objectives for the train planning process can be 
summarised as in the following table. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Management Objectives for the Train Planning Process (Source: 
Author) 
Current View of Train Planning Objective 
‘Black art’  ‘Black box’ 
Sub optimization (if any) Overall cost effective solution optimizing  
infrastructure, rolling stock and staff 
Performance not known until service 
commences 
Performance modelled and ‘tuned’ in 
advance 
Train planning a major staff cost Small staff and software cost 
A major business risk area Support for business development 
 
Managers sometimes see train planning as a ‘black art’, with train planners making 
decisions in isolation, with, they sometimes feel, little regard for the overall effectiveness 
of the resulting train plan.  Managers often do not want to understand the ‘nuts and bolts’ 
of train planning and, hence, ‘black box’ solutions will be acceptable, just so long as 
there is evidence that effective solutions are produced - with an assessment of the 
performance robustness of the solution available in time to make changes, if required, 
rather than having problems only come to light when the service starts operation.  
Business risks inherent in the train planning process can be financial (for instance South 
West Trains, one of the franchised passenger train operators, underestimated the 
number of drivers needed in early 1997 and suffered significant revenue loss and nearly 
incurred a substantial fine for breaching its franchise commitments (OPRAF 1997) or 
through adverse public relations, as suffered by Railtrack when it produced a poor 
quality timetable in 1995 (Wolmar 1996).  In summary, managers want to move from 
train planning being a resource intensive activity with, as they see it, mediocre output, to 
it providing cost-effective support for business growth, through effective planning of the 
provision of reliable access to the railway network. 
5.5.2 Priorities for Train Planners – and Differences from 
Management 
 
The section above indicates that railway managers’ objectives for the train planning 
 112 
process are predominantly about cost effective delivery of reliable train services.  ‘Hands 
on’ train planners, perhaps unsurprisingly, indicate that they have a different agenda.  As 
part of a Quality Improvement initiative undertaken within what was then British Rail, 
aimed at improving train planning processes, the following set of priorities was 
developed by the train planning function, ranked in order of perceived importance: 
1. “Achieve all timetable production timescales 
2. Achieve shortest production timescale 
3. Adopt best practice 
4. Robust to perturbation 
5. Meet customer expectations 
6. Error free 
7. Achieve service reliability standards 
8. Economically efficient in the management of resources required to 
prepare, deliver and operate the plan.”  (Willis, 1992) 
 
This list was used as a prompt in later interviews and it was found that priorities had not 
changed over the intervening period. 
 
That production timescales (1) dominate the thinking of train planners should come as 
no surprise.  Timetable commencement dates (the date that new timetables start from) 
are agreed in Europe years in advance on an international basis and there is little scope 
for delaying this date, even on a local basis, due to the knock on implications for other 
railway operators and other parts of the planning process.  Railway budgets and 
planning cycles are all focused on making changes at these pre-determined dates. 
 
Achieving a shorter production timescale (2) is also an on-going objective - aimed at 
being more customer focused by enabling railway marketing organisations to make 
service changes at shorter notice, currently it is not atypical for marketing specifications 
to be required by the train planners at least a year before the new timetable commences. 
 
Best practice (3) was and is about getting train planning offices to improve the 
effectiveness of the train planning process.  There are many different processes 
employed to undertake basically the same function.  As an example, there are different 
practices regarding display of timetable data: some train planners requiring ‘line graph’ 
representation, others preferring numeric tabulation.   
 
Robustness (4) gives the first match between management’s and train planners’ stated 
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objectives, with managers being aware of the adverse impact on revenue and costs of 
persistent poor performance and train planners having the added incentive of wanting to 
avoid criticism from their operations colleagues and the potential need for an urgent 
‘rework’ of the train plan. 
 
Meeting customer needs (5) is another objective that the evidence indicates that 
management and train planners share. 
 
The train planner looks for an error free (6) ‘perfect solution’, in the sense that there 
must be no conflicts, errors or omissions remaining before starting to attempt to improve 
the efficiency of the solution: offers to help produce a more effective solution will only be 
of interest if it can be shown that a ‘perfect solution’ is obtained as well - so simplifying 
assumptions or approximations are unlikely to be acceptable.  Having said this, under 
more detailed questioning train planners will reveal that they habitually ‘break the 
planning rules’ themselves to achieve workable solutions (e.g. by reducing the turnround 
time at terminus stations below the norm).    
 
Delivery of service reliability (7) again matches with management’s stated objectives. 
 
Perhaps the biggest mismatch is that ‘economic efficiency’ is only ranked 8th by train 
planners, whereas management see this of prime importance.  
 
Of as much significance as the ranking of these objectives is data provided by train 
planners regarding their level of achievement of these objectives.  Train planners noted 
that it is not always possible to achieve production dates; on other occasions they only 
achieve (1) and (4) of the priorities outlined above, and the latter just to the extent that 
they succeed in avoiding negative feedback from the day to day operational staff.  
Documented examples were given of where these basic priorities have not been met,  
c.f. Wolmar 1996: the ‘Great Timetabling Disaster’, where train planners ran out of time, 
with a timetable being published before the timetable planning processes had been 
completed, with the inevitable consequence that many alterations had to be published 
subsequently in ‘supplements’.  Timetablers explain their inability to reliably hit 
production dates as being caused by uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the size 
of the task and by late changes imposed by management.  They note that the task size 
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varies dependent upon the number of conflicting train service requirements to be 
processed (i.e. where two or more train services would be on the same piece of track at 
the same time) and the difficulty of finding a solution that adequately meets the needs of 
the businesses asking for those services, it is sometimes not possible to predict in 
advance whether there is in fact a solution that will satisfy everyone. 
 
It is a point for discussion that of the objectives and needs of railway management and 
train planners do not at first appear to be compatible.  However, resolution of the 
immediate issues for the planners of production timescales and quality of the process 
(best practice and error elimination) leads to the list of needs converging.   
5.5.3 Trade-offs between conflicting objectives 
 
Railway managers and timetablers were asked how trade-offs should be made between 
objectives.  It quickly became apparent that, for the most part, they do not explicitly 
make trade-offs.  As a result there are few generalised rules currently applied.  Certainly 
quantification, of the sort needed to set objective weightings in a timetable generation 
tool, is not available.   
 
When asked how decisions could be improved, bearing in mind this lack of generalised 
rules, one respondent highlighted ‘optioneering’ as the pragmatic approach to take, that 
is, generating a number of different potential timetables with emphasis on different 
objectives and then appraising each of these against a ‘basket’ of criteria, including 
public interest benefit, ‘fare box’ revenue, investment and operating cost, value for 
taxpayer’s money, robustness. 
 
In discussion, it became apparent that this is currently the only effective method of 
making trade offs.  In time, rules for making trade-offs and explicit objective weightings, 
must emerge.   
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5.5.4 Achievement of Objectives 
5.5.4.1 Adherence to production timescales 
 
Willis highlighted achievement of all production timescales as the top priority.  
Discussion with train planners across the industry indicates that this is still not being 
consistently met, with bids from train operators and offers from Network Rail not being 
achieved by the required date. 
5.5.4.2 Shortened production timescales 
 
At the strategic planning stage, detailed timetable development and performance 
modelling projects, which look at the likely performance of a revised infrastructure layout 
and revised timetables, produce timetables at a very detailed level, often with timings 
planned down to when trains would pass individual signals, for the whole route being 
examined.  This process can take many months.  As business growth makes the need 
for greater capacity more pressing, timescales for these assessments need to be 
reduced. 
 
Within tactical planning, the long term planning process typically starts 12 to 15 months 
in advance of the commencement date for the timetable, i.e. before the previous 
timetable has even commenced.  There is, unsurprisingly, considerable pressure to 
reduce these timescales, to permit assessment of the effectiveness of a timetable in 
practice before planning the next one and to be more responsive to changing customer 
needs. 
 
A further issue for ‘mixed’ traffic railways, that is, railways that carry both passengers 
and freight, is that the nature of logistics and freight distribution is such that the tactical 
planning takes place much closer to the train running, with timescales measured in 
weeks, days or even hours, rather than the months ahead that passenger trains need to 
be planned.  This creates an uncomfortable mismatch between planning horizons, with 
the widely held view in passenger service-dominated railways that freight suffers some 
disadvantage, having to accept ‘what is left’ after the passenger services have been 
planned.  This still needs to be addressed, for instance by providing ‘standard hour’ slots 
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that the freight operators can use without having to book them many months in advance. 
5.5.4.3 Robust to Perturbation 
 
‘Robustness’, by which is meant the extent to which a timetable can accommodate minor 
perturbations due to, for instance, train or infrastructure failures without substantial 
‘knock on’ delays to other services, is still usually only tested when the timetable 
becomes operational.  This means that there is a risk that there will be substantial 
delays, should the timetable or resource plan not be capable of coping with the 
inevitable problems that occur, as happened when the Virgin Cross Country increased 
frequency timetable was introduced.  This can have serious financial implications for 
Network Rail due to the performance regime in place with the train operators, whereby 
poor performance due to defects in the timetable results in penalty payments to the train 
operators.   
5.5.4.4 Meeting Customer Expectations 
 
The time required to produce a workable solution means that a wide variety of timetable 
options cannot be considered as part of the tactical planning process.  Typically, in 
Britain, no radically different options are considered.  In the time available, the task is 
simply to produce a timetable that is operationally feasible and meets most of the 
commercial aspirations of the train operators.  This prevents sensible discussion about 
the merits of different timetables and can lead to timetables being implemented that are 
short of what could have been achieved in terms of meeting train operators’ aspirations.  
This can mean that business is turned away because the planners cannot find enough 
paths, with revenue implications for the infrastructure operator as well as the train 
operator.  Similar problems apply to resource planning. 
 
Train planning, then, is in practice predominantly sequential, with the feedback loops 
shown on Figure 10 little used.  As discussed, achieving an optimum solution requires 
account to be taken of the interaction of the different stages of the business process.  In 
theory, this could be achieved by seeking to optimise across the whole process using 
some sophisticated operations research technique.  However, currently, optimisation 
across the whole process is unachievable due to the complexity of the problem.  The 
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practical alternative is feedback from one part of the process to others, sometimes called 
‘iteration’.  This has already been discussed in Chapter 3.  For instance if a particular 
timetable results in inefficient use of train crew then it will be necessary for ‘feedback’ to 
be given from the train crew scheduler to the timetable planner, with sufficient time in the 
process to allow the timetable planner to take account of this feedback and develop an 
improved timetable.  
5.5.4.5 A cost-effective process 
 
As already discussed, train planning is a costly function within Network Rail and train 
operators.  No interviewees considered that the process is as cost-effective as it could 
be, blaming the structure of the privatised railway and the lack of good quality software 
support.   In addition, the difficulty of managing train planning effectively is evident. 
 
5.6 Analysis 
5.6.1 Purpose of this analysis 
 
Having reported the objectives of railway organisations, railway managers and train 
planners, these objectives are categorised across several of the dimensions suggested 
in the literature.     
5.6.2 Categorisation of objectives (1) – growth, cost or performance 
related 
 
Many of the objectives across all of the organisations, both at a high level and at the 
timetabling level, can by put into the following categories: 
1. Growth focused; 
2. Cost management focused; 
3. Performance. 
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Growth focused objectives 
 
Government is looking to rail to support growth of the economy, including reducing road 
congestion by achieving modal shift and reducing the environmental impact of transport, 
again through modal shift.  The SRA had objectives set by government to grow 
passenger kilometres travelled by 50% and freight tonne kilometres by 80% by 2010.  In 
support of these overall objectives the SRA had timetabling objectives to make best 
possible use of existing capacity and to facilitate the provision of extra train services.  
Network Rail was and is committed to increasing passenger and freight capacity and 
exploiting that capacity effectively.  Train operators and FOCs want to grow their 
businesses through running more trains and attracting more revenue. 
 
Cost management objectives 
 
Government needs to ensure that it gets the best benefits it can from a limited budget 
and this fed into SRA’s objectives to ensure best ‘value for money’ and to use private 
funding where possible.  Network Rail is committed to improving financial control, 
improving asset stewardship and improving business performance.  Its objectives for 
timetabling only explicitly mention cost in the context of reducing the cost of the 
timetabling process, rather than reducing the cost of operating the timetables produced.  
However the commitment to customer satisfaction requires consideration of the costs to 
the train operators and FOCs of operating the agreed timetable.  Train operators and 
FOCs of course want to reduce the costs of their business, subject to meeting their 
overall profitability objectives and franchise or contractual commitments.  At the 
timetabling level, their objective is always to ‘tune’ the timetable to save resources 
(rolling stock and crew) wherever possible. 
 
Performance objectives 
 
All organisations within the railway industry are concerned about perceived poor levels 
of train service punctuality, as is the government and MPs, see for instance exchange 
between Duncan Smith and Blair (Hansard, 2003).  Poor punctuality affects revenue, 
discouraging travel by rail and also affects cost adversely as ‘spare’ resources are 
required for contingencies.  Hence, all organisations expect timetabling processes to 
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deliver ‘robust’ timetables, i.e. timetables that work in practice, with delays caused by 
minor failures being accommodated without significant knock-on delays. 
 
5.6.3 Categorisation of objectives (2) – time horizon 
 
Byars et al. (1996) sets out the proposition that objectives can be assessed on a 
strategic vs. operational dimension.  The railway industry timetabling processes are in 
practice split along this dimension, being divided into ‘strategic access planning’ (2-10 
years out), tactical or ‘annual’ planning (6 months to 2 years out) and ‘short term’ 
planning (less than 6 months out).  This section is used to set out each organisation’s 
overall and timetabling objectives against these horizons. 
 
Figure 14 (on the following page) sets out over-riding objectives by organisation by time 
horizon. 
 
The government, the SRA and Network Rail have the primary interests in the strategic 
timeframe.  The government’s 10 year plan seeks growth and the SRA was charged with 
delivering this.  Network Rail has a long term interest in the infrastructure which it owns 
and manages.  The ORR’s role extends to a small extent beyond the 5 year time horizon 
as it has the responsibility for ensuring that Network Rail’s stewardship of the network is 
appropriate for the long term. 
 
In the 5 year time horizon, freight operators have mostly contracts of up to 5 years 
duration (although some extend to 10 years) and franchised passenger operators hold 
their franchises for predominantly between 5 and 10 years (although Chiltern Railways 
and Merseyrail have longer franchises).  The primary objective of Network Rail over this 
time horizon of relevance for this thesis is to increase system capacity, which, to the 
extent that it involves physical work to the infrastructure, typically takes 2 to 5 years to 
plan and bring to fruition.  The government is interested in this timeframe particularly for 
the railways need for funding.  This is considered in ‘spending reviews’ lead by the 
Treasury. 
 
ORR also undertakes funding reviews over this timeframe – specifically focused on 
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Network Rail’s funding needs.  This is the period over which SRA attempted to meet its 
longer term objectives through franchise letting and freight grants. 
 
Figure 14: Objectives by Organisation (Source: Author) 
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In the short term, all organisations are interested in performance improvement.  Network 
Rail, overseen by ORR, focuses on delivery of contracts.  It should be noted that 
Network Rail focuses on contractual compliance at this stage, whereas train operators 
and FOCs are looking for timetables that give them the best possible bottom line – this 
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leads to a certain amount of conflict between the parties. 
 
Turning now to train planning, the following figure takes the objectives set from the 
previous figure and turns them into a set of needs for each organisation from the 
timetabling processes. 
 
Figure 15: Objectives for Train Planning by Organisation and Time Horizon (Source: 
Author) 
 
 
 
Government (and SRA when it existed) need the timetabling process to provide a 
comparison of capacity available over the longer term compared with the capacity 
needed.  Detailed timetables are not required.  Network Rail requires statistics about 
capacity usage to support decisions on asset management.  Numbers of trains over 
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sections of line are needed to ensure that the track and signalling configuration is 
appropriate; total tonnages and vehicle movements are needed to assess wear and tear 
on the infrastructure to assist in the prediction of maintenance and renewal activity 
levels. 
 
In the medium term government needs to see that the timetable that is to apply will 
represent the best value for money.  A range of different timetable options are needed to 
convince the government that it is achieving value for money through the franchises it 
lets and the grants it gives to freight operators.  Train operators and FOCs want the 
timetabling process to deliver the best possible timetable – that is the best possible 
timetable, from their point of view, giving them the best possible profit.  The train 
operators also need timetabling processes to deliver their medium term franchise 
commitments. 
 
In the short term, all organisations want the timetabling process to deliver robust 
timetables.  Network Rail needs statistics to demonstrate to the industry and especially 
ORR that it is managing the process ‘fairly and efficiently’. 
5.6.4 Categorisation of Objectives (3) – Business Objectives, 
Physical Constraints and Robustness 
5.6.4.1 Business Objectives 
 
When looking at the timetabling task, it is possible to divide up objectives in a further 
way – splitting out ‘constraints’ from objectives, where constraints in this context are 
physical limitations imposed on the timetable, such as the number of available platforms 
or the minimum time between trains.   This is particularly important as a precursor for the 
analysis of timetable generation software which comes in chapter 7, as is being able to 
measure the extent to which a particular timetable meets the objectives set. 
 
As already discussed, some of these objectives are of a strategic nature, revolving 
around the achievement of the overall objectives of the organisation, others are of a 
more operational nature, focusing on practical issues, such as trade-offs between 
journey time and stopping patterns for specific services. 
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At the highest level there are what could be described as ‘public interest’ objectives, 
focused around the guidance given to the Strategic Rail Authority by government about 
what it expects the railway industry to achieve – growth of passenger and freight traffic 
and value for taxpayers’ money.  Next come the commercial objectives of the train 
operators and Network Rail – primarily to ensure profitability, but also to ensure 
continued existence through, in the case of Train Operators, the retention and extension 
of their franchises, by meeting the franchise commitments made to the DfT.  In the case 
of Train Operators and Network Rail, this includes delivery of the licence obligations 
made to the Office of Railway Regulation.   
 
In terms of measuring the effectiveness of a given timetable in meeting these strategic 
objectives, the industry ‘standard’ system used to assess the revenue capability of a 
timetable is (MOIRA), although the system used to divide revenue between Train 
Operators (ORCATS) is also considered to be of great importance by Train Operators.  
From a commercial point of view there was seen to be little benefit in developing a 
timetable with good revenue earning potential if all that revenue then goes to a different 
operator.  There is no standard mechanism for assessing the cost implications of a 
timetable (different organisations use spreadsheet or database solutions).  Neither is 
there a standard approach to assessing the implications of different levels of punctuality 
delivered by different timetables, although there is now some degree of agreement on 
the methodology for assessing the level of punctuality that might be achieved by a 
timetable.  This is discussed in chapter 8. 
 
Railway managers and timetablers had difficulty turning these high level objectives into 
operational objectives and were generally unable to prioritise between these operational 
objectives, although some linkages were described by a number of respondents.  
Journey time was seen as a key driver of revenue.  Regular interval services and ‘clock 
face’ times were considered to be beneficial, particularly for shorter distance services.  
Appropriate use of stopping patterns was also seen as important.  Perhaps the most 
significant finding here was that respondents had a number of trade-offs that were in 
their minds when developing a specification for timetables: 
 
 
 124 
1. Carrying more people v. running less trains; 
2. Providing the best possible service v. minimise cost; 
3. Customer focused service v. resource utilisation; 
4. Regular interval v. train service defined to meet demand; 
5. Individual organisation objectives v. overall industry/’UK plc’ benefit; 
6. Competition v. co-operation; 
7. Passenger need v. freight need. 
5.6.4.2 Physical constraints 
 
Train planners were, unsurprisingly, in agreement that it is essential that timetables are 
developed that are physically possible to operate and that are contractually ‘compliant’ 
(many respondents used this term).  Because these are largely limitations on the 
timetable (that is to say they MUST be met) rather than business objectives (that should 
be met to the maximum extent possible), these can be regarded as physical constraints 
on the timetable.  This is not to say that they are absolutes in the medium or long term – 
contracts can be renegotiated and the railway infrastructure and rolling stock changed so 
that different constrains apply. 
 
Timetables typically are built to comply with a set of planning rules, which, for Britain’s 
rail industry, are laid out in Network Rail’s documents the Rules of the Route and the 
Rules of the Plan – the former stating when engineering work is to take place and hence 
trains must not run and the latter setting out the base data to be used in developing 
timetables, for instance, the running times between stations and the required separation 
(‘headway’) between trains.  
 
Timetables must be operable with the resources available to the Train Operators – in 
particular the number of train sets and train crew that they expect to have available.  
They must match with the contractual commitments made by Railtrack/Network Rail to 
the Train Operators, by the franchised Train Operators to DfT and by Freight Operators 
to their customers. 
 
Safety was only mentioned in passing by railway managers and train planners in the 
context of timetabling.  It was noted that timetable planners have only a limited 
 125 
responsibility for safety in specific circumstances, e.g. not planning trains where they 
could not go, for instance because they are too heavy or too long, and not developing 
timetables that due to the interaction of trains might increase the risk of ‘Signals Passed 
At Danger’ incidents (drivers passing signals at red). 
5.6.4.3 Perception of Robustness 
 
Robustness was well defined by one train planner as the ‘ability of a timetable to recover 
effectively and quickly from perturbation’.  To the customer this means a train service 
that is punctual and does not suffer from cancellations.  To the Train Operators 
robustness is in fact part of the commercial specification – because a more punctual 
service generates more revenue.  Robustness also matters because resource costs are 
driven in part by the need to allow resources to recover from poor performance.  At 
present better robustness is also seen by respondents as an end in itself – government 
has set the industry a specific objective to improve punctuality; Train Operators and 
Network Rail are heavily incentivised through ‘performance regimes’ in their contracts to 
improve robustness. 
 
What was very interesting – and problematic from the perspective of the desire of the 
author to find ways to improve the quality of timetables produced was that respondents 
had great difficulty in setting out the characteristics of a robust timetable.  One 
correspondent stated that robustness was ‘an area not often considered in timetabling’!  
The following issues were raised, all of which are physical constraints: 
1. Lack of platform space; 
2. Bottlenecks at major stations; 
3. Too many flat junctions; 
4. Doors, passenger boarding and alighting times. 
 
It can be noted that a trade-off is at work here: robustness vs. resource utilisation, be 
that infrastructure capacity or rolling stock and train crew.  Greater robustness can be 
achieved by using resources less intensively, but this of course increases costs and may 
also reduce revenue – particularly if less trains are run.   
5.6.4.4 Robustness – from first principles 
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The paucity of feedback on robustness objectives has led to it being necessary to 
consider from first principles what the characteristics of a robust timetable would be.  
What quickly becomes apparent is that the complexity of the physical network makes 
this very difficult to describe.  For instance, on a simple ‘single track’ railway, maximising 
the separation between trains should minimise the chance of one train causing a delay 
on another one.  However, as soon as the network becomes more complex, say with a 
junction with trains crossing in front of each other, the best performance may come from 
‘flighting’ trains on one route (that is to say, running them close together) so that they 
clear the junction as rapidly as possible.   
 
This problem warrants further research.  In the meantime a certain amount of ‘trial and 
error’ is inevitable, with simulation tools (see chapter 8) being used to compare the 
performance of different timetables and to highlight issues that require ‘reworking’ by 
train planners. 
    
5.7 Delivering organisational objectives 
 
This thesis is focused on train planning rather than railway privatisation and so this is not 
the place to discuss whether privatisation has ‘worked’ or not – a number of papers and 
books (e.g. Harris and Godward, 1997; Freeman and Shaw Eds., 2000) have covered 
this.  Instead, the author looks at the issues that have been uncovered through this 
research which work against the achievement of organisational objectives. 
 
As has been alluded to in earlier sections, over-arching objectives are not the same for 
different organisations in the rail industry today.  At its crudest level, there is the conflict 
between the government’s desire to get the best value for money from the rail industry 
(where value for money means getting the maximum benefits for the funds it has 
available) whereas the deliverers of the services to the customers of the railway (be they 
passenger or freight) are focused on profit and, in the case of franchised passenger 
operators, short term profit.  In the middle there is now Network Rail, without the 
shareholder and stock market priorities of Railtrack and focusing more on value for 
money (see Network Rail’s Business Planning Criteria, Network Rail, 2006) and 
appearing to many to be an ‘arm of government’ (‘to all intends and purposes in the 
public sector’, TSSA, 2004; ‘the curious case of Network Rail’s status, Jupe, 2007).   In 
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that timetables are the method by which the train operators operationalise their plans, 
train planning is inevitably a battle ground as each train operator attempts to maximise 
its profit, whilst government indirectly, through franchise agreements, direct agreements 
over funding with Network Rail and through guidance given to the Office of Rail 
Regulation, attempts to get timetables which give the best value for money. 
 
The following table sets out issues that interviewees indicated hinder delivery of 
organisational objectives (some of which have already been discussed to some extent in 
the preceding chapter). 
 
Table 3: Factors hindering achievement of organisational objectives (Source: Author) 
 
Problem Discussion 
Passenger Service Requirements (now called 
Service Level Commitments) contractualised 
between DfT and franchised train operators enshrine 
particular service patterns which may have no 
“demand” logic or “supply” logic, giving no flexibility 
in timetable design 
DfT is now sometimes letting bidders for 
franchises have more freedom in 
specifying the service levels that they 
believe should be operated.  However, 
once train operators have signed 
franchise agreements with DfT it is 
cumbersome to make changes 
Access contracts between train operators and 
Network Rail are inflexible 
Train planners in Network Rail and the 
TOCs often say ‘we can’t do that because 
of contractual rights’.  Whilst access 
contracts can be changed, the process is 
again cumbersome and slow, because of 
the need to get ORR approval which in 
turn requires formal consultation 
Political pressure leads to timetabling work being 
focused on meeting this pressure rather than on the 
best possible timetable 
DfT, Network Rail and the TOCs are all 
vulnerable to political pressure, and it is 
difficult to see this going away 
No one looks at overall timetable optimality This is now less true, with the Route 
Utilisation Strategies introduced by the 
Strategic Rail Authority and now Network 
Rail seeking to recommend how 
timetables should be structured and 
providing guidelines for franchise 
agreements and access contracts 
Franchising is undertaken in a piecemeal way which 
uses capacity inefficiently 
Because different franchises are let at 
different times, it is very difficult to 
undertake major ‘recasts’ of the timetable, 
as some operators always have franchise 
commitments and access contracts with 
continue beyond the proposed date for 
timetable change 
No “use it or lose it” clauses, leading to operators 
(particularly freight) having paths that they do not 
use but will not give up 
ORR has now resolved this by inserting 
‘’use it or lose it” clauses into access 
contracts 
No trading of rights – airlines trade rights to airport Trading is unlikely to become part of the 
 128 
slots in some cases: this would ‘free up’ network 
capacity 
timetabling process, due to the fact that 
most paths are subsidised by government 
and a trading market would in effect be 
the government bidding against itself  
Timetable changes must always be “win-win”, as a 
result of political pressure and contractual rigidity 
All too often good ideas are rejected 
because of the difficulties of 
implementation. This problem appears set 
to continue indefinitely 
Network Rail processes Overall Network Rail has control of the 
timetable – but it struggles to undertake 
the analysis and negotiation required in 
the time available in the processes to get 
optimal answers 
 
5.8 Conclusions  
 
Objectives for railway organisations and personnel regarding train planning have been 
set out and then categorised across several dimensions. 
 
Conflicts between objectives have been noted and it is clear that there is a need for 
elimination of these conflicts and/or the development of formal trade-off mechanisms.  
However, the elimination of conflicts between organisational objectives, e.g. between 
government’s desire for low subsidy and train operators’ objective of profit 
maximisation),is outside the scope of this thesis, focused as it is on train planning.  
Rather than seeking to develop trade-off mechanisms as such, the author of this 
research will in later chapters investigate software that can help to provide data to inform 
these trade-offs, by rapidly providing timetable options and by assessing the likely 
punctuality of different timetables. 
 
It is suggested that there are a number of other ways in which better achievement of 
objectives can be delivered – through better management, further changes to processes, 
better procedures and better trained and more focused train planning staff. 
 
Is there any scope for generalisation from the analysis undertaken in this chapter?  
Certainly the research fits into the general frameworks suggested in the literature, with 
confirmation of the proposition by Byars et al. (1996) that there will be different 
objectives at different levels of the organisation and that at lower levels objectives are 
much more likely to be ‘satisficers’ rather than working towards strategic objectives.  The 
value of undertaking this kind of analysis is also evident since understanding 
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mismatches between objectives is the starting point for making changes.  
 
One recurring theme mentioned by railway personnel is the need for better software to 
support the processes and the people in delivering the objectives set.  It is perhaps 
surprising that train planning tasks are performed largely without significant computer 
support and indeed from time to time researchers developing optimisation algorithms or 
packages for use in solving train planning problems note this (c.f. Wren, 1996), 
recognising that ”very few [models] are actually implemented and used in railway 
operations” (Cordeau et al., 1998).  This is an area that warrants research and hence the 
remainder of this thesis is devoted to understanding the software currently in use by train 
planners and to highlight were research and development could increase the ability of 
train planners to deliver effective timetables efficiently.   
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6 THE ROLE OF SOFTWARE IN SUPPORTING TRAIN 
PLANNING 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the software currently in use by train planners in 
Britain and then sets out the views of train planners as to where more help is needed.  A 
comparative analysis is then undertaken of the software support available in the closely 
aligned (in process terms) area of scheduling of mass transit operations.   
 
In addition to providing the groundwork for the analysis of specific software in the two 
chapters that follow, this chapter is intended to provide an insight into areas where 
software research and development would be of most benefit to train planners. 
 
Some of this chapter (including much of the section on train planners’ software 
requirements) has been developed from the author’s paper ‘Prospects for computer 
aided railway scheduling: perspectives from users and parallels from mass transit’ 
(Watson, 2000). 
 
6.2 Method 
 
The review of train planning software has been built up from a literature review together 
with the unstructured interviews with the users of some of the packages.  These 
interviews, undertaken in 1999, were also used to construct the section which sets out 
the views of train planners regarding the improvements to software that they would like 
to see to support them.   
 
The comparative analysis with mass transit was undertaken through a literature review 
together with written questionnaires sent to the leading providers of software for mass 
transit scheduling.  These questionnaires were developed with the support of ICL Ltd. in 
2000, as ICL was at the time investigating the potential for these packages for a railway 
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application in Scandinavia. 
 
6.3 Literature 
 
In line with the aims and objectives of this research, the literature reviewed focuses on 
application rather than theory or development. 
 
Earl (1989) suggests that software can be applied in four strategic ways: 
1. To gain a competitive advantage; 
2. To improve productivity and performance; 
3. To facilitate new ways of managing and organising; 
4. To develop new businesses. 
 
Each of these objectives can be related to train planning: 
1. Competitive advantage might be achieved by bidders for franchises – producing 
train plans that better match the requirements of the DfT, matching qualitative 
requirements more closely than other bidders or through producing timetables 
that will generate more revenue or train plans that will cost less; 
2. Improved productivity might be either of train planners or the resources they plan. 
Improved performance could again refer to the outputs of the train planners or 
the punctuality of the timetables produced; 
3. An example of a new organisational structure that software was intended to 
support has been described in chapter 4 above.  More generally, improved 
software could enable organisations to be restructured with fewer train planners 
employed; 
4. Better software might enable consultancies to enter markets that have been 
traditionally the domain of the train operators themselves. 
 
Peppard (1993) suggests that there are three types of software that can be applied in a 
business context: 
1. Data processing and transmission; 
2. Decision support, where data is presented to a decision maker: scenarios are 
modelled but no decision is made or proffered by the software; 
3. Expert systems. 
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The following sections of this chapter consider each of these as they apply to train 
planning. 
 
Daly (1993) suggests a further categorisation.  He compares ‘conventional’ software with 
expert systems as follows: 
 
Table 4  Conventional programs versus expert systems (from Daly, 1993) 
 
Conventional Software Expert System 
Algorithmic Heuristic 
Right/Wrong Probabilistic 
Static Evolving 
Works with data Works with information 
 
He defines expert systems as “programs that manipulate knowledge and expertise to 
solve problems efficiently and effectively” and comments that ”after many years of 
research and seemingly endless endeavour,….we began to see the emergence from the 
ivory tower of academia of a new multi-faceted commercially viable technology”.   
 
Barrett and Beerel (1988) define expert systems as ‘computer programs which can solve 
problems that would otherwise require a human expert’ and provide a definition of 
Artificial Intelligence of which expert systems are a subset: “the attempt to build 
machines which carry out tasks that would be considered to require intelligence if 
performed by a human”, explaining that this incorporates challenges such as 
understanding language, interpreting pictures and robotics as well as planning tasks. 
 
It is interesting to note that Drucker, back in 1954, said the following: “the attempt to 
replace judgement by formula is always irrational; all that can be done is to make 
judgement possible by narrowing its range and the available alternatives”, stressing that 
human judgement (i.e. an expert) would always be needed to balance objectives.  
Expert systems seek to codify that judgement and this can be very difficult – as Turban 
and Liebowitz (1992) report, “the sad fact is that the vast majority of expert systems 
being built are never used, or are used for a brief duration”. 
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A variety of reasons for this failure are cited by Watson and Buede (1987).  “Failure to 
involve the decision-maker in the experimental and iterative nature of the analysis; 
failure to appreciate the organizational and personal context of decision making; failure 
to explore ends as well as means”.  Barrett and Beerel (1988) are more ‘upbeat’ noting 
that “many experts seem to feel that they operate according to ‘intuition’ or ‘gut feel’, and 
that this know-how which they have acquired can never be trapped in a computer.  This 
is not the case.  Their know-how may be complex, and it may take effort to define, but if 
an expert can describe what he does then at least some fraction of his expertise can be 
recorded in an expert system”. 
 
Clear (1998) asserts that developers must not only understand how the ‘expert’ 
processes information but must also have a working knowledge of the wider subject area 
to define appropriately the series of ‘if...then’ rules. 
 
The two chapters that follow consider software which to a greater or lesser extent can be 
described as expert systems. 
 
6.4 A Brief Review of Current Train Planning Software 
 
6.4.1 ‘Data management’ packages 
 
In the terminology of the literature review, these packages perform data manipulation 
and transmission functions. 
 
Train planning processes in Network Rail and the train operators are predominantly 
supported by software tools that enable them to store and manipulate the core input data 
to the train planning process (this includes infrastructure data and performance 
characteristics about the trains that will run on that infrastructure, the ‘base data’ 
discussed in Chapter 3, together with the train schedules that are created from that base 
data).  Sophisticated graphical interfaces are used to enable train planners to move lines 
on the graphs to ‘flex’ train times to attempt to achieve the commercial specification 
required and eliminate any ‘conflicts’ between trains by ensuring that all trains obey the 
‘headway’ and ‘junction margin’ rules for every section of track.  The ‘headway’ is the 
time that the signalling system requires between trains travelling along the same track in 
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the same direction, while the ‘junction margin’ is the time that the signalling system 
requires between trains that cross one another’s paths.  These packages do not at 
present support the train planner by providing automatic ‘conflict detection’, defined as 
situations where trains breach the minimum headways or junction margins laid out in the 
Rules of the Plan.  Development of these packages continues, to better cope with the 
process of making short term variations to the timetable (e.g. to accommodate 
engineering work), to improve the effectiveness and speed of the graphical interface and 
to provide the planner with more information, by such facilities as ‘version comparison’ 
(listing where changes have been made from a previous edition of the timetable) and 
conflict detection (listing or showing graphically where the paths proposed infringe the 
rules for headways or junction margins).   
 
The packages also provide support for rolling stock diagramming and train crew 
diagramming, again without automatic identification of potential non-compliances with 
planning rules.  Again, developments are in hand by the suppliers to improve the 
functionality in this area. 
 
In Britain’s  ‘main line’ railway industry, Trainplan and Voyagerplan (previously PROTIM) 
are the commercially provided packages used for long term planning and short term 
planning.  For reviews of these packages see respectively Hammerton (1996) and 
Brooke (1996) and the suppliers’ websites (as at 2007, Funkwerk Enterprise 
Communications GmbH and Atos Origin respectively) for more up to date information.  
Trainplan is used predominantly by Network Rail, with a national database as a client 
server application accessed from the 4 train planning offices; Voyagerplan is used by 
train operators and typically is a ‘single site’ client server application.  London 
Underground uses its own software, although during 2007 DeltaRail were commissioned 
to replace this with a new system.  
 
DeltaRail’s Capacity Management Suite (CMS) contains a timetable editor (TTED), a 
national infrastructure data base (NID) and a rolling stock diagramming ‘bolt on’ and is 
used by some train operator owning groups and consultancies for forward planning 
work.  This will be the foundation of London Underground’s new system. 
 
The VIRIATO system is another package that sees limited use in Britain.  It has some 
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capability to detect and resolve conflicts, although this is intended to support the 
development of a regular interval ‘Swiss style’ timetable rather than the more complex 
irregular services that are typically adopted, to some extent at least, in Britain (Moreira 
and Oliveira, 2000). 
 
6.4.2 Timetable Simulation Packages 
 
Simulation packages represent an example of decision support software.  They contain 
some element of ‘expert systems’, in that some decisions are made by the software itself 
(e.g. replicating the decisions made by a signaller).  Ultimately though, the software does 
not seek to produce an optimal solution but simply provides information on the 
characteristics of different solutions for consideration by the train planner. 
 
In the train planning arena, simulation packages are used to take timetables developed 
using data management packages and to assess them for robustness (i.e. the amount of 
delay that a particular timetable will typically incur).  These are used by Network Rail, 
consultancies providing support to Network Rail and the Department for Transport.  
These packages take a timetable and overlay a number of possible perturbations (for 
instance, points failures or train breakdowns) and assess how much overall delay might 
be caused.  Timetables where there is little ‘knock on’ delay caused by a failure are 
robust; timetables where a lot of incremental delay occurs need further work, or, 
perhaps, indicate that the infrastructure is being used rather too close to the capacity 
limits for a robust timetable to be produced.  Typically, simulation packages require very 
detailed infrastructure maps, down to individual turnouts and signals and, hence, are 
complex and time consuming to set up and run.  By contrast the data management tools 
described in the previous section use a less detailed – and therefore less accurate – 
model of the railway.  Simulation packages are frequently used as ‘strategic planning’ 
tools to validate infrastructure improvements for robustness and are also used, for the 
same purpose, where major restructuring of a timetable is intended.  Typically they are 
run for a single station or just a few miles of infrastructure.  Time constraints mean that 
these packages are rarely used as part of the tactical planning process or, until recently, 
to examine ‘whole route’ effects during strategic planning.   
 
The use of simulation packages is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
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6.4.3 Train Plan Generation and ‘Optimisation’ Tools 
 
A small number of software tools are now being developed that seek to provide a much 
more sophisticated aid to train planners – seeking to take a set of objectives and 
constraints and to use the power of computers, typically through the use of linear 
programming or heuristics, such as simulated annealing or genetic algorithms, to ‘create’ 
timetables, rolling stock diagrams or train crew diagrams and then to attempt to find the 
best, or close to the best, sets of train paths or diagrams when judged against a set of 
pre-defined objectives.  These are genuinely ‘expert systems’. 
 
The main example of a timetable generator in Britain comes from AEA Technology Rail 
(now DeltaRail) and was developed substantially at Railtrack’s expense.  This is 
discussed in the following chapter.   
 
There are a number of tools available to train planners to semi-automate diagram 
production and those that are used in Britain are included in Table 5 below.  As these 
diagramming tools are well developed and have been well documented elsewhere, 
these are not explored further in this thesis. 
 
Table 5: Tools to semi-automate diagram production (Source: Author) 
 
Rolling stock diagramming CMS, from Deltarail (AEA Technology Rail, 2005) 
 DISPO, from IVE Hannover (Radtke and Horstel, 1994) 
Train crew diagramming TrainTRACS, developed by the computing department of 
Leeds University and now available from Tracsis (c.f. 
Fores et al. 2001) 
 CREWS developed by SISCOG of Portugal (c.f. Morgado 
and Martins, 1998) 
 
6.4.4 Strategic Tools 
 
A small number of strategic tools exist – tools that do not require a detailed link-node 
model of the network and a detailed timetable, of the sort found in Trainplan and 
Voyagerplan.  For instance, DeltaRail has developed a ‘capacity utilisation index’ 
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(Gibson et al., 2002; Lampkin, 2002) which attempts to assess how close to ‘full’ 
sections of the railway network are.  These tools inevitably make considerable 
simplifications, e.g. the CUI has difficulty in providing an appropriate value in complex 
areas, as it has no understanding of ‘nodes’ (junctions and station), which are often the 
factors that limit capacity. 
 
Researchers abroad (c.f. papers in Hansen, 2007, Goverde and Odijk, 2002, Lucchini, 
Curchod and Rivier, 2001) are putting considerable effort into attempting to develop high 
level measures appropriate for forward planning, and so it may be the case in the future 
that tools of this type come to be used with success in Britain. 
 
These strategic tools have been regarded as ‘out of scope’ because they are usually 
regarded as being outside the boundaries of train planning.  
 
6.5 The Views of Train Planners on the Need for Improved 
Software 
 
6.5.1 Interview Results 
 
Typically (but not necessarily obviously) train planners do not ask for support in solving 
conflicting requirements and optimising resource utilisation (that could in theory be 
solved by a ‘generator’ or ‘optimiser’) but rather ask for help with the elimination or 
reduction of the repetitive data manipulation tasks that delay them from tackling the 
‘interesting’ conflict resolution and optimisation work.  
 
Thus the avoidance of data re-keying between systems is a primary requirement, 
followed by support for data formatting and preparation (e.g. producing the printed 
timetable at the end of the process) and then better visualisation of train schedules, 
preferably with ‘interactive graphical edit’ to enable the planner to move around lines that 
represent train services on screen and see the effect on other services immediately.  
Next in priority for help comes ‘error detection’ and ‘conflict detection’, i.e. showing 
where intervention is necessary.   
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Train planners rarely asked for robustness checking software or optimisation software 
which might help them achieve more complete conflict resolution, resource cost 
minimisation or reliability improvement.  When prompted, they were sceptical about 
whether this was technically feasible and noted that a software tool that produced a 
‘90%’ solution would be of little use, as it might be necessary to start again from scratch 
to develop a full solution. 
 
The priorities for software support derived from interviews with train planners are set out, 
ranked, in the table below, together with key issues raised. 
 
Table 6: Train Planners’ Priorities for Software Support (Source: Author) 
 
TRAIN PLANNER REQUIREMENTS 
 
 ISSUES  
1. Avoidance of data rekeying Users are currently rekeying in a number 
of areas (e.g. engineering work, train and 
infrastructure performance 
characteristics).  However, if they do not 
rekey, they need output that confirms 
data quality and provides analysis of data 
imported 
2. Data preparation and access Need simple ways of coping with 
different ‘days run’ scenarios (minor 
differences due to Bank Holidays and 
engineering work, which can lead to an 
explosion of data) 
3. Data formatting (e.g. printed timetable 
preparation) 
Old systems exist which are largely 
satisfactory in terms of the quality of 
output, although somewhat laborious to 
use – including not being ‘WYSIWYG’ 
(what you see is what you get).  The key 
problem is keeping in step with late 
changes made in ‘up stream’ systems 
4. Schedule edit/visualisation Existing systems have problems with 
graphical representation of complex 
infrastructure (e.g. parallel running lines, 
major junctions). 
Existing systems also have a major 
problem with speed of drawing train 
graphs on screen (can take several 
minutes for even a small geographic 
area, partly due to network speed but 
also to inherent weaknesses in the 
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software design) 
5. Schedule error/conflict detection More support needed – particularly for 
complex areas 
6.  Robustness checking (only mentioned 
when prompted) 
Train Planners understand the need for 
this but consider it a ‘nice to have’ rather 
than a ‘need to have’.  They consider that 
a skilled train planner can by ‘eye’ and 
experience tell whether a timetable will 
perform well or not. 
7. Schedule generation/optimisation (only 
mentioned when prompted) 
Train Planners are sceptical about the 
benefits of tools of this nature - an 
automated solution that does not 
completely solve the problem may be of 
no use at all - it may be easier to start 
again from scratch.  It should be noted 
that, because the amount of manual 
intervention required is not known until 
the programme has run, optimisation 
does not help with planning workload and 
achievement of production timescales 
 
6.5.2 Analysis 
 
The above section provides a detailed list of objectives for software improvement that 
need to be considered alongside the broader objectives set out in the section in the last 
chapter on ‘compliance with train planning best practice’. 
 
Supporting the views of train planners, it is essential that planners should have all the 
data they need to do their jobs in the systems that support them - they should not have 
to keep in their heads or on paper any of the information they need, most obviously the 
headway and junction margin data and similar that is essential to undertake the conflict 
resolution task.  As far as possible the tasks should be automated and, where that is not 
possible for the time being, the tasks should be straight forward.  All this is essential to 
make sure that the plans that result are consistent with the Rules of the Plan so that 
there is a reasonable chance that they are robust. 
 
Reducing time pressures on train planners by eliminating rekeying and automating data 
preparation would appear to be a priority.  The time freed up can be used in several 
ways.   The most obvious use of this time is to improve the quality of the timetables and 
diagrams produced - this gives a short term gain.  The more perceptive (and typically 
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more senior) train planners note, however, that this does not move forward the 
achievement of substantial efficiency improvements through the successful 
implementation of sophisticated new software.  Train planner involvement in software 
development is essential if the software is to be successful and, hence, some argued 
that the most appropriate way of using the time freed up by early improvements is to use 
it to support the development of requirements specifications and the testing of new 
software.  In practice a mix of these two ways of using the time created would appear to 
be most appropriate. 
 
Following on from this, tools must be provided which standardise train planning tasks 
and procedures and eliminate errors.  This would give quality improvements and 
improves efficiency by reducing the amount of rework required.  
 
Once these basic functions have been successfully addressed by the software, schedule 
generation/optimisation software that supports the development of more efficient 
schedules can be developed.  Not discussed by train planners, but the logical final step 
(to replace the iteration between process steps) is the development, eventually, of 
software that integrates timetabling, rolling stock diagramming and train crew 
diagramming, looking to optimise across these tasks. 
 
The following table puts this analysis into a priority list. 
 
Table 7: Summarised Priorities for Train Planning Software Development (Source: Author) 
 
1.  Tools that reduce production timescale pressures  
2.  Tools that promote best practice processes and support 
the production of error free outputs 
3.  Robustness checking software 
4.  Schedule generation/optimisation software that supports 
the development of more effective schedules  
5.  Software that integrates timetabling, rolling stock 
diagramming and train crew diagramming, looking to optimise 
across these tasks  
 
In the following two chapters, software is considered that seeks to address the first four 
of these priorities – firstly timetable generation software which covers the first, second 
and fourth and secondly simulation software which assesses timetable robustness (the 
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third priority). 
 
6.6 Comparative Analysis – Mass Transit Use of Scheduling 
Software 
 
6.6.1 The Relevance of Mass Transit Experiences 
 
The term Mass Transit is generally used to encompass urban public transport 
operations, be they road (‘bus) or rail (tram, train or underground/subway).  These are 
substantial undertakings with often many hundreds or even thousands of vehicles, many 
more staff and a complex network of connecting services.  
 
To what extent are mass transit operations comparable with railways and therefore of 
relevance to this thesis?  Similarities include the need to schedule vehicles and people, 
often based at a number of depots and, for the rail mode, to manage infrastructure 
capacity issues.  The basic rules for scheduling vehicles and people are inevitably 
virtually identical, although there are typically more, and more complex, rules that apply 
to railway operations and, hence, findings should be transferrable to ‘main line’ railways.  
More obvious differences include the absence of freight traffic from mass transit 
operations and the greater distances and often greater network complexity of ‘main line’ 
railway operations. 
 
6.6.2 Mass Transit User Needs 
 
The proceedings of the Computer Aided Transit Scheduling conferences, more recently 
titled Computer-Aided Scheduling of Public Transport (Daduna and Wren, 1990, 
Rousseau, 1992, Daduna et al., 1995, Wilson, 1999, Voss and Daduna, 2001) provide 
rich coverage of the state of development of software to support mass transit scheduling.  
 
Hoffstadt (1990, at the 1988 conference) considered management and planning staff 
objectives.  He found that management wants to reduce subsidies, reduce operating 
costs or run more services for a given cost whilst planning staff want help with handling 
time-consuming routine work to give time to process short term changes more 
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effectively.   
 
Elms (1990), describing the experiences of London Buses, noted that scheduling 
expertise is a key driver in controlling staff costs and observed that larger benefits can 
be derived from tackling the schedule optimisation problems than data transfer and 
management - because improvements in scheduling have greater ‘leverage’, attacking 
the much larger operating staff cost rather than the relatively small scheduling team.  
However, he conceded that addressing the support functions first may be ‘quicker and 
cheaper’ and he indicated that, when addressed, substantial staff savings can be made.   
 
Reporting on the successful implementation of scheduling software at SEMTA 
(Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority) Campbell (1990) set out some 
features that the software needs to have, including speed of processing, so that the 
scheduler does not have to wait for background tasks to complete, and a high quality 
graphical interface.  He notes that schedulers have good reasons for tending to use 
large pieces of paper for manual scheduling.   
 
Wallace (1995) set out what drove London Underground to invest in computer 
scheduling.  The driver for software development here was very different to the previous 
reviews: automated signalling systems needed train service data to feed them; this data 
in turn needed to be error and conflict free.  Hence error and conflict detection software 
was in place before schedule edit and generation programmes. 
 
A common thread through these papers is that the speed of processing and efficiency of 
the resulting schedules are key drivers in the introduction of scheduling software.  
Another common thread is that basic ‘support functions’ are best encompassed first 
(Elms 1990) with automation of scheduling functions coming later.   
  
This matches well the priorities of train planners as set out in the last section. 
 
6.6.3 Mass Transit and ‘Main Line’ Train Planning Software 
Compared 
 
The close parallels between mass transit and railways would lead one to expect that 
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scheduling software would develop in parallel.  The extent to which this is true is now 
considered. 
 
Daduna and Pinto Paxao (1995) noted that, for mass transit scheduling, initial effort (in 
the 1960s) focused on data processing, with schedule generation and optimisation not 
gaining wide acceptance due to the processing limits of the computers of the time and 
the limited effectiveness of the algorithms.  They also noted that a three stage process 
needs to be supported (preparation, automatic scheduling and interactive alteration, 
graphic and alpha-numeric).  Hoffstadt (1990) predicted that major areas for software 
development would be (and indeed were) in the provision of user-friendly interfaces, 
data management systems and computer networks. 
 
Today, mass transit scheduling software such as HASTUS (Giro, 2007) and Trapeze 
(Trapeze, 2007) provides considerable support for mass transit schedulers, including 
automated schedule generation and optimisation.  Development is now extending into 
‘real time’ scheduling.  This compares with railway scheduling, where optimisation tools 
are only just beginning to be developed and much software development effort is still 
being spent on improving more basic data manipulation and edit functions.  It is clear 
that mass transit scheduling has become far more automated than railway scheduling 
(c.f. Borndorfer et al., 1998).   
 
Cordeau et al. (1998) suggest that solutions currently offered for rail have tended to lack 
realism.  Wren and Rousseau (1995) assert that the complicated rules that are so much 
more prevalent in railway scheduling problems have a profound effect and note that, for 
many specific railway problems, modification to the basic algorithm is needed to produce 
a satisfactory solution (see also Ferriera, 1997).  This is particularly true in the area of 
timetabling, where rail networks are very significantly more complex than mass transit 
networks.  Wren also notes that changing rules are a particular problem where 
algorithms have, of necessity, been adapted to particular circumstances.   
 
Cordeau et al. also suggest that there has been a lack of urgency within railways to 
improve efficiency and hence spend money on scheduling software. 
 
A significant feature of the railway software development scene is that it is very 
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fragmented, with most railways having their own bespoke software.  This can be 
contrasted with the more successful mass transit scheduling packages, which have a 
very wide international customer base, with the opportunity to share specification, 
development and testing costs. 
 
Overall it is apparent that railway scheduling software development is some years 
behind mass transit scheduling software.  There are a variety of reasons for this, 
including the complexity of the problem, the commitment of the railway industry to use 
advanced algorithms and the software supply industry structure.   
 
6.7 Conclusions   
 
It is clear that there is a considerable need for improved software to support train 
planning processes.  Even basic data management tasks are not fully automated, whilst 
more sophisticated tools which could generate solutions and potentially optimise them 
too are considered a ‘pipe dream’. 
 
Whilst it would have been interesting and valuable to explore all of the areas of potential 
software development set out in earlier sections it has been necessary to be selective for 
reasons of time. 
 
The investigation of how to enhance the basic data management software to better 
support the needs of train planners has not been pursued because this does not require 
substantial research – it requires detailed specification, software coding and 
implementation.  At the other end of the requirements list, the development of process-
wide optimisation tools that integrate timetabling, rolling stock diagramming and train 
crew diagramming, looking to optimise across these tasks, is dependent on, firstly, being 
able to construct software that reliably produces software for the individual process 
steps.  As tools to do this do not currently exist, there is no adequate base on which to 
develop these tools at present. 
 
This leaves simulation and timetable generation and optimisation as two key areas 
where research could help hasten their deployment and hence these areas are explored 
in the following chapters. 
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7 USE OF HEURISTICS IN TIMETABLE GENERATION 
AND OPTIMISATION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter has as its focus the use of expert systems and, in particular, heuristics in 
timetable generation and optimisation.  
 
This is not an Operations Research thesis and, hence, discussion of the principles of 
heuristics and their development is restricted to a high level description of the nature of 
the timetabling problem from an operations research prospective and a literature review 
of research work in the area of heuristics as applied to timetabling.  This is provided as 
background to the discussion, from a business perspective, of timetable generation and 
optimisation.   
 
Following sections on research method and literature, the bulk of this chapter is 
concentrated on analysing the only heuristic-based tool currently available in Britain, the 
Planning Timetable Generator, and analysing the extent to which it is ‘fit for purpose’, in 
the sense that it usefully supports train planners in meeting the objectives they are set 
and where improvements need to be made.  In particular, it is necessary to consider the 
extent to which the software offers: 
 
· A worthwhile reduction in timetable development timescales; 
· Facilitation of the assessment of a wide range of timetables; 
· Facilitation of the assessment of the feasibility of a range of different commercial 
specifications over a variety of different possible future infrastructures. 
 
Much of this chapter has been peer reviewed prior to presentation at conferences 
(Watson et al., 2000; Watson, 2003; Watson, 2006). 
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7.2 Methodology 
 
Two primary research methods have been used to provide material for this chapter. 
 
Firstly, analytical reviews (in effect semi-structured interviews) have been undertaken 
with the developers of the Planning Timetable Generator (PTG) and train planners 
attempting to use the tool.  These were focused on issues that have arisen in attempting 
to get satisfactory results.   
 
Secondly, participant observation and experiments have been undertaken through 
‘hands on’ use of the software, thanks to support from Railtrack (now Network Rail) and 
AEA Technology Rail (now DeltaRail).  This included the provision of a researcher for a 
year to gain additional ‘hands on’ experience of PTG.   
 
A literature review follows, to provide background to the primary research. 
 
7.3 Literature Review 
 
7.3.1 Heuristics: Principles and Appropriateness for Train 
Planning Problems 
 
Several primers in the use of heuristics are available, including: Burke and Kendall (eds.) 
(2005), Michalewicz & Fogel (2000) and Reeves (1993).  Taken together, these books 
provide a good grounding in how to use heuristics and how to choose which heuristic to 
use to address a particular problem.  Gilroy and Robertson (2001) provide an 
introduction to the use of heuristics in timetabling.  The remainder of this section draws 
heavily on this paper.  
 
The development of train plans is in operations research terms a complex ‘search 
problem’.  There are many variables, broadly split between those that make up the 
business specification (sometimes called objectives) and those that relate to the 
feasibility of the timetable (sometimes called constraints).  Robustness is also an 
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important issue (this is both an objective – good punctuality – and a constraint – there is 
a minimum acceptable level of punctuality).  Potentially millions of different combinations 
of train schedules need to be created and compared, to assess which is the best in 
terms of meeting the objectives, whilst not breaching any of the constraints.  To use the 
jargon of this research field, to find a solution the planner or computer has to examine 
the problem’s ‘search space’. 
 
Creating a timetable comes from a class of mathematical problems known as ‘NP-Hard’  
because the search space can be very large as it expands as the number of trains is 
increased but, more significantly, as the size of the model in terms of geographical 
coverage and complexity increases.  When considered by train planners the size of the 
search space is often reduced very substantially by only considering small changes to 
an existing timetable.  When ‘recasts’ (major timetable changes) are considered 
necessary, simplifying assumptions are typically and often sub-consciously made by the 
train planner and a large range of potential solutions will simply be ignored.   Although 
computing power continues to increase year by year, the vast number of options that 
exist means that it is not possible for a software tool to consider all the possibilities and 
so the search for good solutions has to be ‘directed’ to some extent.  In the case of 
software this direction needs to be explicitly written into the tool, whereas the train 
planner tends to use experience and intuition to decide on which timetable structures to 
explore. 
 
The literature suggests that heuristic based techniques are particularly appropriate for 
this type of problem.  Heuristics are methods of ‘trial and error’ that attempt to 
progressively improve solutions to move towards an optimum.  Heuristics do not 
‘optimise’ in the absolute sense, as there is no guarantee that they will find the best 
possible solution.  The quality of the solution depends on the quality of the heuristic and 
the number of attempts made to find the best solution, which in turn is usually a function 
of the amount of computing power used.  It is the huge leap in computing power over the 
last decade, linked to the development of heuristics, that has made solving ‘real live’ 
timetabling problems using computers possible. 
   
The method for using a heuristic approach to timetabling is to create a timetable and 
then assess it using a set of ‘costs’ or ‘penalties’ which ‘score’ the timetable in terms of 
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its achievement of constraints and objectives.  Having scored one timetable a further 
timetable or timetables are generated, using a set of rules for how these timetable(s) are 
to be devised, which may be to make major or minor changes to a timetable which has 
already been created or to go ‘back to the drawing board’ and create another timetable 
from scratch.  Comparing the scores for these different timetables then provides 
guidance on where in the ‘search space’ the tool should (or should not) look next.  This 
process continues until a pre-defined milestone is reached – which can be, for instance, 
a number of iterations or a particular ‘score’. 
 
7.3.2 Published Operations Research Work in the Area of 
Timetabling 
 
Research work has been under way for some years to develop and implement software 
that can provide much greater support and, gradually, should enable better schedules 
(both in terms of robustness and efficient use of resources) to be produced in less time.  
Bussieck et al. (1997), Caprara et al. (1997), Cordeau et al. (1998) and Ferreira (1997) 
provide useful summaries of these developments up to the late 1990s, covering 
timetable planning, crew and rolling stock scheduling, freight car routing, yard models, 
car management (all focused on a freight-dominated North American/Australian-style 
freight railway operation).  More recent work has been presented at the on-going series 
of Computer-Aided Scheduling of Public Transport conferences (2000, 2003, 2006) and 
seminars of the International Association of Rail Operations Research (2005 and 2007). 
 
Work focused on generating timetables was limited until the last few years, and, as 
Carey (1994) highlighted (and this has not changed materially since), what there was 
tended to focus on single track railways (c.f.  Mees, 1995; Brannlund et al., 1998; 
Higgins et al., 1996; and Salim and Cai, 1997), appropriate for North America and 
Australia, but of very limited relevance for typical European railways or complex Mass 
Transit networks, with short headways, trains every few minutes and diverging routes or 
connections to be maintained. 
 
Of relevance is work looking to construct timetables so as to achieve an overall 
customer benefit, such as minimising passenger waiting time (c.f. Daduna & Voss, 
1995), or a combination of this and operating cost (c.f. Chang et al., 2000; Nachtigall and 
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Voget, 1997).  Whilst this is focused on the passenger, it does not fit very well with the 
developing European railway industry structure, where railway infrastructure providers 
need to focus on the requirements of their customers, the train operators, more than the 
ultimate customer, the passenger or the freight shipper.   
 
Carey worked for some years on the generation of timetables for complex European 
railway networks.  In papers in 1994, 1995, 2000, 2003 and 2007, he describes and 
extends the discussion on algorithms to generate timetables, highlighting along the way 
the particular problem of station infrastructure complexity and considering whether this 
should be treated as a separate computing task.  Comparable work has also been 
undertaken in the Netherlands.  Kroon et al. (1997) and Odijk (1996) providing early 
papers setting out work to develop algorithms for generating railway timetables; this has 
culminated in the development and implementation of the ‘DONS’ software package for 
Railned, the Netherlands state-owned railway infrastructure provider (Hooghiemstra et 
al., 1999).   
 
More recently work on timetable generation has continued to emerge from Dutch 
universities, but focused typically on generating a ‘standard hour’ timetable (Peeters and 
Kroon, 2001; Liebchen, 2003) rather than the less regular type of timetable often found 
in the UK.  The number of papers, and the complexity of the timetabling problem being 
investigate, have increased in the last few years, with Leibchen (2007), Rodrigue (2007), 
Ingolotti et al. (2006), Tormos et al. (2007) describing research underway seeking to 
generate feasible timetables for complex European railways.  The European 
Commission now provides a web site for researchers to share information on research 
under way in this area (EU, 2008). 
 
Also of interest is the approach adopted by London Underground through until 2008, 
which was the subject of a paper presented by Wallace (1995), although ‘metro’ 
operations have rather simpler timetabling challenges than ‘main line’ railways.   
 
A ‘Railway Timetabling Optimizer’ has been developed by Eurobios (a technology 
consultancy) in conjunction with Italian Railways and a demonstration given by the 
developers suggests that it has similarities with the software (PTG) discussed in detail in 
the next section, although it lacks some of the sophisticated capability of PTG (see 
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Eurobios, 2007).  
 
This researcher has not attempted to understand any of these research and 
development projects in detail, but he has concluded from reviewing the literature that 
none are especially suitable for the UK situation, where complex ‘all day’ timetables 
need to be produced. 
 
The remainder of this chapter focuses in on software that has been developed 
specifically with British railway operations in mind – the Planning Timetable Generator. 
 
7.4 An Example of Timetable Generation and Optimisation 
Software – the ‘Planning Timetable Generator’ 
 
7.4.1 Early Development 
 
The Planning Timetable Generator (PTG) started life as an MSc project undertaken in 
1992.  The project was carried out by Simon Adcock at the London School of Economics 
as part of his studies towards an MSc in Operational Research (OR).  It was sponsored 
by the British Rail OR Division (BROR) and supervised by Stewart Robertson (whilst 
working for AEA Technology Rail, the successor to BROR).  The following description of 
this research has been developed from conversations with Stewart Robertson and an 
unpublished AEA report ‘the PTG Heuristic’ (Gilroy & Robertson, 2001). 
  
The objective of the project was to investigate whether the heuristic technique known as 
simulated annealing might be applicable to timetable optimisation.  Simulated Annealing 
is a heuristic optimisation method based on an analogy to the physical process of 
annealing, where random changes made to a crystalline structure gradually decrease as 
the temperature drops and the structure settles into its optimal form (Gilroy and 
Robertson, 2001).   A good introduction to Simulated Annealing is provided by Aarts et 
al. (2005). 
 
Adcock sought to prove the principle by using a simulated annealing heuristic to create a 
timetable for a single direction on a single commuter line (Northampton-London).  The 
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program determined the stopping patterns of a pre-specified number of trains in the peak 
hour such that: 
· Each station had at least a specified number of trains calling at it; 
· The required headways were maintained; 
· Passenger loadings (estimated using a very simple method) were balanced. 
The project succeeded in demonstrating that the simulated annealing technique held 
promise.   
 
In the summers of 1993 and 1994, BROR sponsored a further student projects at LSE to 
build on the Adcock work.  The objective function was improved, for instance, by 
incorporating the desirability of achieving even-interval services from each station.  The 
underlying representation of the utilisation of the railway network was extended to cover 
the fast and slow lines on a commuter route (Reading-London).  Increasingly 
sophisticated methods of estimating the passenger loadings and revenue consequences 
of each timetable were built in.   
 
Unfortunately, with privatisation the research and development budget that BROR had 
had the benefit of disappeared and, also as a result of privatisation, the train planning 
process was fragmented, with no one party responsible for meeting demand and 
developing the timetable.  There was therefore a gap in development until, in 1997, 
Graeme Cooper of Railtrack’s Access Planning department was given a remit to explore 
new possibilities in operational planning, and he commissioned a feasibility study to 
demonstrate the possibility of creating timetables using optimisation techniques to 
achieve objectives set.  In discussion with the author in 1999, prior to the author and Ian 
Bradshaw reviewing the usefulness of PTG, Graeme described how development for 
Railtrack of an automatic timetable generation package was originally justified for use in 
strategic planning on the basis that Railtrack had a very substantial infrastructure 
investment requirement to manage and the inability of train planners to test out large 
numbers of options relating to the train service required in future years and the 
infrastructure that might be provided was seen to be a key constraint.  High level 
business objectives for the development were set as facilitating an examination of a 
wider range of options, a more thorough evaluation of the achievement of objectives by 
each option and a better understanding of what could be achieved without infrastructure 
investment. 
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This latter study was carried out by Stewart Robertson and Richard Mann, by then of 
TCI, the company who had bought BROR (this company was subsequently bought by 
AEA Technology Rail).  The study implemented a simulated annealing heuristic, not, 
they note, because this was necessarily the best way of approaching the problem, but 
because the 1992-1994 studies had demonstrated that it was viable, in principle, and the 
short timescales did not permit exploration and implementation of any alternatives.   
 
The 1997 study was judged successful by Railtrack and further funding was provided to 
improve the objective function and develop a ‘production quality’ package that could be 
used by Railtrack staff.  A number of enhancements were made which included:  
(i) modelling trains in both directions on a multiple-track route; (ii) maintaining prescribed 
headways and margins between trains; (iii) allowing even intervals between trains to be 
specified;(iv) allowing ‘clock-face’ times (e.g. xx00, xx15, xx30, xx45) to be specified 
[note that this definition of ‘clock-face’ is different from that usually employed which is ‘at 
the same minutes past each hour’ (see e.g. Rail, 2008, in references); (v) allowing 
minimum and maximum connectional times to be specified; and (vi) allowing minimum 
and maximum turn-round times to be specified.  As part of the development process 
Railtrack commissioned a number of studies to trial the application of the model: these 
studies included the East Coast Main Line, the Coventry-Birmingham corridor, the 
London-Brighton line, the southern part of the West Coast Main Line and the Heathrow-
London routes.  
 
7.4.2 Overview of PTG 
 
Given a set of trains to be run and their times for trains to run between stations, PTG 
initially creates a timetable using a random assignment of journey start times.  This 
timetable will [usually] breach constraints and be sub-optimal in meeting the objectives 
set.  The tool then attempts to move to a solution which is feasible (i.e. no constraints 
are broken) and optimal (i.e. the best possible timetable in terms of meeting the 
objectives set), based on the repeated application of a seven step process for a large 
number of iterations: 
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1. Make a small change to the timetable; 
2. Assess the cost of the new timetable compared with the old.  The PTG cost 
function evaluates both the operational constraints and the commercial 
objectives shown in the table below: 
 
Table 8: PTG Cost Function Variables (Source: Gilroy and Robertson, 2001) 
 
Headways 
Bi-directional Reoccupation 
Absolute Block Reoccupation 
Run-throughs (trains ‘overtaking’ other trains on the 
same track) 
Junction Margins 
Platform Occupation 
Operational 
Pathing 
Key Times 
Clockface timings 
Evenness by Service Groups 
Turnround by Service Groups 
Commercial 
Connections 
3. Decide whether to accept the change based on the cost difference and 
temperature.  A probability factor is applied which decides whether a new 
timetable with a worse cost is still accepted.  The ability to accept a worse 
timetable is an important feature that prevents the heuristic from being ‘trapped’ 
in a region of the search space and only being able to find a local optimum for 
that area.  The probability of accepting a worse solution decreases as the 
temperature decreases; 
4. If the change was accepted then compare the new timetable to the best 
timetable; 
5. If it is better then make it the best; 
6. Reduce the scope for the algorithm to make big changes to the timetable. 
7. If the iteration limit has not been reached then repeat from (1), otherwise 
terminate the application and output the best timetable. 
 
PTG splits its search into two phases: phase 1 allows larger random changes than 
phase 2.  Phase 1 attempts to steer the heuristic to a good region of the search space 
(i.e. one where the objectives are tending to be met relatively well and where constraints 
are not being broken) by moving a train at a time by up to 59½ minutes.  Phase 2 seeks 
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to find an optimum in that space by moving trains a maximum of a minute (with the 
default settings).  The screen shot below shows the form where the train planner can set 
the Simulated Annealing parameters for each phase.  Three ‘moves’ (types of ‘flex’ in 
train planners’ parlance) are available: changing the departure time, adding pathing time 
(extra journey time) somewhere en route and rerouting the train somewhere en route 
(e.g. moving it from the fast to the slow lines). 
 
Table 9: PTG Phases (Source: Gilroy and Robertson, 2001) 
 
 
 
7.4.3 Detailed Description of PTG 
 
This section draws on the PTG manual produced by AEA Technology Rail (AEA 2003). 
 
7.4.3.1 Inputs and Outputs 
 
The specification for PTG required the following inputs and outputs: 
 
 155 
Table 10: PTG Inputs and Outputs (Source: Gilroy and Robertson, 2001) 
 
Each of these elements is now considered. 
 
7.4.3.2 The Commercial Specification 
 
Considerable thought was put by the development team into how the train service 
required should be specified.  Whilst it was undoubtedly the case that passenger 
volumes and the minimisation of passenger journey time were the underlying drivers of 
the train service requirement, it was considered that this was too distant from the 
business drivers for an infrastructure provider (Railtrack) and, hence, it was decided that 
the ‘commercial specification’ should be based on the requirements of the infrastructure 
provider’s customers, the train operators.  Many of these requirements are now 
enshrined in the access agreements that are in place between the train operators and 
Railtrack (and subsequently Network Rail) and hence it was possible to use these 
agreements as the starting point.  Analysis concluded that the following elements would 
need to be incorporated in the commercial specification to be input to the timetable 
generator:  
· A list of types of trains which were to feature in the timetable, with details of their 
routes and stopping patterns; 
· Details of specific times at which specific trains might have to run at (or very 
close to) a specific time, (e.g. to meet a particular market need); 
· Details of regular intervals required for those services made up of several trains 
per hour (that is to say the need for even spacing of services, say every 20 
minutes, rather than with gaps of 18, 17 and then 25 minutes); 
· Turnaround times of trains at termini being within specified limits (recognising 
that rolling stock utilisation is an important issue for train operators but that a 
minimum turn round time is needed for servicing and robustness of the 
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timetable); 
· Required ranges for connectional times between specific ‘main line’ and ‘branch’ 
trains; 
· Trains required to have ‘rounded’, commercially attractive departure times, 
sometimes called clock-face (e.g. xx00, xx15, xx30, etc.); 
· Weighting of particular services to ensure their priority (e.g. for prestigious 
express services); 
· A general requirement (possibly with some relaxation) that pathing time should 
be minimised.  Pathing time is a delay planned into a train schedule to cope with 
congestion on the network - it is time spent waiting for the track or junction in 
front of the train to be free.  
 
7.4.3.3 Infrastructure and ‘Rules of the Plan’ 
 
The physical mapping of the network is held in a number of systems at a number of 
different levels.  PTG works off the ‘National Infrastructure Database (NID)’ created by 
AEA Technology Rail (now DeltaRail).  The ‘Rules of the Plan’ specify, amongst other 
things, the minimum headways and margins at junctions that are required between 
successive trains at each location and the point-to-point timings which are achievable by 
different kinds of rolling stock on the route and these are held in the NID. 
   
An important business requirement was that data input should be kept to a minimum, as 
this otherwise can increase substantially the cost of setting up and keeping current the 
base data.  This proved to be a considerable challenge, as Railtrack did not previously 
have at its disposal one database that contained a physical representation of the 
infrastructure at the level of detail required, together with the necessary signalling 
characteristics of that infrastructure. Inevitably, therefore, an amount of manual input 
was required.  
  
The task of specifying potential for conflicting movements between trains was 
particularly challenging. Here, to minimise the input, at stations and complex junctions 
the NID only holds the data necessary to check that trains do not come into conflict with 
one another.  For example, Figure 16 is a representation (one direction only) of the 
infrastructure layout at Alexandra Palace, London: 
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Figure 16: NID Junction Conflicts (Source: Gilroy and Robertson, 2001) 
 
 
 
Here the following train movements are possible: 
 
 
 
The system needs to understand that there is a conflict point, so that it cannot route 
these two trains at the same time and not report that there is a problem.  To solve this, a 
‘Conflict Point’ is input to the NID for the point indicated. 
 
                                 
 
As a further route to minimising data entry for the PTG user, basic data regarding train 
journey times and stopping patterns can be transferred to PTG from the tactical planning 
systems Trainplan and Voyagerplan; the commercial aspirations for that service can 
then be attached within PTG. 
 
7.4.3.4 Generating Timetables 
 
The simulated annealing approach used produces solutions for an 'hourly pattern’ 
service over a complex network quite quickly (perhaps ½ an hour) and, given more 
processing time, can extend this to cover up to a full 24 hour period (typically run 
overnight).   
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PTG examines potentially hundreds of thousands of trial timetables during a run.  Each 
trial timetable contains a complete set of timings for each train listed in the commercial 
specification.  Since, in any particular situation, it is by no means guaranteed that a 
feasible (i.e. conflict-free) timetable can be created, PTG allows the trial timetables to 
contain conflicts between trains.  It evaluates each trial timetable to determine the 
number of conflicts, and the extent of departure from the 'ideal' commercial and 
operational characteristics expressed in the commercial specification.  There is a 
'penalty' or 'cost' associated with each violation of operational rules (headway violations 
etc) and each failure to meet the commercial specification.  Each category of violation is 
given a weight by the user to reflect its relative importance in the planning process. The 
importance of each train can also be reflected so that contractual obligations can take 
precedence over non-essential aspirations. The penalties for each train are combined 
into a 'cost' for each timetable, and the algorithm searches for the timetable with the 
lowest possible 'cost'. 
 
The key operational cost categories used are: 
 
1 Run through - the cost applied to ‘illegal overtakes’ and ‘collisions’ in a solution.  
These are given a considerably higher cost than any other unwanted feature of 
the timetable, as, however, low the costs might be in other categories, a 'run-
through' indicates that the timetable cannot be implemented as it stands; 
2 Occupations - the cost applied per half minute (the standard unit of time in UK 
timetables) of ‘headway’ or ‘margin’ infringement. This is evaluated by recording 
when trains enter and depart each section of track and effectively occupying the 
entry/exit from the track for the length of time specified by the headway. 
Whenever more than one train is found to occupy that section’s entry or exit point 
for half a minute, an occupation penalty is added to the total score for each 
additional train. These again indicate that the timetable cannot be implemented 
as it is and, hence, are given a high cost, although this is less high than for ‘run 
throughs’. 
 
The key objectives (known in PTG as commercial specification cost categories) are: 
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1. Turnaround - the cost applied when turnaround times have not been 
achieved for specified groups of trains. This is assessed by pairing incoming 
and outgoing services. Desired minimum and maximum turnaround times will 
have been specified and a penalty will be applied for any pair which do not 
achieve these targets. This is proportional to how far the turnaround is from 
this window, as measured in half-minutes; 
2. Connection - the cost applied when connection times for a pair of services 
have not been achieved. Typically a connection 'window' will have been 
specified. The penalty is proportional to the deviation from this window e.g. if 
it were specified for two trains to connect between 5 and 10 minutes from the 
time the first arrives to the time the second departs, and the best achieved 
were 12 minutes, the penalty will be proportional to 4 half minutes; 
3. Evenness - the costs applied when groups of trains have failed to run at even 
intervals throughout the timetabling period. The trains within a group are 
ordered in terms of departure times and a penalty is applied for each 
consecutive pair which are not the required spacing apart.  For example if the 
required spacing is 15 minutes, and one consecutive pair were found to be 14 
minutes apart, this would incur a penalty proportional to 2 half minutes of 
deviation; 
4. Roundness - the cost applied when a train has failed to achieve a clockface 
departure or arrival time.  This cost is proportional to the deviation from the 
nearest clockface timing in half minutes e.g. xx:17 would be 4 half minutes 
from xx:15, which would be used to cost this deviation rather than the six half 
minutes from xx:20; 
5. Deviation - the cost applied when a train fails to meet its fixed time. This cost 
is proportional to the deviation in half minutes from the ideal time or time 
window; 
6. Pathing - the cost applied according to how much pathing has been inserted 
into a train.  This cost is not pro-rata (the only non-linear cost in the model at 
present), but is weighted according to how much pathing has already been 
inserted at other points in the train's journey.  Thus the cost for a minute of 
pathing is quite small, but the cost for five minutes of pathing is 
disproportionately higher. This penalty is also applied when considering 
switches as a means of assessing the increased journey time which may 
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result from a change to the original route. 
 
7.4.3.5 Outputs  
 
A complete timetable can be output, in forms that timetable planners are familiar with 
(tabular and graphical).  These outputs have been specified to enable timetable planners 
to use their ability to assess timetables ‘by inspection’, meaning that no special new 
skills would be required to undertake a review of timetables produced by PTG to ensure 
their compliance with operational rules. 
 
More significantly, ‘diagnostic information’ is provided to enable timetables generated to 
be assessed on the basis of the ‘costs’ incurred through failing to comply with 
operational constraints or the commercial specification set.  ‘Costs’ are set out by 
category and by magnitude, making it possible to compare costs for different timetables 
generated and hence enabling the decision making process to be more quantitative than 
had previously been the case.   
 
More detailed reports, e.g. of the location and nature of any remaining conflicts, enable 
the user to diagnose underlying causes, for instance inadequate infrastructure or over-
tight commercial requirements. 
 
7.4.4 Case Studies 
 
The author was given the opportunity to be involved in two case studies involving PTG   
 
The first was a study undertaken of the feasibility of operating the ‘standard’ Sunday 
timetable when engineering work reduces the number of tracks available on certain 
stretches of the London to Brighton main line from four (two each way) to two (one each 
way).  The scale of this problem would represent a significant challenge to conventional 
approaches.  Some 68 trains were involved in the ‘standard hour’ service, although 
some of these are making crossing moves and therefore were only on the route for a 
short distance. The network considered comprised the full route from London to Brighton 
(51 miles), with all tracks that could be used by passenger trains included in the data.  
This study was undertaken jointly by Railtrack and AEAT and the outputs from PTG 
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were passed to the author for analysis.  In addition the author met with the train planners 
involved to understand their views on the outputs and usefulness of PTG. 
 
This study was regarded by the train planners as having been largely successful in 
meeting its objectives, with PTG demonstrating that the original proposal was 
unworkable and enabling other scenarios, with less trains, to be rapidly tested.  The 
most promising were then passed to train planners to be worked up in detail. 
 
More details of this case study can be found in Appendix 1, section 10.1. 
 
The second case study involved the use of PTG for timetabling analysis on the East 
London Line Extension Project (ELLE), a project to upgrade the East London Line (part 
of the London Underground network) and to link it to the national rail network at Dalston 
in the north east of London and New Cross Gate south of the Thames.  The ELLE study 
was undertaken by a ‘hands on’ team comprised of Ian Bradshaw, working under the 
direction of the author, and with the support of experts from AEAT.   
 
The study was designed to give a detailed understanding of PTG from a user 
perspective, in addition to being designed to achieve some of the train planning work 
which was required to enable the project configuration to be agreed in detail.  The ELLE 
was also regarded as a good ‘test case’ for PTG because it enabled the author to 
examine how successful PTG was when faced with a series of very tight constraints and 
a necessity for development of a regular interval timetable. 
 
PTG performed much less well in this study, failing to produce a solution as good as had 
been produced manually by train planners.  A change to the code within PTG was 
required to enable an adequate solution to be produced.  Despite this problem, the 
object of providing a user perspective was achieved and much was learnt about the 
challenges of replacing conventional train planning methods with a heuristic. 
 
Full details of this study are contained in a report produced jointly with Ian Bradshaw 
(Watson and Bradshaw, 2001). 
 162 
7.4.5 Analysis 
 
7.4.5.1 Introduction 
 
This section draws out issues and conclusions regarding the use and usefulness of 
PTG, focusing particularly on the ‘lessons learnt’ from the case studies. 
 
7.4.5.2 A radically different way of working 
 
The use of PTG changes the role of the timetable planner beyond recognition.  Key 
manual processes currently undertaken, in particular ‘conflict detection’ and ‘conflict 
resolution’ to ensure operational feasibility, are substantially taken away from the 
planner.  
 
The first new task is to have a good understanding of customers’ real commercial 
requirements.  It is then necessary to make decisions on how parameters should be set 
(such as the run time and the ‘seed’ to be used) and what weightings should be applied 
to particular trains and to particular cost categories in order to achieve those commercial 
requirements.  For instance, PTG could well produce more interesting potential 
timetables if the commercial requirements are left relatively unspecific; there is however 
a natural tendency to give everything that train operators have asked for a high 
weighting, potentially reducing the options that PTG will consider. 
   
At a more detailed level, balances need to be struck, for instance between even-ness 
and clock face - is it better to have departures at xx00, xx20 and xx30 (i.e. good ‘clock 
face’ characteristics) or xx03, xx23, xx43 (good even-ness)?  Another problem that has 
emerged in practice again relates to even-ness:  it is clearly better to have departures at 
xx02, xx22, xx42 than at xx02, xx24 and xx43; but is this latter outcome better or worse 
than xx02, xx20 and xx41? 
 
The second new task for the user is to assess the outputs and, in particular, the 
diagnostic information.  Whilst an ‘overall cost’ of a timetable is now produced, the fact 
that a substantial number of different timetables can easily be generated means that 
there is now potentially a substantial comparative analysis to be undertaken.  
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Unfortunately, it is not easy or intuitive to compare the final score of one timetable with 
another.  Difficult questions that now have to be answered include assessing which is 
more important, the number of individual violations or the overall cost.  The total cost 
incurred depends upon the number of trains and constraints, the utilisation of the 
network, the weights placed upon each train and each compliance category and, hence, 
it is necessary to work through the breakdown of costs.  Once performance simulation of 
the timetables is undertaken routinely, a further problem will be to trade off good 
robustness against poorer compliance with the commercial specification, for instance, 
one way of improving robustness is to reduce the number of train services operated.  
Even getting a zero penalty cannot necessarily be regarded as a success with this type 
of programme - it probably means that either the commercial requirements have been 
under-specified or the network is under utilised.  What is clear is that it takes some 
experience to get full value from the diagnostics now made available by PTG.  
 
An issue that has arisen in use is that PTG employs a weighting to encourage the 
removal of operational ‘conflicts’ whereas the conventional timetable planner has been 
trained to see the removal of conflicts as an absolute requirement.  In reviewing the 
output timetables, this training may lead the timetable planner to concentrate on minor 
operational violations which could be put right manually, rather than fully considering the 
more important issue of whether commercial requirements have been met.  
 
All this leads to the conclusion that the role of the timetable planner changes very 
substantially when PTG is used, from a craftsman, who manually creates a timetable on 
the basis of intuition and training, to that of an analyst, who needs a set of analytical 
tools to assess and compare timetables, once the system has generated them, after 
which ‘fine tuning’ can be undertaken. This transformation is not unique to railway 
timetabling.  Eibl (1996) Ainger (1990) and Schmid et al. (1994) have found similar 
issues regarding respectively the introduction of computer aided scheduling of road 
vehicles and manufacturing systems. 
 
The importance of training or retraining the planner cannot be overstated.  This 
conclusion matches closely that highlighted in papers presented to previous 
conferences, c.f. Lamont 1988. 
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7.4.5.3 Quality of Conflict Detection 
 
Much discussion took place with the train planners involved about the extent to which 
the timetables generated must be operationally ‘conflict free’.  Timetable planners are 
trained to consider that, unless a timetable would work in practice, it has no value, even 
if operational rules have only been infringed by a small margin.  The logic behind this 
view is that, ultimately, before implementation the planner will be expected to eradicate 
these infringements and, until this has been done, it cannot be assumed that it will be 
possible to produce a workable timetable.  It was agreed that some flexibility was 
possible when PTG was intended purely for strategic use; once some possible 
timetables had been devised and assessed, they could be checked for full compliance 
with operational rules and constraints by train planners.   
 
The following problems were found with how PTG identified conflicts:  
· The way in which the program interpreted single line bi-directional track resulted 
in PTG missing conflicts, as it considered the trains as being on two separate 
tracks; 
· PTG did not have platform reoccupation time as a constraint.  This is often 
different to the standard headway for a route, reflecting the particular 
circumstances of access into and out of a platform; 
· Modelling of complex junctions was also limited and only a single junction margin 
could be defined for each junction.  Hence, a freight train which would take 
several minutes to cross a junction was assumed to have the same margin as a 
fast passenger train which would block the junction for a much shorter time. 
 
Each of these could be remedied to improve the realism of the timetable produced. 
 
7.4.5.4 Limitations in the Constraints Set  
 
Running PTG for time periods of less than 24 hours 
 
It was found that PTG had difficulty correctly processing services which were running at 
either the start or the end of the model time period.  This could be ‘worked around’ by 
running PTG with a time period set as from the middle of one night until the middle of the 
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next, but this substantially increased the running time. 
  
PTG unable to make appropriate replatforming decisions in stations 
 
The very simple nature of the algorithm within PTG gives an option to move a train from 
one platform to another.  Unfortunately it makes this move without any knowledge of 
whether other platforms are being used at that time and because of the randomness 
built in, it does not look at all the platform options before rejecting replatforming as 
producing a better solution. 
 
Limited number of turn rounds for a single train set  
 
A turn round is when a train set finishes one journey and then starts another.  On a short 
route like the East London Line each train set performs a considerable number of these 
each day.  There was a very low limit on the number of turn rounds that PTG could 
recognise for each train set (in fact only 2).  This meant that platform working could not 
be properly modelled for the ELLE project. 
 
Joining of train sets not properly modelled 
 
PTG did not have the functionality to ensure that two train sets that had to be joined 
together both got to the station where they were to be joined before they had to leave.  
Hence, PTG sometimes ‘flexed’ a service so that the train set got to the station after it 
had to leave. 
 
Evenness 
 
The cost function only considers evenness at the start of services – hence PTG could 
(and did) put pathing time into trains en route which reduced the evenness of trains in a 
service group after that point but considered the timetable produced to have the same 
‘score’ for evenness as a timetable that was even throughout. 
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7.4.5.5 Data Input 
 
There was a substantial data management task to ensure that the infrastructure data 
was in the required format.  Whilst this was substantially a ‘one off’ task, finding 
resources to undertake this task can be difficult, as the planners who have the skills to 
do it are typically working full time on the development of timetables using traditional 
manual means.  
 
7.4.5.6 Where is the use of automatic timetable generation appropriate? 
 
PTG has been used to tackle a variety of problems. It has proved particularly useful for 
strategic what-if scenarios (such as the first case study) and less good at very detailed 
studies that are heavily constrained (such as the second case study). The type of 
problems that it has been used for include: 
1. Assessment of network capacity resulting from infrastructure changes, both 
proposed and actual (removing 'redundant' track, adding in new 
track/crossovers); 
2. Assessment of the impact of changes to station stop times and minimum 
times between trains on key sections of the network; 
3. Addition of completely new services (e g. London St. Pancras-Heathrow 
airport express trains); 
4. Exploration of possible improvements to current timetables. 
 
Experience in using PTG, evidenced by Grant and Wood in providing interview evidence 
for the paper presented at CASPT (Watson et al., 2000) and by the author in comparing 
the success of Brighton line study and the ELLE project, has shown that it is best to 
restrict the area of coverage of runs of the program to improve the effectiveness of the 
search.  This includes: 
5. Concentrating on areas of high utilisation and/or congestion; 
6. Concentrating on areas where there are many and varied options. 
 
PTG, at the time these case studies were undertaken, took no account of the existing 
timetable, except to the extent that the commercial requirements input dictated this, as it 
always produced new timetables from scratch.  Hence the approach was not very 
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suitable if there was a requirement to produce a timetable with only incremental change 
from an existing timetable.  This was an important limitation, as this is often the case - 
either because of ‘traditional thinking’ that it is too difficult to do otherwise or for good 
reasons to do with stability of the timetable for passengers.  
 
7.4.5.7 Appropriateness of Objectives and Commercial Specification 
 
As already described, PTG has a number of detailed commercial specification 
categories incorporated: 
 
· Evenness (regular interval), ‘roundness’ (achievement of ‘clock face’), deviation 
(from a fixed time); 
· Pathing (additional time above the minimum journey time added to remove 
conflicts between trains); 
· Connection quality; 
· Turnround (time between arrival and departure of trains at a terminus). 
 
The first three categories measure in part the revenue generating capability of the 
timetable and turnround has a bearing on the resource cost of the service (longer 
turnround suggesting more resources are needed) rather than the revenue achieved by 
the service. 
 
It was noted, in an earlier chapter, that the achievement of strategic objectives is of 
particular importance to railway managers.  PTG does not directly address any of these 
– the inputs to the generator would need to be set with these objectives in mind and then 
the outputs appraised against them.  PTG can only play a small (if potentially important) 
part in developing timetables to meet these objectives.  
 
At an operational level, PTG does not consider a number of key trade-offs – again, the 
inputs to the generator would need to be set with these objectives in mind and then the 
outputs appraised against them: 
· Revenue potential vs. resource cost (how many trains to run?); 
· Regular interval vs. train service tuned to meet demand (particularly important for 
commuter services); 
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· Stopping patterns; 
· Passenger trains vs. freight trains. 
 
7.4.5.8 Constraints and Feasibility 
 
The primary constraints that PTG attempts to ensure are not broken are headways and 
junction margins, that is ensuring that two trains are not planned to be on the same 
stretch of track at the same time.   
 
Other elements of the Rules of the Plan, such as running times between stations or 
suitability of the route for the train are not addressed.  Some of these (e.g. running 
times) are set in the input files, and, as long as these are correct at input, the resultant 
timetable will not infringe these; others (e.g. suitability of route for the type of traction) 
could at present be violated by the timetable generation process.  Currently these would 
need to be manually checked and adjusted as part of an appraisal process.  
  
Rules of the Route (engineering access requirements) are not handled by PTG and this 
means that PTG cannot be used to create timetables where engineering access has to 
be accommodated.  
 
Train operator resources are implicitly considered through the input specification of the 
train service to be operated.  Currently however PTG does not assess how many units of 
rolling stock or train crew would be required to operate a particular timetable generated. 
 
Contractual commitments are not considered, meaning that PTG cannot be constrained 
to ensure that contractual commitments are met. 
  
Safety objectives are not considered.  In particular train planners must ensure that new 
timetables do not introduce increased risk of signals passed at danger, by making it 
more likely that drivers will see red signals.  PTG has no capability to limit the number of 
red signals that drivers will see. 
 
It will be apparent from the above that considerable checking of any timetable generated 
will be required to ensure that it is in fact feasible.  This could be added to PTG as a 
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‘post-process’ appraisal suite or through interfacing the timetables produced into other 
software which can validate them against these objectives.  It would be better to 
incorporate these factors within the ‘scoring’ module of PTG so that, as the heuristic 
searches for better solutions, it takes more elements of feasibility into account. 
 
It is clear that as currently implemented, in some circumstances the output of the 
timetable generator could be sufficiently poor to require a different software tool to be 
used to produce a viable timetable. 
 
7.4.5.9 Robustness 
 
This is not currently considered at all in PTG.  As is discussed in Chapter 9, it is of 
considerable importance to the rail industry that timetables are delivered that will perform 
satisfactorily, that is to say will have an acceptable level of punctuality.  It is not sufficient 
for a timetable to comply with a set of rules, the Rules of the Plan.  Cases have been 
found where the timetables generated using these rules were not robust.  Because PTG 
does not have any input parameters or variables to impact the performance of the 
timetables produced, it is not possible to get PTG to find better performing timetables 
and there is a risk that PTG will produce timetable options that do not have satisfactory 
performance.   
 
7.4.5.10 To what extent has automatic timetable generation met the business 
needs? 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, several key business needs were identified:   
 
· A substantial reduction in timetable development timescales; 
· Facilitation of the assessment of a wide range of timetables; 
· Facilitation of the assessment of the feasibility of a range of different commercial 
specifications over a variety of different possible future infrastructures. 
 
The assessment of timetables for robustness during the timetable development process. 
 
Some of these objectives are being achieved.  Using PTG it is possible to generate 
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timetables quickly and, through rerunning the programme with different inputs, it is 
possible to assess a wide range of commercial specifications and infrastructures.   Using 
the interface between PTG and RailSys, Network Rail’s simulation package, it is also 
possible to undertake a rapid assessment of the robustness of timetables generated by 
PTG.  Further developments will enhance the capabilities of PTG.  However, probably 
the most important future issue is how to introduce the new ways of working that 
automatic timetable generation facilitates. 
 
Facilitation of the assessment of a wide range of timetables and  facilitation of the 
assessment of the feasibility of a range of different commercial specifications over a 
variety of different possible future infrastructures 
 
Heuristics can be used to solve timetabling problems.  In principal, after initial data set 
up, feasible timetable solutions can be found to answer ‘what if’ questions in a matter of 
hours rather than the days or weeks that are required to produce a manual solution.  
This has substantial benefits.  Tools such as PTG can test a number of different options, 
e.g. various commercial specifications and a variety of different infrastructure 
configurations, rather than just developing one feasible timetable.  This should in 
principle lead to the design and construction of more appropriate infrastructure in the 
future, better able to cope with a range of possible future commercial requirements.   
 
What is clear, however, is that further research and software development are required, 
looking at many aspects of the scope and design of timetable generation tools.  The next 
section considers what might be done. 
 
7.4.5.11 Using PTG for Production Quality Timetabling 
 
The intention to extend usage of PTG to tactical planning and short term planning 
requires more rigorous solutions.  It became apparent that it was necessary to define 
two types of ‘conflict’ in timetables output, with different actions required.  Firstly, there 
were conflicts that remained because there was no feasible solution - where there were 
too many trains for the available capacity.  It was agreed that, in this circumstance, 
outputs must clearly indicate that the timetable or the proposed infrastructure would 
have to be altered.  Secondly, there were conflicts that remained which the software had 
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not detected.  In this case it would be necessary to consider enhancing the programme 
to ensure that the outputs included warnings about these non-compliances.  A number of 
minor problems of this type have now been identified, for instance, variable headways 
where the speed of trains differ and the accommodation of a number of trains in the 
same platform at the same time. 
7.4.6 Areas for Development 
7.4.6.1 Improved heuristic 
 
It has proved difficult to get answers from PTG that are recognisably close to being as 
good at meeting the commercial specification set as those that can be produced by 
experienced train planners – albeit that it takes train planners many times longer to 
produce those solutions.  Why is this?  The very limited understanding of performance 
robustness is a problem that has already been discussed.  However in practice there 
has been a more fundamental problem - PTG often completely misses what is to the 
train planner the ‘obvious’ answer and produces something considerable less good 
(measured against the commercial objectives).  This appears to be a result of the 
heuristic approach being used in PTG.  Analysis of the search algorithm used indicates 
that there is too much randomness to produce solutions that are good in the eyes of the 
train planner.  Because of the way in which the algorithm moves around the problem 
space early on it often discards solutions which might ultimately lead towards a very 
good solution and then later it becomes too constrained and searches for a local 
optimum which is ultimately considerably sub optimal.  
 
Discussions with leading U.K. researchers in the area of heuristics (Raymond Kwan of 
the University of Leeds and Chris Hinde of Loughborough University) indicate that work 
is needed to improve the search method.  This is very likely to lead to the replacement of 
the simulated annealing approach with a more guided search such as, for instance, a 
genetic algorithm.  To date it has not proved possible for DeltaRail to find funding for this 
work and unfortunately until this development is undertaken it is very likely that PTG will 
continue to be used to only a very limited extent. 
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7.4.6.2 Improved realism 
 
Fully replicating the manual timetabling processes of conflict detection and conflict 
resolution is expensive, both in terms of software development and computer run time.  
However, initial project planning and ‘what if’ work does not require a fully conflict free 
timetable to be output and hence PTG was initially put into production use in this area. 
 
Further development work has been undertaken to make the solutions more precise, 
through the inclusion of more detailed data regarding what constitutes a conflict within 
station limits and at junctions.  There is some way to go before the software will be 
capable of providing solutions which could be used operationally with just some minor 
‘tweaking’ by the timetable planner. 
 
7.4.6.3 Base data 
 
Timetable generators are ‘data hungry’.  To produce realistic solutions they need to 
know a lot of detail about the network – much of which is not held on one system and 
some of which is only in timetable planners heads.  There is a substantial initial ‘set up’ 
cost in using PTG as data is collected together, validated and input.  More of this needs 
to either be generated within the software or transferred electronically. 
 
7.4.6.4 Functional development 
 
There are a number of functional enhancements in development or needed: 
1. Linkage into tactical train planning systems - so train planners can use the full 
suite of tools to view, check and improve the solutions generated; 
2. Linkage to other Railtrack/Network Rail systems, e.g. ARDV, which validates 
timetables against the contractual rights of train operators (described in 
Harris and Cooper 2000), and SCORES, a passenger demand forecasting 
model; 
3. Refinement of cost functions (currently mostly linear); 
4. The inclusion of weightings for performance robustness; 
5. Inclusion of additional operational violation checks; 
6. The ability to include or exclude complexity of layouts at junctions and major 
 173 
terminals; 
7. The ability to ‘fix’ part of the timetable and get PTG to only vary the 
remainder. 
 
7.4.6.5 Training and Implementation 
 
Currently there are only a limited number of trained users.  Decisions have to be made 
regarding the extent to which PTG is ‘rolled out’ to existing timetable planning offices, or 
whether it might be better to develop a small team of expert ‘analysts’ instead. 
There is much to learn by watching this process in action and conclusions about how 
best to undertake this important stage will be drawn as implementation progresses.  
Irrespective of this final outcome, advanced training, based on the portfolio of case 
studies already to hand, is already being organised, initially for a small group of selected 
train planners. 
 
7.4.6.6 Wider use 
 
Integration of PTG into tactical timetable planning processes appears to be a realistic 
objective in the medium term, once the software has a sufficient user base and any 
residual operational compliance issues have been resolved. 
 
In addition the relevance of these techniques to mass transit needs to be explored 
further.  Although the importance of operational compliance has been a particular focus 
of the work to date, the inclusion of connections and turnrounds in the heuristic means 
that it could produce useful outputs, especially if there are also infrastructure constraints, 
such as platform capacity, junctions between lines or even bus station congestion. 
 
7.4.6.7 Comparative analysis 
 
The work in the Netherlands and that of Carey has been referred to.  It would now be of 
considerable value to compare the strengths and weaknesses of these different 
approaches, with the standard hour approach in the Netherlands and the station/platform 
optimisation work of Carey both representing solutions to part of the overall problem for 
Britain’s railways.  
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7.5 Connecting Timetable Optimisation Research and 
Development to Reality 
 
The assessment of user needs highlights that there is a gap between what will be 
acceptable to users and most of the optimization models developed.  This results from 
these models not being embedded in software that already meets users’ basic needs 
and by the models not taking into account all the facets of real railway operation. 
 
It is argued that these problems can be overcome by a combination of the following 
factors: 
 
1. The integration of optimisation models with software packages that meet 
schedulers’ data management needs; 
2. The development of partnerships between researchers and commercial 
software houses to achieve this integration; 
3. Work focused on extending the applicability of optimization models to cover 
more real-life circumstances, rather than an emphasis on the development of 
more elegant models; 
4. A focus on the development of solutions which can be implemented in many 
different railway environments without major customisation, so that it is 
possible to achieve ‘economies of scale’ in software development. 
 
Interviews with railway personnel have provided a detailed assessment of what railway 
managers and schedulers consider to be their key objectives and needs and give a 
‘hierarchy of needs’ for researchers to consider, starting with basic data collation and 
processing, then incorporating quality checks and only then moving on to the use of 
schedule generation and optimisation software.  It is clear from this that any software 
that does not meet these basic needs fully is unlikely to be a success in the railway 
environment.  This is an important finding that may go some way towards explaining why 
optimisation algorithms are little used.  This result confirms the principle that advanced 
software must be built on a firm foundation (Booch, 1994, Downs et al., 1992), that is, 
meeting the basic data management needs of train planners before being extended to 
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include more advanced functions.   
 
The concern of Cordeau et al. (1998) that optimisation solutions have tended to lack 
realism warrants further consideration.  Put together with other comments regarding the 
need to match specific circumstances and rules that apply, it is apparent that a particular 
problem is that solutions do not cover all these circumstances. The importance of 
developing this flexibility cannot be over-emphasised.  The author is aware of two 
European railway scheduling software developments that have been aborted due to their 
inability to cope with the changing nature of the operational rules that apply.  This can be 
addressed by a change of focus, from the development of more elegant optimization 
algorithms to the extension of existing algorithms to deal with a global set of rules and 
constraints, enabling models to address the needs of different railways and the changing 
rules of individual railways without the need for substantial rewrites.  
 
Probably the best chance that researchers have of seeing their models in operational 
use is if they work with commercial organisations that already have software that meets 
the basic needs of schedulers.  This will require these companies to have the foresight 
to realise that an appropriate way forward is to gradually incorporate schedule 
generation and optimization into their product portfolio and appropriate partnership 
arrangements will need to be put in place, with user involvement and requirements 
specifications, together with funding provided by the commercial partner and improved 
models being delivered in return. 
 
There are now signs of consolidation of suppliers in the way that happened some years 
ago in mass transit, with companies such as Funkwerk with their Trainplan product 
(Hammerton 1996) and Siscog (Morgado and Martins 1998) with their CREWS package 
penetrating international markets.  These could become the stepping stones to 
packages that have world-wide applicability.  Globalisation is an inevitable trend in many 
areas, and there are no obvious reasons why railway scheduling software should be any 
different.  There are signs that railway undertakings are becoming less national in 
orientation and it appears inevitable that systems will follow suit.  It can be argued that 
those that achieve a global presence early will have some distinct ‘economies of scale’ 
advantages.  Firstly a larger user community means that more funding is likely to be 
forthcoming.  As important, a larger user community means that there is potentially more 
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experience to draw on to enable the production of solutions that meet a variety of 
different circumstances.  The advice to researchers must therefore be to choose a 
commercial partner early and to make sure that the partner has global aspirations. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
Timetable generation software has, in principle, considerable application.  However, the 
research reported here has indicated that, to date, software of this type has not proven 
successful ‘in the field’. 
 
Further work now needs to be undertaken to assess commercial software and research 
activity against this framework: indeed it should be possible to predict the likely success 
of scheduling software on this basis.  Not covered in this thesis, but of considerable 
importance to users, is the issue of implementation.  Evidence collected from Britain’s 
railway industry indicates that the approach taken to implementation can have a very 
significant impact on the success of computer aided scheduling.  This warrants further 
analysis, possibly along the lines adopted by Eibl (1996) in considering the 
implementation of computerised vehicle scheduling in road transport.  It would also be 
beneficial for analysis to be undertaken to assess over what timescales railway 
management should reasonably expect software enhancements to be developed and 
implemented and what level of funding is required to achieve the desired results.  
 
Lessons of general applicability from this chapter are the challenges of implementing 
sophisticated software in complex processes and the importance of undertaking 
research and development for this kind of software in close communication with users, 
so as to ensure that it meets their needs. 
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8 TIMETABLE SIMULATION SOFTWARE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
  
In this chapter the author looks in detail at timetable simulation software - software which 
takes timetables and assesses them for robustness, taking into account the 
infrastructure configuration, train performance characteristics and levels of primary 
delay. 
 
Following a description of the methods employed and a short literature review, the tools 
currently available in Britain are described.  A detailed case study relating to one 
particular tool is described in the Appendix (Section 10.2).  Using this and other data as 
the base, issues with the simulators currently available are then assessed, before 
suggestions are made as to the research work which still needs to be undertaken.   
 
The intention is that this chapter provides a more complete assessment of timetable 
simulation tools than is available elsewhere and also provides guidance for other 
researchers on where attention should be focused to make simulation more accurate 
and more efficient.  
 
Key sections of this chapter have been published in a conference paper (Watson, 2006, 
2); a short paper on issues relevant to the UK has been published in a relevant trade 
journal (Watson and Radtke, 2007). 
 
8.2 Method 
 
This chapter has been developed through a synthesis of several complementary 
investigation methods.  Interviews with suppliers/developers undertaken as part of the   
Gardermoen Railway Project (1998-99),  have been brought together with analysis of 
promotional material from suppliers (referenced in the relevant section below), interviews 
with users of a number of the models documented in O’Brien (2002) and ‘hands on’ 
experience of RailSys, including the case study included in the Appendix.   
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The following reviews of stochastic simulation tools have been drawn on. 
 
Table 11: Reviews of Stochastic Simulation Tools (Source: Author) 
 
Author Date of 
Report 
Client Models 
Covered 
Purpose Report Title 
S Brown October 
2002 
AEAT General 
review, 
focus on 
Opentrack 
and RailSys 
MSc Thesis, Sheffield 
University, UK 
Railway 
Network 
Simulation as 
a Systems 
Engineering 
Tool 
 
CJ Casson May 2003 SRA Trail For possible use on 
East London Line 
Project 
East London 
Line Project 
Development 
of Project 
Output 
Specification 
 
A Pepworth Sept 2003 Network 
Rail 
RailSys and 
VISION 
Business decision on 
which tool to use in 
future 
RailSys 
Formal 
Evaluation 
 
J Marshall,  
S Lowes 
Sept 2003 Network 
Rail 
MERIT Accuracy Report to 
understand validity of 
MERIT outputs 
Investigation 
of MERIT 
Accuracy 
 
M Tiller Nov 2002 Network 
Rail 
All Tools review to 
support business 
decision on technical 
strategy 
Operational 
Planning 
Business 
Improvement 
– Technical 
Strategy 
 
H Verwey March 
2004 
SRA All Business decision on 
which tools to 
endorse the use of 
Performance 
Models 
Review 
 
 
 
8.3 Literature Review 
 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide a brief overview concerning the 
principles of simulation, before turning, in the following section, to timetable simulation 
as practiced in Britain. 
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Simulation has been defined by Robinson (1994) as ‘a model that mimics reality’ and by 
Gamerman and Lopez (2006) as ‘treatment of a real problem through reproduction in an 
environment controlled by the experimenter’.   
 
Simulation can be deterministic, where the results are entirely predictable, or stochastic 
(also called probabilistic in some texts, e.g. Selia, Ceric and Tadikamalla, 2003) where 
“behaviour cannot be entirely predicted, though some statements may be made about 
how likely certain events are to occur” (Pidd, 2004) or, as Gamerman and Lopes (2006) 
put it, “stochastic simulation is the area of science dealing with when some or all of its 
components are subject to random variations”.  This kind of random variation clearly 
occurs in railway operations – be it caused by points’ failures, extended station dwell 
times or whatever. 
 
Monte Carlo simulation is particularly appropriate in these circumstances, using “a 
method of sampling in such a way that the sample represents the whole” (Jones, 1972).  
For railway timetable simulation this method is used to sample delay events to affect the 
running of trains in a way which, if repeated over enough simulation days, will produce 
by the average of all these days a good approximation of performance on a typical day.   
 
Authors (e.g. Robinson 1994) note that simulation is more appropriate than 
mathematical models where there are many variables and that mathematical models are 
not good at assessing ‘knock on’ impacts, e.g., in the case of railway operations, 
‘secondary delay’ caused by one train delaying another.  
 
The appropriateness of using simulation in a business situation has been described by 
Jones (1972) as follows: “a company may feel that before committing itself to a plan of 
action it would be useful to see what the effect of alternative actions would be – a sort of 
look before you leap”.  Robinson (1994) sets out the potential benefits as being: 
· Risk reduction; 
· Greater understanding; 
· Operating cost reduction; 
· Lead time reduction; 
· Faster planned changes; 
· Capital cost reduction; 
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· Improved customer service. 
All of these are sought in the use of simulation in railway timetabling.  
 
Particular problems with using stochastic simulation are noted by writers as being 
associated with assessing what is ‘good’ in terms of a simulation package – across at 
least three measures: run speed, visualisation, ability for interaction between the user 
and the software (Robinson, 1994).  Railway timetable simulations are typically discrete 
event simulations, and run speed can very much be impacted by whether a time-slicing 
approach is adopted (moving forward in equal time intervals, usually a few seconds at a 
time for railway timetable simulators) or an event based approach.  Visualisations vary in 
how user friendly they are (some replicate signal box ‘panels’; others are less 
sophisticated).  Some simulators allow the operator to ‘play signaller’, planning each 
train through the model area; others allow little or no interaction, relying on predefined 
(or hard-coded) ‘regulation rules’.  The latter is equivalent to the Automatic Route Setting 
deployed in modern signal boxes – but often switched off by the signallers when things 
go badly wrong! 
 
It is noted that it is possible to create over-elaborate simulators, where elements are 
included which are not material but, more commonly, over simplification is a problem – 
with insufficient detail being provided to enable the simulator to properly handle the full 
complexity of the simulated system. 
 
Validation of the model can be by inspection of the detailed workings of the model, 
sometimes called ‘white box’ simulation (Pidd, 2004), comparison with other models, or, 
best of all, comparison with ‘real life’. 
 
8.4 Timetable Simulation in Britain 
 
8.4.1 Background 
 
Simulation tools have now been in regular use in Britain for over a decade to model the 
performance of different infrastructure and timetable combinations.  Initially, simulators 
were capable of simulating the running of single trains but this was then expanded to 
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allow the simulation of a number of trains at the same time, with the interaction between 
these trains an output of the simulation.  However, these tools were deterministic in 
nature and, hence, were not able to predict with any accuracy the performance 
(punctuality) impact of different infrastructure and timetable options, by taking into 
account in a statistically valid way the failures and delays that occur every day.  In 
addition, these tools, limited by their design and computing power, were only able to 
model limited geographic areas and limited timetable options. 
 
Researchers have always understood the potential to address these issues, seeking to 
turn timetable simulation from a representation of physical facts (railway geography, train 
acceleration and braking) to tools that exhibit some of the facets of an expert system, at 
least to the extent of replicating signallers’ decision making processes. 
 
More recently, railway managers have also come to realise the need for better tools, 
capable of predicting the performance of railway networks when the infrastructure and/or 
timetable is changed.  Why this greater interest in simulation from railway managers?  
Many railway infrastructure managers are finding that there is more demand for train 
paths on their networks than they are able to provide, c.f. European Conference of 
Ministers of Transport (2002), requiring capacity management of one form or another to 
resolve this conflict.  Investment in the infrastructure to increase capacity is an option, 
but this is expensive and will not always represent the best value for money.  Often 
better, and certainly more cost effective, is to ensure that the capacity already available 
is used as effectively as possible.  Central to this proposition is the need to understand 
the impact that options to change the way capacity is used have on train running 
performance (punctuality). 
 
Whilst the author concentrates on developments in Britain, it should be noted that the 
European Union has also, indirectly, been instrumental in focusing attention on software 
tools in this area.  It has undertaken work on path allocation with a key objective of 
making best use of available capacity (EU, 1998) and Directive 2001/14/EC (EU, 2001) 
requires member states to put in place standard processes to analyse capacity problems 
and propose solutions.  This directive defines the role of infrastructure manager (in 
Britain this is Network Rail) and requires that this body produces a capacity 
enhancement plan and cost/benefit analysis wherever it cannot accommodate current or 
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forecast bids for capacity.  In addition, the infrastructure manager must publish a 
network statement covering the nature of the infrastructure, the capacity allocation and 
timetabling process, procedures and criteria for dealing with congested infrastructure 
and restrictions on the use of infrastructure, as well as the charging arrangements.   
 
Analysis of the relevance of simulation techniques has extended to considering the 
Japanese and European situations.  Japanese railways operate in ways that the UK 
should aspire to but, in the performance modelling area (as in a number of others) the 
business situation is distinctly different, with Japan having such small levels of delay that 
it has little need for performance modelling tools capable of handling a large range of 
failure and delay types.  European experiences, however, have been found to be very 
relevant and the potential of a number of European modelling tools has been explored.     
 
8.4.2 The British Rail Inheritance 
 
British Rail Research (BRR) and British Rail Operational Research (BROR), both 
divisions of the British Railways Board prior to privatisation, were active in the simulation 
area.  BR Research developed and used its deterministic ‘signal berth’ level tool 
simulation tool GATTS (later re-named VISION) to model the infrastructure down to 
individual signals and track circuits.  This tool was designed originally to model 
infrastructure schemes over small geographic areas.  BROR developed a stochastic 
simulator, MERIT, which did not use a signal berth level infrastructure model, relying 
instead on a simplified set of track layouts, routing tables and rules, and using a Monte 
Carlo sampling of failure data and multiple simulation runs to attempt to predict 
performance changes due to changes in the timetable over whole routes.  At 
privatisation first BRR and later BROR were acquired by AEA Technology (then a 
subsidiary of the Atomic Energy Authority) and, in 2006, the rail activities of AEAT were 
acquired by DeltaRail, which still owns VISION.  DeltaRail has exploitation rights for 
MERIT but Railtrack and then Network Rail invested heavily in the development of this 
tool and Network Rail now has full rights to it for its own use.   
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8.4.3 Stochastic Simulation Software in Regular Use in Britain 
     
8.4.3.1 The models 
 
There are now a number of stochastic simulation packages in use in Britain.  They take 
a timetable, overlay this with a number of possible perturbations (for instance points 
failures or train breakdowns) and assess how much overall delay might be caused as a 
result.  Typically these packages use a Monte Carlo approach to sampling historic delay 
data which is then applied to specific trains.  With the software running a significant 
number of timetable days, with delays sampled for each of these days using Monte 
Carlo principles, the average of all these days gives a good approximation of the 
performance on a typical day.  A timetable where there is little ‘knock on’ delay caused 
by a failure is called ‘robust’ and is what is sought; timetables where a lot of incremental 
delay occurs need further work or, perhaps, indicate that the infrastructure is being used 
rather too close to capacity for it to be possible to produce a robust timetable.   
 
Software of this type is frequently used as a ‘strategic planning’ tool to validate 
infrastructure improvements for robustness and is also used, for the same purpose, 
where major restructuring of a timetable is intended.  Simulations have until recently 
been run for a single station or just a few miles of infrastructure, due to computer run 
times becoming significantly larger as the model size grows.  Typically simulation 
packages require very detailed infrastructure maps, down to individual turnouts/switches 
and signals and are hence complex and time consuming to set up and run.  Time 
constraints mean that these packages are rarely used as part of the annual planning 
process or to examine ‘whole route’ effects during strategic planning.  VISION has been 
the ‘industry standard’ in the UK until recently, with RailPlan being used by some 
consultancies; in the late 1990s these tools were joined by Opentrack, RailSys and 
Trackattk.   
 
MERIT and the tools most closely associated in technical terms (TRAIL and TTRA) 
adopt a different approach to the assessment of robustness, employing an event-based 
Monte Carlo approach to assess robustness over a line of route and using a full 
timetable, but with a simplified link-node view of the infrastructure and failure rates for 
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components of the system.   
 
The following table lists the simulation models in use in Britain. 
 
Table 12: Simulation models in use in Britain (Source: Author) 
 
Link-Node Level  Signal Berth Level 
MERIT    Opentrack 
TRAIL    RailPlan 
TTRA    RailSys 
    Trackattk 
    VISION 
 
8.4.3.2 MERIT 
 
As already mentioned, MERIT (Modeling the Reliability of Infrastructure and Timetables) 
is supplied by AEA Technology (AEAT), now DeltaRail, who describe it as a ‘strategic 
simulation tool’ (AEAT, 2002). 
 
The data requirements for a MERIT run, particularly with regard to the infrastructure, are 
deliberately simplified - for instance it knows the track layout of each “place” on the 
network, and knows whether each line is bi- or uni-directional, but does not explicitly 
know which of the physically possible routes are signalled. Junction margins are 
generally somewhat simplified to reduce data preparation time and because MERIT 
does not contain the data necessary to calculate junction margins from basic principles.  
MERIT relies on ‘planning’ (Rules of the Plan) values for headways and junction 
margins, with the technical values approximated from the planning values.  It does not 
simulate the traction characteristics of trains, instead assuming that the timetable 
supplied as an input is achievable (before any delays are applied) for the traction types 
specified.  However, MERIT checks for trains which would need to exceed line speed 
limits between locations in order to meet the supplied schedule and warns the user.  
These simplifications increase MERIT’s speed and usability, but reduce its accuracy.  
MERIT has also been known to give counter-intuitive results and the limited views of 
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results and how they were generated has not helped to build confidence in its accuracy. 
 
The greatest strengths of MERIT are seen by its advocates to be its national coverage of 
the network and timetable.  The other key feature of MERIT is its link with individual, 
randomly sampled incidents which cause delays to trains – whereas other systems 
either require the user to undertake a pre-process to supply a distribution function or 
simulate individual ‘days’ and then require the user to make assumptions about how 
typical that day is.   
 
MERIT has been used by Network Rail (and AEAT on Network Rail’s behalf) for a 
number of years but has not come to be generally accepted by the UK Rail Industry, with 
industry experts saying that this is because, in particular, MERIT can produce counter-
intuitive results due to it not having sufficient understanding of the infrastructure.  In 
March 2005, Network Rail decided to stop using MERIT. 
 
8.4.3.3 TRAIL 
 
TRAIL is a railway system reliability simulation tool supplied by Jardine (Jardine and 
Associates, 2002).  TRAIL is very different from to the other tools described here in that 
its primary function is to compare scenarios relating to different asset types in the rail 
industry. It can be used to a limited extent to simulate differences in infrastructure layout 
or timetable but that is not what it is best suited for.  TRAIL is a dynamic equipment 
reliability simulator, which takes rail operations into account as far as utilising assets and 
determining consequential delay due to incidents.  It uses a link-node infrastructure 
model. 
 
8.4.3.4 TTRA 
 
TTRA (Timetable Robustness Analyser ) is a Vossloh (now Funkwerk) tool that 
simulates a detailed timetable over an approximate network to test timetable quality and 
robustness (Stallybrass, 2002).  
 
TTRA enables users to get a coarse indication of a detailed timetable’s performance 
over an approximate network within hours. Independent assessment of TTRA suggests 
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that the model will give an accurate indication of problem areas.  However, delays 
calculated by the model are subject to a number of approximations.  An approximation in 
TTRA is the division of link sections by the number of signals to give a number of equal 
length block sections. Concerns have been expressed (e.g. by Operational Planners 
within Network Rail) that in heavily operated network sections this approximation could 
inadequately describe headway conflicts and hence influence capacity and performance 
indications.       
  
8.4.3.5 OpenTrack 
 
Opentrack is a detailed signal berth simulation model developed by the Institute for 
Transport Planning and Systems (IVT) of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
(ETH Zurich).  It is used by a small number of consultancies in the UK. 
 
OpenTrack is considered by users to be a modern, easy to use detailed signal berth 
simulation system. The system is viable for a detailed study and simulations of up to 20 
runs but user intervention is required to separate simulation run information in different 
files. It is understood that the system has been set up for multiple simulation in this 
limited way because the Swiss rail system does not suffer the same amount of daily 
service variance as Britain. 
 
The main benefits of the system appear to be the user friendly interface, fast and 
effective information input, detailed information being taken into account in the 
simulation, RailML data files and the simulation animation. 
 
More information can be found on the supplier’s website (OpenTrack Railway 
Technology, 2008).   
 
8.4.3.6 RailPlan 
 
RailPlan is another detailed signal berth simulation model, which simulates 
infrastructure, timetable and rolling stock information in detail (Comreco Rail, 1997).  
RailPlan was first developed in 1987 and is of Swedish origin, now being developed and 
sold by Funkwerk (the current owner of the York-based business that previously traded 
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as Comreco Rail and then Vossloh).  In the UK, the system is mostly used by 
consultancies, including Funkwerk’s own consultancy team. 
 
Probably the key limitation of the tool is the lack of a graphical interface. It makes it 
impossible to see the actual operations of trains during a simulation (although this can 
be done as a ‘post process’ using a separate tool) and makes data entry difficult.  
 
An ‘add-on’ is PowerPlan, a post-processor for RailPlan that allows the modelling of 
electrical networks.  Not all tools have this capability. 
 
8.4.3.7 RailSys 
 
RailSys is a comprehensive signal berth simulation package developed by the Institute 
for Transport, Railway Construction and Operation, University of Hanover and RMCon.  
It is used by Network Rail as well as a number of consultancy companies in the UK.  
 
RailSys was the most functionally-rich railway simulation package evaluated, which 
gives the user great flexibility in simulation and analysis.  The user is supported with 
graphics and RailSys has the best output analysis module.  .csv outputs and log files are 
also available.  An important strength of RailSys is its sophisticated simulation algorithm, 
which combines time-based and event-based techniques to avoid “deadlock” situations 
during perturbed simulations. This means that RailSys can be used to rapidly simulate a 
statistically valid number of stochastic simulations.  Areas where some interviewees 
consider RailSys as perhaps inferior to VISION or OpenTrack are the user interface for 
data preparation and, to a greater extent, the graphical interface during simulation. 
 
RailSys can be used over the whole range of timetabling and performance modelling 
tasks that are required in the strategic planning environment and this has made the tool 
very attractive not only to consultancies who want to have all this capability in a single 
tool, but also for Network Rail’s Strategic Access Planning Team.  RailSys was selected 
for detailed evaluation by this team and, ultimately, purchased by Network Rail on the 
basis that it was more advanced than the British tools available and that its predictive 
capabilities had been satisfactorily validated in Germany (Pepworth, 2003).  This team is 
now makes full use of RailSys, following the decision to discontinue the use of MERIT.  
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It is believed to be now the most frequently used railway performance modelling tool in 
the UK.  A more detailed description is provided as part of the case study provided in the 
Appendix. 
  
8.4.3.8 TrackAttk 
  
TrackAttk is a signal berth model developed by the Railway Consultancy (based in 
London) that simulates track layout and signalling accurate to the nearest 20 metres, 
while leaving out details such as gradients, curvature, setting time for signals, power, 
platform lengths etc. The timetable is simulated to the level of individual trains with 
planned schedules including station stops and dwell times. Rolling stock types are not 
recognised other than by maximum speed and train length for each schedule. Specified 
acceleration and deceleration characteristics are therefore not simulated for each train 
type. 
 
TrackAttk is therefore a simplified signal berth model, which should give users a good 
understanding of operational performance of the network, although not accurate to the 
nearest second. It is viewed by its suppliers as a cost effective, quick to use 
performance model, which will identify problems in small network sections and provide a 
reasonably accurate approximation of delay figures. 
 
The model can be used quickly to support option assessment, with a good simulation 
visualisation.  However, it is not regarded as being sufficiently accurate for signalling 
system design, running time calculation or performance regime cost forecasting and the 
author’s understanding is that it is very little used.  
 
8.4.3.9 VISION 
 
VISION (Visualisation and Interactive Simulation of Railway Networks) has been until 
recently the most widely used simulation package in the UK.  It is the signal berth model 
owned and supported by DeltaRail.  
 
VISION is considered to have a good graphical interface during simulation and this 
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enables UK railway operators (and non railway specialists) to easily understand the 
visualisation. Built-in outputs are limited however, e.g. there are no statistical analysis 
graphs drawn directly by the software. The model focuses on the infrastructure design 
for small network sections. This is reflected in the output format and tool features.  
 
The main drawbacks to VISION are, however, its lack of scalability and slow simulation 
run times.  VISION is cumbersome to use for simulation compared with the other tools 
described – this is substantially because it has lacked investment in recent years. 
Rerouting is only semi-automated and the route-setting (or “dispatching”) methods are 
less sophisticated than those of other tools.  This is primarily because VISION is a purely 
time-based incremental simulator and cannot therefore test the consequences of 
decisions before making them, e.g. to check that no “deadlock” situations will occur. 
Statistically valid stochastic simulation using VISION is therefore time consuming.  
 
A detailed description of VISION is provided in Brown (2002). 
 
8.4.3.10 Comparison 
 
Comparisons have been undertaken by the author, judging the capability of each 
simulator against the priorities recommended by the literature (see section 6.3).  
Technical ‘white box’ analyses of these tools have been put alongside reviewing the 
results of a number of real projects and interviews with users and procurers of 
performance modelling.   
 
The following table (the format based on Verwey’s work) attempts to provide a formal 
ranking of the tools.  Each tool has been scored by the author from 0 to 3 against a 
number of measures for different railway simulation tasks.  The highest scoring tools are 
then highlighted in green for each of these tasks. 
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Table 13.  Scoring for simulation software packages for typical tasks (Source: Author) 
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Detailed layout design (requires detailed 
infrastructure and exact replication of UK 
signalling to score maximum) 
0 0 0 2 2 2 1 3 
Determining the effect of re-signalling on 
line capacity (requires detailed 
infrastructure and functionality to output 
capacity utilisation statistics) 
0 0 0 3 1 3 1 3 
Determine the approximate running time 
of specified rolling stock for a new rail 
extension (requires detailed infrastructure 
and knowledge of traction data) 
 
0 0 0 3 3 3 1 3 
Determine the effect of infrastructure 
expansion (new sidings, extra platforms in 
a station, etc) on operational capacity. 
(detailed infrastructure and stochastic 
simulation will give the most reliable 
answers) 
1 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 
Determine the effect of equipment 
reliability on performance (the best score 
will be achieved by a tool that can use 
equipment failure rates as an input; an 
above average score will be achieved by a 
tool that requires equipment failure rates 
to be pre-processed and input as 
distributions) 
2 3 0 2 1 2 0 1 
Design a new timetable for a re-
franchising exercise. (a timetable editor is 
required to score on this task; scores of 3 
are not achieved by any of the simulators 
– tools designed specifically for timetable 
development (e.g. CMS) do better) 
0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 
Adjust the timetable to insert 2 extra train 
schedules in the peak hour timetable 
(simple timetable editing capability is 
required to score on this task) 
2 0 1 3 1 3 1 0 
Determine the robustness of the 
timetable (some stochastic simulation 
capability is required to score well on this 
task) 
2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 
Design contingency plans for maintenance 
work (tools with functionality specifically 
designed to facilitate this kind of test will 
score best) 
1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 
Simulate the high level operations of a 3 0 3 1 0 2 3 0 
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network section to a very tight timescale 
– say within 2 weeks (needs either the 
infrastructure already set up and/or very 
fast set up and run times) 
 
Evaluate system performance of different 
alternatives by comparing total delay 
minutes for each alternative 
1 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 
NUMBER OF ‘BEST TOOL’ SCORES 
(OUT OF 11 TEST TASKS) 1 1 1 5 2 8 1 3 
 
It can be concluded that the simulation tools that use a less detailed infrastructure model 
(including MERIT and TTRA) have relatively limited applicability, due to over-
simplification.  They are only of use when just an indication of performance impact is 
required and when there will be future opportunities to assess the impact in detail and 
then make changes to the proposals.   
 
The ‘signal berth’ level tools have the potential to undertake stochastic simulation but all 
of them have either technical limitations (e.g. use of time-slicing rather than event based 
steps), need development to incorporate stochastic simulation (e.g. Opentrack, VISION) 
or need development to improve the accuracy of the results in British railway 
environment (RailSys).  Currently no one tool evaluated would always be the best for all 
performance assessment purposes. 
 
Overall, however, it is concluded here that for most circumstances RailSys represents 
the most developed and flexible tool.  This conclusion was also reached by Brown (with 
some caveats), Pepworth (comparing VISION and RailSys) and Verwey.   
 
8.5 Issues with the Use of RailSys and other Simulation Tools 
 
8.5.1 Introduction 
 
Analysis and interaction with industry players, together with case studies such as that 
set out in Appendix 1 (section 10.2), indicate that there are a number of issues that need 
to be resolved before stochastic simulation can become a cornerstone of timetable 
development in the UK.  These are considered in turn.  Some elements of this section 
have been published in Railway Technical Review (Watson and Radtke, 2007). 
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8.5.2  ‘Implementation’ Issues 
 
8.5.2.1 National Infrastructure Database 
 
There is only an emerging national infrastructure database, so any new simulation 
requires either a new infrastructure model to be built from signalling plans or an existing 
model to be updated and extended.  Where an existing model is held in a different 
format conversion is required and careful checking and amendment are needed to 
ensure the model works properly in its new environment.  This lack of base data in 
compatible electronic form leads to simulations being expensive and time consuming to 
set up.   
 
8.5.2.2 Validation and Calibration 
 
There is limited validation and calibration of models, partly due to the relatively recent 
introduction of performance modelling (meaning that there are not as yet ‘before and 
after’ actual results to compare with the model results) and partly due the UK rail 
industry not being prepared to undertake ‘head to head’ comparative studies (partly for 
cost reasons and partly because of vested interests by some the existing suppliers).  
This has lead to results from all of the tools being challenged.   
 
It is accepted that analysis needs to be undertaken but, at present, no way of resourcing 
and funding this has been found. 
 
8.5.2.3 User and procurer expertise 
 
Growth in the use of stochastic simulation in the UK has led to the majority of users of 
the tools (and clients seeking results from the tools) being inexperienced.  This in turn 
has led to examples of these sophisticated tools being used in inappropriate ways (e.g. 
without appropriate delay data being used), leading to invalid results being produced.   
 
There are examples of project managers requesting performance modelling without any 
understanding of which tools are appropriate.  They are generally unaware of what to 
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specify as output, how to be sure that the results delivered are appropriate and how to 
incorporate this output into the project.  
 
Both users and clients of performance models lack understanding of the statistical 
principles underlying stochastic simulation – this leads to modellers not using the models 
appropriately and clients not understanding what the results mean.  
 
Clients and project managers are insufficiently aware of all the performance modelling 
packages available and their various strengths and weaknesses.   
 
All of these issues can be overcome in time through appropriate training and 
development of modellers.   
 
8.5.2.4 Modelling Standards 
 
There is a lack of standards as to how the models should be set up and run, with 
different organisations setting up their models in different ways and then arguing over 
which way is appropriate.  A range of areas lack standard parameters, e.g. what braking 
curves should be used, how best to represent driving practice and signaller actions, the 
number of simulation runs that should be undertaken in different circumstances, how to 
model specific ‘worst cases’.  The author of this thesis is currently working with Network 
Rail to develop appropriate standards. 
 
8.5.3 Technical Issues 
 
Perhaps of most interest to researchers, there are a number of limitations within the 
modelling tools currently available which either restrict the nature of problems that they 
can address or which impact on the quality of the results.   
 
8.5.3.1 Cancellation and ‘terminating short’ 
 
A particularly important example is the inability of stochastic simulators, as currently 
available in the UK, to cancel or ‘terminate short’ trains when this is the appropriate 
regulation decision to make.  This means that these simulators cannot easily be used to 
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assess the delays which will occur when major disruption occurs.  As a small number of 
major disruptions can cause more delay on a route than a large number of small failures, 
this is an area which needs research and development to enable a better estimation of 
the overall performance impact of timetable or infrastructure changes. 
 
8.5.3.2 Representing UK driving practices accurately 
 
‘Defensive’ or ‘professional’ driving has been introduced in the UK over the last few 
years as one of a series of actions to reduce the number of SPADS (signals passed at 
danger).  Drivers are now trained to brake earlier and to approach red signals and 
stations very slowly. This has had the practical effect of reducing capacity and increasing 
journey times and makes using standard braking rates within modelling tools inaccurate.  
Tools (such as RailSys) which have a range of signalling and braking options will give a 
better result, but more analysis is required. 
 
8.5.3.3 Representing en route delay accurately 
 
The UK has more en route infrastructure failures, e.g. track circuit failures, temporary 
speed restrictions, than many other countries and simulators from abroad tend to focus 
delays more on station areas.   
 
In addition, some simulators do not have the capability to apply delays to a number of 
trains in a row as part of the Monte Carlo sampling of delay data, e.g. where a track 
circuit failure causes a number of trains in a row to be brought to a stand to be cautioned 
by the signaller.   
 
8.5.3.4 Representing signaller/signalling systems accurately 
 
Replication of signaller or ARS/ATC (automatic route setting/automatic train control) 
actions is often constrained, with the modeller having limited options.  Circumstances 
have arisen where a more sophisticated ‘despatch’ function is needed to enable the 
modeller to set up priorities in the modelling tool which reflect how the signaller regulates 
trains, in reality.    
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8.5.4 Where Next for Simulation?  
 
8.5.4.1 Addressing the issues 
 
Researchers, consultancies and the railway companies need to cooperate to ensure the 
issues described above are analysed and appropriate solutions produced. 
 
8.5.4.2 Use of heuristics alongside simulation 
 
Simulators for the most part require a complete timetable and resource plan as inputs.  
Tools are required, either separate or integrated into a suite of tools with a performance 
simulator, to turn specifications provided by railway marketing people into detailed 
timetables.  Some tools are already being developed or extended to do this and at least 
are seeing some live use, e.g. AEAT’s Planning Timetable Generator – see Chapter 7 
and Watson, 2006, RMCon’s ‘train slot search’ – see Klemenz and Schultz (2007), and 
Eurobios’ Railway Timetable Optimiser, see Eurobios (2007). 
 
8.5.4.3 Part of the annual timetabling process? 
 
Some thought is now being invested by the author, working with Network Rail, as to 
whether it might be possible to use stochastic simulation as part of the annual timetable 
development process rather than it being specifically a strategic planning tool.  Some 
years ago it was accepted that the ‘objective should be for every timetable to be 
stochastically simulated before being signed off’ (Network Rail Operational Planning 
Business Improvement Design Group, 2002) and so it is clear that senior management 
within Britain’s rail industry understands the benefits of assessing the likely performance 
of the annual timetable before it is implemented.  However, analysis demonstrates that 
there are a number of process and technical issues to be resolved before this can 
become reality.   
 
To be of value, stochastic simulation has to deliver the following, when compared with 
current ‘expert judgement’: better train running performance, which all industry players 
want, and better use of capacity, i.e. the potential to run more trains at an acceptable 
level of performance, a key objective for government.  It has to deliver these benefits at 
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an acceptable implementation and on-going resource cost and in an acceptable 
timeframe.  
 
A number of ‘precursors’ to the use of stochastic simulation in the annual timetabling 
process have been found: 
 
· Firstly, a national infrastructure model is needed or at least one that covers all 
the main lines (some lightly used lines have insufficient traffic to warrant 
simulation).  Network Rail has now funded a substantial model building, 
conversion and update programme is needed, so that by some time in 2009 the 
lack of ready-built infrastructure will no longer be an issue; 
 
· Standard automated routines are needed for delay data analysis and input, 
together with the validation of the base model that is required before variations 
can be run.  Again, progress is being made, with Network Rail having developed 
semi-automated delay day analysis tools and most main lines now having fully 
validated base models; 
 
· Users only become expert over time, using the chosen tool full time and for some 
time (many months).  A substantial group of UK users needs to be trained and 
retained.  The kind of people who make good modellers are in short supply and, 
to date, Network Rail has had trouble retaining them, once trained.  On-going 
coaching will be required from a limited pool of real expert modellers; 
 
· Limitations in the tools which require manual intervention need eliminating.  
Examples of these problems include fully replicating signaller practice and 
handling ‘joining and splitting’ of trains.  Without these substantially resolved, 
results will not be achieved sufficiently quickly to influence the timetable under 
development. 
 
· A key issue, without as yet a worked through solution is how to deal with 
incompleteness in the timetable being input to the simulation tool.  Typically, 
during the timetable development process the following ‘incompleteness’ issues 
will arise; very often, freight services will not be in the timetable or, if they are, 
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they will not have been ‘conflict resolved’ (i.e. there will still be theoretical 
‘clashes’ between passenger and freight trains); platforming at key stations will 
be incomplete; associations between trains (where one train working then forms 
another) will not be explicit.  In addition, current data exports from the main 
timetabling tool (TrainPlan) are not complete, in particular routing of trains is 
often not clear - current RailSys import needs manual work arounds and pre-
processing. 
 
8.6 Conclusions 
 
Performance modelling of railway timetables is being undertaken more and more by and 
for the British industry.  Much analysis has been undertaken of the various tools 
available and their strengths and weaknesses and the level of understanding about 
these tools and their capabilities, whilst still low, is improving.  It is beginning to become 
clear in Britain that RailSys will be the dominant tool going forward, but with other 
packages being used where they are more appropriate, because RailSys’ functionality 
does not match well with the business need. 
 
A number of issues with simulation tools in general have been described and where a 
way forward has become clear this has been set out.  A number of issues require further 
study and the development of technical solutions. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 Purpose of this chapter 
 
This chapter demonstrates that the aims and objectives set for the research have been 
met and the author then discusses the extent to which the methods adopted have 
proved appropriate. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations for further work are then brought together.  Finally 
the value of the research is assessed, measured against the extent to which it has 
contributed to the body of knowledge in the area of train planning. 
 
9.2 Have the Aims and Objectives been met? 
 
Three aims were set for this research (chapter 1):  
 
· Firstly the researcher aims to analyse the processes which are used to develop 
train plans and the extent to which they meet the objectives that they might be 
expected to meet; 
 
· Secondly, the researcher aims to understand the impact that privatisation of the 
railways in Britain has had on train planning processes; 
 
· Thirdly, the researcher aims to investigate selected new and innovative software 
approaches that might make a material difference to the effectiveness and/or 
efficiency of train planning processes.  
 
Train Planning processes have been described and key factors and issues analysed in 
chapters 3 and 4.  The objectives that they should meet have been collated in chapter 5 
and a qualitative assessment made of the extent to which these objectives are being 
met. 
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The second aim is addressed in chapter 4, where the impact that privatisation of the 
railways in Britain has had on train planning processes is described in detail and it is 
concluded the impact is substantially negative. 
 
After an introductory chapter on train planning systems (chapter 6), two key areas have 
been investigated in which software can better support train planning processes – 
timetable generation (chapter 7) and timetable performance simulation (chapter 8).  In 
each area, after a general description of the problem that the software seeks to address, 
case studies using the most developed software in the area have been set out and 
analysis has been undertaken of the issues and challenges with using the software to 
meet train planning objectives successfully. 
 
It is contended that the aims set have been achieved, to the extent possible within the 
relevant resource and time constraints. 
 
A number of more detailed objectives were set out in the first chapter.  These are now 
considered in turn. 
 
1 To describe train planning processes at a high-level and to discuss generic 
issues with these processes  
 
Chapter 3 described train planning processes, with charts and descriptions 
setting out the high level process and discussing some of the key stages 
(particularly timetabling) in more detail.  Generic issues discussed were the 
importance of iterations to improve the solution and complexities in the process, 
both physical and organisational.  A comparison with manufacturing process 
scheduling was also undertaken to gain some understanding as to whether train 
planning processes are unique, concluding that this is not the case - there are 
significant similarities. 
 
2 To describe the timetabling processes as they existed in the UK prior to 
privatisation. 
 
These were described in chapter 4 (4.3), with the importance explained of the 
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hierarchical ‘first on the graph’ principle to the satisfactory operation of train 
planning processes. 
 
3 To describe how the processes changed at the point of privatisation and to 
assess the issues that the new processes created 
 
The new processes introduced with privatisation were described in chapter 4 (4.4 
to 4.7).  The significance of the split of timetabling tasks between Railtrack and 
Train Operators and the large number of ‘iterations’ between these organisations 
proposed was explained.  Whilst a good fit was achieved between the new 
processes and the high level objectives for privatisation set by government, the 
‘Peterborough Process’, as it became known, was never fully implemented, and 
the ‘watered down’ version of it still had many problems and was unfavourably 
compared with pre-privatisation processes in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
4 To describe how the processes have subsequently evolved and to assess the 
extent to which they are now ‘fit for purpose’ 
 
The evolution of processes since privatisation were described, along with 
emerging problems and remaining issues, in chapter 4 (4.8 to 4.11).   
 
5 To understand the objectives that train planners should be attempting to meet 
 
In chapter 5 (5.4) a review of high level objectives for the key organisations was 
synthesised into a set of objectives for train planning. 
  
6 To understand what railway practitioners (timetablers and managers) think needs 
to be done to improve train planning processes 
 
In chapter 5 (5.5) results of interviews with railway practitioners have been 
synthesised into a set of priorities for improvements needed to train planning 
processes. 
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7 To describe the current role of software in supporting timetabling processes 
 
Chapter 6 (6.4) delivers this objective. 
 
8 To understand the key gaps in software support  
 
Chapter 6 (6.5) describes the limitations of current software and sets out the 
gaps that need filling. 
 
9 To investigate selected promising software avenues for making a material 
improvement to the quality of the efficiency and effectiveness of train planning 
 
Chapter 7 has been used to investigate timetable generation and optimisation 
and Chapter 8 covers timetable simulation, both of which offer considerable 
potential for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of train planning. 
 
9.3 Have the Methods adopted proved Appropriate? 
 
As Gill and Johnson (2002) point out, choice of research methods is always a 
compromise, often influenced by resource availability.  The breadth of the aims and 
objectives inevitably ruled out quantitative methods of analysis because they required 
large amounts of data collection and analysis.  The decision to use qualitative and case 
study methods in turn inevitably limits the opportunities to generalise.  It also makes it 
hard to prioritise, e.g. which software improvement might give the biggest benefit? 
 
It would seem appropriate to ask the question ‘how else could the aims and objectives 
have been better met, given the resources available?’.  It is not obvious that alternative 
methods would have better met the aims and objectives.  More depth in some areas 
would inevitably have meant less in others. 
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9.4 Train Planning Processes – Conclusions and 
Recommendations for Further Work 
 
In chapter 3, looking at train planning processes, it was concluded that train planning is 
always going to be complex in nature but that analysis can help by explaining some of 
this complexity and pointing towards areas for process improvement.  
 
It can be expected that these conclusions are applicable to processes that take place in 
different contexts.  Research undertaking more comparative analysis would be very 
beneficial, both with similar processes in other industries and the train planning process 
used in other countries. 
 
In chapter 4, it was concluded that the restructuring and subsequent privatisation of 
British Rail had an adverse effect on the output achieved from the timetabling and 
resource scheduling processes.  It was suggested that several possible factors were at 
play.  Management attention may have been diverted from day to day issues to the 
major reorganisation task, key personnel may have been displaced or retired and/or it 
may be that the nature of the restructuring undertaken was not conducive to effective 
train planning.  Undoubtedly the first two factors played a part – however these were not 
investigated in this research.  There is an important area here for further research.  
 
The author of this thesis focused on processes and systems and attention has therefore 
been concentrated on the effect of the third factor.  It has been concluded that the new 
structure imposed on the industry in Britain by the Railways Act 1993 has hindered the 
development of effective timetables and resource plans by creating an artificial boundary 
in the middle of what needs to be a seamless process.   
 
It has also been concluded that, whilst the changes made since the initial process was 
introduced at privatisation have improved the timetables delivered, there is still much to 
be done before the process can be considered as truly ‘fit for purpose’.   
 
Overall it is evident that better planning prior to privatisation, together with more realism 
as to what was practically possible, could have made the transition far less traumatic 
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than it was.  This conclusion is of considerable importance to governments and other 
railway administrations that might be planning railway privatisation. 
 
With other nationalised railways now being restructured and privatised across Europe, 
research is needed to see whether the same problems are emerging and whether the 
lessons learnt in the UK are directly transferrable.  
 
The case specific nature of the research presented in this thesis means that attempting 
to make generalisation outside railways requires caution.  Having said this, it is clear that 
the conclusion that serious problems are likely to result from poor planning and rushed 
implementations with processes not redesigned to match with new organisational 
structures is transferable to other sectors and other circumstances. 
 
Chapter 5 considered objectives for railway organisations regarding train planning.   
Conflicts between objectives were noted and it was concluded that there is a need for 
elimination of these conflicts and/or the development of formal trade-off mechanisms.   
 
Investigating ways to eliminate conflicts between organisational objectives (e.g. between 
government’s desire for low subsidy and train operators’ objective of profit maximisation) 
has had to be excluded from the scope of this thesis.  Strategic research is now needed 
to investigate the extent to which conflicting objectives are inevitable or whether it is 
possible to better align objectives whilst involving the private sector. 
 
9.5 Train Planning Systems – Conclusions and 
Recommendations for Further Work 
 
In Chapter 6 it was concluded that there is a considerable need for improved software to 
support train planning processes.  It was noted that even basic data management tasks 
are not fully automated. 
 
It has been necessary in this thesis to select specific areas for detailed investigation 
(timetable generation and timetable performance simulation) and research and 
development is needed in many other areas, from relatively straightforward data 
 204 
management methods and software, through better optimisation tools for all the process 
steps, to the development of process-wide optimisation tools that integrate timetabling, 
rolling stock diagramming and train crew diagramming.   
 
Timetable generation software was discussed in Chapter 7.  It was concluded that 
timetable generation software has, in principle, considerable application but that to date 
software of this type has not proven successful ‘in the field’. 
 
Lessons of general applicability from this chapter are the challenges of implementing 
sophisticated software in complex processes and the importance of undertaking 
research and development for this kind of software in close communication with users, 
so as to ensure that it meets their needs. 
 
Further research work is now needed to develop timetable generation heuristics and the 
associated software.   
 
Not covered in this thesis, but of considerable importance to users, is the issue of 
implementation.  This warrants further analysis, possibly along the lines adopted by Eibl 
(1996).  It would also be beneficial for analysis to be undertaken to assess over what 
timescales organisations should reasonably expect software enhancements to be 
developed and implemented and to develop better metrics to help define what level of 
funding is likely to be required to achieve particular results.  
 
Chapter 8 investigated the use of simulation to assess the performance of railway 
timetables.  Analysis of the various tools available led to conclusions as to which tool 
was most likely to be appropriate for particular types of study. 
 
A number of issues with simulation tools in general have been described and, where a 
way forward has become clear, this has been set out.  A number of issues, for instance 
the ability to simulate days when primary delay is very significant, require further 
research. 
 
For both timetable generation and simulation, more case studies should be undertaken 
by different researchers using different software, to validate further the conclusions 
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reached in this research and to explore the extent to which the conclusions can be 
generalised.  
 
9.6 The Value of the Research Undertaken 
 
The research that has been the basis of this thesis has contributed to the body of 
knowledge in the area of train planning in a number of ways: 
 
· Train planning processes have been documented in outline and the timetable 
development process documented in detail, providing a ‘way into’ this complex 
area for other researchers and students; 
· The effectiveness of train planning processes has been analysed, providing a 
baseline for the assessment of future developments; 
· The impact of changes in industry and organisational structures on train planning 
processes in the UK has been analysed.  It is hoped that this analysis will enable 
railways who are following similar structural changes to make less mistakes than 
were made in the UK; 
· High level objectives for train planning have been collated and categorised.  This 
is now available to assess the achievement of train planning processes and 
systems.  It can also be used to inform the development of objective sets for 
timetable generation and optimisation; 
· The needs of railway managers and train planners for better software have been 
collected, collated and documented.  This can be used to inform both 
researchers and commercial software developers about where their attentions 
should be addressed; 
· The use of heuristics to permit automated timetable generation and optimisation 
has been analysed in detail and a range of recommendations have been made 
for further research and development; 
· The use of simulation to assess timetable performance has been investigated in 
detail; again a range of recommendations have been made for further research 
and development. 
 
Papers have been published in academic journals or presented at academic 
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conferences to disseminate much of the analysis undertaken. 
 
Of all the work undertaken, which does the author regard as the most significant?  
Without doubt, the analysis of the use of heuristics to permit automated timetable 
generation and optimisation.  Although the results of the appraisal of PTG indicated that 
more work is necessary before it can play a key role in supporting train planners, the 
principle has been demonstrated.  This appears to be a key area in which researchers 
could provide early benefits to the effectiveness of train planning and the author believes 
that the documentation of the issues to be resolved provides a firm base for that 
research and development.   
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10 Appendix 1 – Case Studies 
 
10.1         PTG Case Study - Brighton Main Line 
 
10.1.1 General description 
 
One of the uses to which PTG has been put was to assess the feasibility of operating the 
‘standard’ Sunday timetable when engineering work reduces the number of tracks 
available on certain stretches of the London to Brighton main line from four (two each 
way) to two (one each way).  The scale of this problem would represent a significant 
challenge to conventional approaches.  Some 68 trains were involved in the ‘standard 
hour’ service, although some of these are making crossing moves and therefore were 
only on the route for a short distance. The network considered comprised the full route 
from London to Brighton (51 miles), with all tracks that could be used by passenger 
trains included in the data.  This study was undertaken jointly by Railtrack and AEA 
Technology Rail and the outputs from PTG passed on for analysis. 
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Figure 17: PTG Case Study 1 Model Area (screenshot from the NID)  
 
 
 
Figure 18: Screenshot from the NID showing the level of detail held within the National 
Infrastructure Database 
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10.1.2 Preparation 
 
Before any data input was undertaken, the analyst who undertook the study talked at 
length to staff who understood the commercial requirements for the various trains on the 
route.  Some of these were: 
· A regular 15 minute interval ‘fast’ service was required, made up of train to key 
destinations; 
· Airport express trains were to have ‘clockface’ regular interval times (in effect 
they could not be changed from the existing timetable); 
· Trains running through London Bridge station to north London should not have 
their times in the north affected at that station or beyond, to avoid consequential 
effects on services outside the scope of the study; 
· Certain turnarounds and connections were required. 
 
It was at this stage that bounds were put on the network to be assessed and 
simplifications agreed; in addition the restrictions to be placed on the use of the network 
by engineering work were agreed. 
 
Infrastructure data and the current timetable were then input to the system, the trains 
being manually edited where required to pass on the two tracks not affected by 
engineering work and the commercial aspirations placed against each train in the form of 
weightings. 
 
This preparatory work took 4 to 5 man days to complete, of which perhaps half might be 
attributed to the need for the staff involved to acclimatise themselves to this new 
approach.   
 
10.1.3 Running PTG 
 
Over the next 5 days (elapsed time rather than man days) 18 separate runs were 
undertaken.  Considering 300,000 different timetables took a little over ½ an hour; 
900,000 different timetables took about an hour and a half; greater numbers of iterations 
were run overnight.  The machine used had a Pentium II chip and hence greater speed 
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can be expected by improving the hardware. 
 
Table 14: Summary of PTG Runs (Source: Author) 
 
SUMMARY OF PTG RUNS 
 
 OPERATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL CONSTRAINTS  
Run 
name 
Iterations7 Headw
ay 
violatio
ns1 
Key 
times2 
Connections3 Turn 
rounds4 
Evenness5 Pathing6 
        
Base 300,000 2 16 OK 3 OK, 2@3.5, 
1@6 mins 
OK 2 OK, 3 
Poor  
19 mins 
Base 900,000 2 16 OK 4 OK, 2@ 5.5 
mins 
OK 2 OK, 3 
Poor 
23.5 mins 
Base 4,000,000 0 16 OK 4 OK, 
2@3.5mins 
OK 2 OK, 1 out 
by 6 mins, 2 
poor  
22.5 mins 
Base 12,000,000 1 16 OK 5 OK, 
1@4mins 
OK 2 OK, 1 out 
by 4 mins, 2 
poor  
17.5 mins 
        
Bal_win1 300,000 4 15 OK, 1 
0.5 mins 
early 
3 OK, 2@4, 
1@3.5 mins 
OK 1 OK, 4 
poor  
21.5 mins 
Bal_win2 300,000 4 15 OK, 1 
1.5 mins 
late 
3 OK, 2@4.5, 
1@6 mins 
OK 3 OK, 2 
poor  
25.5 mins 
Bal_win3 300,000 5 15 OK, 1 
1 min 
early 
4 OK, 1@4.5, 
1@11 mins 
OK 3 OK, 2 
poor  
17 mins 
Bal_win4       300,000  4 15 OK, 1 
5.5 min 
early 
4 OK, 1@4, 
1@7mins 
OK 3 OK, 2 
poor 
20.5 mins 
Bal_win5 300,000 3 15 OK, 1 
0.5 mins 
late 
5 OK, 1 @ 6 
mins 
OK 2 OK, 3 
poor  
16 mins 
 900,000 0 OK 4 OK, 1@5.5, 
1 @15 mins 
OK 3 OK, 2 
poor  
18.5 mins 
 4,000,000 0 15 OK, 1 
5.5 min 
early 
2 OK, 1@4, 
1@5, 1@11.5 
and 1@29.5 
mins 
OK 3OK, 2 poor 15.5 mins 
 12,000,000 0 15 OK, 1 
8 min 
early 
3 OK, 1@3.5, 
1@4.5, 1@26 
OK 4 OK, 1 
poor  
16 mins 
Bal_win6       900,000  0 15 OK, 1 
6 min 
early 
3 OK, 2 @4,  
1@7.5 mins 
OK 2 OK, 3 
poor 
9 mins 
Bal_win7       900,000  4 19 OK, 1 
6.5 min 
3 OK, 1@3.5, 
1@4, 1@4.5 
OK 3 OK 19.5 mins 
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early mins 
 12,000,000 3 19 OK, 1 
early by 
5.5 mins 
3 OK, 2@4, 
1@5 mins 
OK 2 OK, 1 
poor (out by 
5.5 mins) 
20.5 mins 
Bal_win8       900,000  5 15 OK, 1 
1.5 mins 
late 
3 OK, 1@3.5, 
1@5, 1@18 
mins 
OK 3 OK, 1  14.5 mins 
Bal_win9       900,000  4 19 OK, 1 
6.5 min 
early 
4 OK, 2@6 
mins 
OK 1 OK, 1 out 
by 3 mins, 1 
poor  
20.5 mins 
Bal_win1
0 
      900,000  1 19 OK, 1 
6.5 min 
early 
3 OK, 1@4, 
1@5, 1@11.5 
mins 
2OK, 1 
out by 
0.5 mins 
2 OK, 3 
poor  
15.5 mins 
 
Notes:  
1 Number of instances where two trains violate the headways or junction 
margins 
2 OK if key times specified are met, otherwise deviations from the 
specified time are listed 
3 OK if within 1-3 minutes where relevant 
4 OK if within 5-30 minutes or 10-20 minutes as specified 
5 OK if services are within 2 mins of the required spacing, poor if greater 
than 5 mins  
6 The total amount of pathing in minutes inserted into all trains is listed 
here 
7 The user defined number of timetables that PTG investigates in a run 
before picking the best one 
 
The number of runs undertaken in this particular study reflects the dual objectives, 
namely to test the feasibility of the proposal and to better understand the workings of 
PTG.  On this basis, between runs it was necessary for the analyst to review the outputs 
(particularly the diagnostic information) with the local timetable planners to decide 
whether to run the same scenario again but for longer and to consider how to change 
the weightings applied to try to achieve a better timetable in the next run, in order to 
achieve a better solution. As more runs were undertaken it became clear that the 
infrastructure constraints caused by the engineering work, together with the commercial 
constraints were leading to no solutions being found that were acceptable overall.   
 
It was therefore decided to open discussions with customers (train operators) in order to 
prioritise commercial constraints for relaxation, in the search for the optimum feasible 
solution. 
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10.1.4 Conclusions 
 
After the initial time spent on data input, a wide variety of timetables were generated in a 
short space of time.  This quickly confirmed that with the number of trains specified, all 
the commercial requirements could not be met.  In addition, further runs provided the 
evidence needed to go back to the train operators to set out what could be achieved, 
either with compromises in the commercial requirements or in the number of trains to be 
run each hour. 
 
Overall the use of PTG was regarded as a success on this project, as it demonstrated 
that the original specification could not be met and enabled Network Rail and its 
customers to focus on options that could be achieved. 
 
10.2  RailSys Case Study - ERTMS 
 
10.2.1 Introduction 
 
ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) is an advanced train control 
system which provides Automatic Train Protection (ATP), together with potentially more 
capacity from the existing track configuration. It will eliminate, when fully implemented, 
most Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) and increase capacity, particularly at 
bottlenecks.  There are different levels of ERTMS systems, depending on whether 
lineside signals are eliminated through the use of radio communication and ultimately 
the elimination of fixed signalling sections through the adoption of ‘moving block 
signalling’.  See Hall (2003), Rail Safety (2003), UNIFE (2007) for introductory 
descriptions of ERTMS. 
 
This study was undertaken for the National ERTMS Project (NEP), an SRA project, to 
obtain an indication of the benefits of ERTMS System D (level 2) on a congested 
commuter railway.  System D uses fixed block sections but does not have lineside 
signalling.  In-cab signalling enables shorter block sections than is practicable with 
drivers having to ‘read’ fixed signals and eliminates the impact of sighting distances, as 
drivers can be advised immediately of any change in signal aspect ahead.  The study 
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was also to intended to demonstrate the suitability of the RailSys simulation tool for 
studies of this type.  Because of the limited time available for the study, to meet NEP 
deadlines, only a small number of options were considered and analysis time was short.  
Hence a number of questions that arose during the analysis had to be left only partially 
answered.   
 
RailSys was operated by Ian Bradshaw for this study. 
 
The route between London Victoria and East Croydon was chosen for the study as it is a 
busy commuter route.  Indeed the model incorporates more than 1700 trains in a single 
day with 30 trains, one every two minutes, arriving in Victoria in the peak hour).  There 
are a number of busy junctions and stations in the model area.   
 
The remit consisted of the following options: 
· Running the current timetable on the current infrastructure, to validate the model 
and provide a base case; 
· Running the current timetable on an ERTMS infrastructure, with a limited number 
of additional blocks added at 3 key pinch points (Victoria, Balham, East 
Croydon); 
· Adding in trains in the peak periods on the ERTMS infrastructure (whilst leaving 
existing trains untouched) to assess the extent to which additional services would 
‘soak up’ the performance gains from the introduction of ERTMS; 
· Additional blocks at further locations (Windmill Bridge Junction and Clapham 
Junction); 
· ‘Unconstrained’ platforming at Victoria. 
 
10.2.2 Detailed Description of RailSys 
 
RailSys is a railway timetable and infrastructure simulator that was developed initially by 
Hanover University and is now developed and marketed by the spin-off company 
RMCon.  It has been widely used for a number of years in Northern Europe and also in 
Australia.  A number of UK consultancies have now purchased the software and 
Network Rail, following an extensive comparison between Vision and RailSys (Pepworth 
2003), has chosen the latter as its standard package. 
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RailSys has two in-built simulation tools:  
 
· Simulation of the ‘nominal’ timetable; 
· Multiple simulation. 
 
Nominal timetable 
 
The nominal timetable simulator can be used to highlight direct conflicts between trains 
as a result of inaccuracies or lack of precision in the scheduled timetable.  Conflicts 
include headway conflicts, double occupation or crossing conflicts as well as any 
incidence where a train driver will see and react to a restrictive aspect signal. 
 
The nominal timetable simulator is only suitable for: 
 
· Running time analyses for future infrastructure and rolling stock; 
· Headway calculations and capacity analyses; 
· Feasibility studies where performance prediction is not immediately required, for 
example timetable construction reflecting future infrastructure; 
· Modelling and testing of current and future timetables for conflicts; 
· Certain types of what-if-analyses, for example track possessions. 
 
Multiple simulation 
 
Delays on railways can be replicated reasonably reliably by using multiple simulation 
techniques.  The modelling work starts by setting up delay distributions representing 
primary failure rates at locations in a study area and at the entry points to the area.  
These distributions are then sampled using the Monte Carlo statistics principle.  The 
multiple simulation tool within RailSys creates a number of timetables to be perturbed by 
overlaying these samples of primary delay.  Simulating these timetables gives 
punctuality results for, in effect, a range of possible operating days with different primary 
delays and hence different secondary delays.  
 
The number of timetables, required in a multiple simulation run to provide a good level of 
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likelihood that the overall average delay reflects reality, can vary between 30 and 250, 
depending on the nature of delays in the study area and the complexity of the network 
and timetable.  Higher levels of congestion usually require higher numbers of runs as 
overall delay levels can be more sensitive to small changes in primary delay.  
 
The Multiple Simulation tool can be used for: 
 
· Bottleneck analyses of infrastructure and/or timetables; 
· Understanding the knock on impact of delays; 
· Evaluating robustness and quality of the modelled system; 
· Comparing and evaluating different infrastructure and timetable versions. 
 
Outputs  
 
After simulation the results can be evaluated in RailSys’ internal application performance 
evaluator.  Results can be filtered, and a wide range of information can be extracted 
including the following:  
· Arrival and Departure Delays - RailSys computes delays considering the arrival 
or departure of trains at each station in the network; 
· Additional Delays - The increase or decrease of secondary delays between two 
adjacent stations; 
· On Time Running Performance - Each station can be evaluated in respect of the 
on time running of train types;  
· Number of Delayed Trains - The number of delayed trains and the delay per 
delayed train can be computed for every station; 
· Number of Operational Manoeuvres - RailSys counts the operational 
manoeuvres in each station during a simulation;  
· Block Occupation - The block occupation by trains during the simulation of a 
timetable can be used to describe the use of each block in the railway network 
statistically.  
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10.2.3 Scope and Set Up of the Model 
 
10.2.3.1 Infrastructure set up 
 
The infrastructure model used by RailSys can be populated either by manual input from 
signalling diagrams or through conversion from a different signal-berth level model.  For 
this particular case study, up to date infrastructure data in VISION format was provided 
by Network Rail, Southern Region.  RMCon (the supplier of RailSys) undertook the 
conversion to RailSys and then this raw conversion had added to it the extra data not 
provided in the Network Rail model (e.g. routing).  Signalling diagrams were not supplied 
and so this level of validation was not possible. 
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Figure 19: RailSys Case Study: ERTMS Model Area (Source: Author) 
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10.2.3.2 Timetable preparation 
 
Trains were added using a series of files containing weekday train records (known as 
CIFs – common interface files) provided by Network Rail, Southern Region, for Winter 
2002-03 including all passenger trains, all timetabled empty stock workings and freight 
trains.  The Winter timetable period was used because performance data for the period 
March to May is regarded as more representative than for the Summer period.   
Performance is typically better in Summer due to less bad weather problems, except for 
problems caused by excessive heat, and there are fewer commuters travelling.   
 
The CIFs were converted using RMCon’s import software.  A number of complexities in 
the CIFs led to considerably more manual amendment being necessary than expected,  
in particular due to reuse of train IDs and multiple variants of trains for different days of 
the week (the import routine is being improved to eliminate these problems in future).  
The density of the train service and the fact that some paths (in particular, as is common 
practice, empty stocks) appear not to have been fully validated by the Region, led to a 
considerable number of timetable ‘conflicts’ within the model that had to be eliminated.  
This was achieved by moving the trains the minimum number of seconds necessary.  
The high capacity utilisation on this route was confirmed by the fact that moving some 
trains just a few seconds led to knock-on conflicts. 
 
All train movements on the main running lines and stations within the geographic model 
were included in the simulation.  Train movements to and from yards and sidings onto 
and from running lines were modelled but train movements within yards and sidings 
have been not been simulated.   
 
10.2.3.3 Performance data input 
 
Performance data for period 11 2002-2003 was provided for the model area by Network 
Rail, Southern Region, with initial analysis being undertaken by the ERTMS team.   
Primary delays were consolidated into delay distributions for entry points to the model 
and stations within the model.   
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10.2.3.4 Assumptions 
 
To ensure that driver and signaller behaviour is simulated in a satisfactory method the 
following assumptions were made:  
 
A driver will not accelerate if the train has less than 800 metres to go before a speed 
decrease is required. If the train’s current speed is less than the line speed further down 
the line then the train will accelerate towards the next line speed if possible. 
 
If a train is being delayed by more than 120 seconds then the following delayed train is 
permitted to overtake, if possible, to prevent further delay. 
 
If a train is more than 120 seconds late arriving at a station then it will be re-platformed if 
possible. 
 
The delay statistics supplied by Southern Region of Network Rail were run over typically 
125 days to simulate 6 months worth of operational days.  No account was taken of 
weekends or ‘special’ days, such as sporting events where extra / reduced services may 
be run.  In addition the statistics have been cleaned of ‘abnormal adverse performance’ 
days, to ensure that the model represents typical performance properly. 
 
For the purpose of clarity, a conflict in RailSys is not defined as simply as physical 
contact between trains, but any incidence where a train driver will see and react to a 
restrictive aspect signal displayed. 
 
It should be noted that RailSys does not check for Rules of the Plan (ROTP) 
infringements, with regard to minimum headway values.  RailSys will consider a 
timetable valid, and conflict free, if the trains can run as timetabled without the driver 
seeing a restrictive aspect signal.  
 
Minimum and desired dwell times are adhered to throughout the modelling process. 
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10.2.4 Modelling the Existing Infrastructure and Working Timetable 
 
When the base infrastructure and working timetable had been input to RailSys a number 
of conflicts were discovered. On further examination these conflicts were only minor but, 
due to the density of the traffic around London Victoria and East Croydon, even a delay 
of a few seconds was found to escalate into a much larger problem, particularly in the 
morning peak.  
  
Where possible all of the conflicts within the base timetable were removed – only 2 
minor delays (totalling 22 seconds) remained.  None of the errors within the timetable 
were caused by the Operational Planning department within Southern Region, but are a 
direct result of the inaccuracies associated with the timetabling tools used - only 
calculating times to the nearest 30 seconds - and the rounding methods used to achieve 
this.  Removing these conflicts did not require re-timing of trains by more than a small 
number of seconds. 
 
There were also a small number of inconsistencies between different source documents. 
With recognition of all these errors the identification of the correct platform became 
obvious and did not cause any additional problems / conflicts within the base timetable. 
 
No unusual problems were found with making the base timetable work in RailSys. 
 
10.2.5 Modelling ERTMS System D in RailSys 
 
The ERTMS System D signalling system was set up to use the current interlocking 
times, as these were presumed to be unchanged (no better information being available), 
with an additional 3 second delay for the ERTMS system to send and receive 
transmissions to / from trains. The current interlocking times take into account the 
average time required for signals to change aspect and points to be moved, locked and 
detected.  It should be noted that, throughout this chapter, where signals are referred to, 
for the ERTMS models this means in-cab messages about track occupation in front of 
the train and the resulting maximum permitted speed, rather than lineside signals. 
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RailSys was set up so that the aspects of ‘signals’ in advance of the train are known 
immediately.  The trains are under constant communication with the ERTMS system so 
that any changes in position of the train or signal aspect / point positions are known by 
the train (driver) when it happens.  This gives an improvement in performance, in most 
circumstances, because it enables the driver to adjust his speed earlier than under 
conventional signalling. 
 
Within the model the train begins to react to that signal as soon as a change in aspect is 
known.  Where braking is required, the model will allow the train to coast, giving the 
signal in front of the train more time to clear.  This increases the likelihood of the train 
not reaching a stand at the signal and this can improve journey times. 
 
However, when the ERTMS system was imposed on to the current infrastructure and 
timetable a number of additional conflicts were identified that were not present in the 
timetable operating in today’s infrastructure.  All of these new conflicts were less than 20 
seconds and were due to trains reacting earlier to restrictive aspect signals and, 
therefore, causing small conflicts with following trains, demonstrating that coasting is not 
always the most appropriate driving strategy from a capacity point of view. 
 
The constant notification of changes in aspect allows the trains to accelerate again as 
soon as the restriction is lifted, with better flow of trains in this circumstance.  The overall 
effect of ERTMS is a smoothing of the acceleration and deceleration curves of train 
services, resulting in a more reliable service and increased timetable robustness, 
combined with energy savings.  There is, however ,a small negative impact on 
headways: technical headways under the ERTMS system are slightly greater (with 
existing block sections kept) due to this earlier notification of signal aspect. This can be 
remedied by inserting additional block sections when ERTMS is implemented to mitigate 
against this (but note that this has not been done in this modelling exercise) or could be 
mitigated by changing driving practices. 
 
A minimum block section of 200m has been assumed and between 200m and 250m has 
been used for the approaches to junctions at Balham, Victoria and East Croydon (where 
possible).  This has enabled existing blocks (typically 450-500m) to be split in two.  For 
main running lines the existing block lengths (mostly 500m) have been left untouched. 
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10.2.6 Options Run and Results 
 
Options run 
 
A substantial number of simulation runs were undertaken with different infrastructures 
and minor variations to parameters and the timetable.  Runs of 25 perturbed timetable 
days were undertaken to confirm that the model is functioning satisfactorily and to give 
indicative performance figures.  Runs of 125 perturbed timetable days were undertaken 
to give more robust performance figures (consistent with Monte Carlo modelling rules). 
 
At the end of the analysis period, the key options were re-run with all parameters 
comparable and the same timetable (except where stated).  The figures tabulated cover 
only these final runs. 
 
CURRENT 
 
The first option run was the current timetable on the current infrastructure, to validate the 
model and provide a base case.   
 
ERTMS SYSTEM D WITH NO EXTRA BLOCKS 
 
The infrastructure was then modified to ERTMS System D, using the principles 
described in an earlier section.  The current timetable was overlaid on this infrastructure 
and a limited number of minor adjustments were made to the timetable to make it work 
satisfactorily when simulated.   
 
SMALL AREA EXPERIMENTS 
 
Additional blocks were added, to separate models, at Balham and East Croydon to test 
the behaviour of the models with shorter blocks.  A substantial number of extra blocks 
were added at Balham and train flow improved substantially.  However, as was found in 
later runs, much of the benefit was lost once the area with extra blocks was left, as the 
trains simply get delayed a little further along their journeys.  A smaller level of 
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improvement was found at East Croydon. 
 
ERTMS SYSTEM D WITH LIMITED NUMBER OF EXTRA BLOCKS 
 
Following these experiments and subsequent review with the NEP team, the ERTMS 
infrastructure file was amended to have extra blocks on the approaches to Victoria, 
Balham and Windmill Bridge Junction/East Croydon.  Initial runs restricted the ability of 
the model to re-platform trains at Victoria and, in fact, the extra blocks caused UP trains 
on some lines to restrict DOWN moves, causing delays not already in the base case.  
For the final results, the model was permitted freedom to re-platform trains if a 2 minute 
or more delay would otherwise result.   
 
ERTMS SYSTEM D PLUS EXTRA TRAINS 
 
A key requirement of the analysis was to see the extent to which additional services 
would ‘soak up’ the performance gains from the introduction of ERTMS.  This was tested 
by adding in trains in the peak periods on the ERTMS infrastructure, whilst leaving 
existing trains untouched – due to time constraints.  It was not possible to find ‘conflict 
free’ paths on the slow lines, but three return ‘fast’ paths were found in each 3 hour peak 
period – adding 12 trains over these 6 hours – about a 3% increase in trains in and out 
of Victoria in each peak hour. 
 
It was decided not to add in trains in the off peak because it was understood that the 
SRA did not expect additional off peak trains to be required in the foreseeable future 
(demand growth being accommodated by longer trains where necessary).  Separate 
results for the two peak periods were prepared so that the impact of the extra trains on 
performance could be fully understood.   
 
ERTMS WITH ADDITIONAL BLOCKS 
 
To investigate whether the specification for extra blocks in the ERTMS model had been 
too cautious to get a high level of performance benefit, the ERTMS infrastructure was 
modified to increase the number of blocks between Clapham Junction and Victoria plus 
around Windmill Bridge Junction.  Options without and with the extra trains were run 
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over this revised infrastructure. 
 
REMOVAL OF STOCK WORKING AT VICTORIA 
 
To investigate the extent to which the Victoria throat and platforms were the key 
constraint on ERTMS benefits, all ‘connections’ between inbound and outbound trains 
were removed, providing something closer to a ‘free flow’ situation (although the throat 
still limits train movements to some extent).  ‘Up’ trains go into the first available free 
platform and then ‘disappear’ from the model; ‘down’ trains appear in the relevant 
platform shortly (30 seconds, the default dwell time value) before departure time.  
 
Results 
  
The results cover the route from Selhurst Junction to Victoria and vv.  Summaries of the 
results for each option are set out below.  Differences in average delay (in seconds) 
between ERTMS System D and the current signalling are shown.  A negative number 
means this option has less delay than the current timetable and infrastructure.  The % 
change in delay minutes is also shown.  Negative value again mean that the option is 
better than current position.   
 
East Croydon to Selhurst Junction delay figures were excluded because of an 
unexplained issue.  In the morning peak the timetable performance was worse with 
ERTMS than with the current signalling between Windmill Hill Junction and Selhurst 
Junction in both directions.  The ‘down’ am peak figure was taken at Balham, because 
the Selhurst Junction value suffers from ‘blocking back’ as a result of the problems with 
ERTMS between Windmill Bridge Junction and Selhurst Junction.   These issues 
provided an interesting insight into the complexity of simulation and the great care 
necessary to ensure that the results were representative.  
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Table 15: Results - ERTMS vs CURRENT (Source: Author) 
 
ERTMS v 
CURRENT 
AM PEAK  
* to 
Balham 
PM PEAK  ALL DAY  
UP (a) -8 secs -11% -10 secs -14% -15 secs -19% 
DOWN (b) -11 secs * -27% * -29 secs -45% -10 secs -19% 
 
(a) Selhurst Junction to Victoria 
(b) Battersea Park to Selhurst Junction 
 
An 11% reduction in delay minutes was shown to be achievable in the morning peak 
between Selhurst and Victoria.  This confirmed that ERTMS with a limited number of 
additional blocks at key pinch points can provide worthwhile performance benefits.   
 
In interpreting the high level of benefits in the down direction in the peaks it must be 
taken into account that no seriously congested areas were included in the figures.  
Results from a full line of route study would give a more robust indication of whether 
these levels of benefits are sustainable. 
 
Table 16: Results - ERTMS with extra peak trains vs. current (Source: Author) 
 
ERTMS with 
extra peak trains 
v CURRENT 
with existing 
timetable 
AM PEAK  
 
 
* to 
Balham 
PM PEAK  
UP (a)  3 secs 4% -4 secs -5% 
DOWN (b) -11 secs * -27% * -18 secs -28% 
 
(a) Selhurst Junction to Victoria 
(b) Battersea Park to Selhurst Junction 
 
The inclusion of extra peak hour trains (three fast services in each direction between 
East Croydon and Victoria in each three hour peak) had a very pronounced effect on the 
morning peak ‘up’ figures, eliminating all the delay improvement achieved through the 
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introduction of ERTMS.  In the evening ‘contra-peak’ (up) direction about 2/3 of the 
benefits of ERTMS are used up.  There appeared to be little scope in the up direction for 
additional trains beyond the three inserted, without more extensive use of shorter blocks 
and/or track or timetable changes. 
 
In the down direction the effect of the extra trains was smaller, with scope for more trains 
to be inserted in the timetable – if there were a way of getting the inward working into 
Victoria at an acceptable performance cost. 
 
ERTMS with further extra blocks added 
 
In an attempt to reduce congestion at Windmill Bridge Junction and Clapham Junction 
additional block sections were added to the ERTMS model at these locations.  The 
simulation runs gave no perceptible additional overall punctuality benefits.   
Table 17: Results - ‘Unconstrained’ platforming at Victoria (Source: Author) 
 
Unconstrained 
current  v 
CURRENT 
AM PEAK  
 
* to 
Balham 
PM PEAK  ALL DAY  
UP -27 secs -36%  7 secs 9% -10 secs -13% 
DOWN  13 secs * 32% *  5 secs 8% 7 secs 13% 
 
Unconstrained 
ERTMS  v 
ERTMS 
AM PEAK  
 
* to 
Balham 
PM PEAK  ALL DAY  
UP -31 secs -46%   7 secs 11% -10 secs -16% 
DOWN   3 secs * 10% * 16secs 44% -14 secs -33% 
 
Unconstrained  
ERTMS v 
Unconstrained 
current  
AM PEAK  
 
* to 
Balham 
PM PEAK  ALL DAY  
UP -12 secs -25%   -7 secs -12% -15 secs -22% 
DOWN -21 secs * -39% * -18 secs -26% -31 secs -53% 
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To better understand the impact of capacity constraints at Victoria the model was run 
without inbound and outbound workings ‘connected’.  This means that platform 
congestion and ‘blocking in’ of trains in the platform could not occur and this was 
intended to give a picture of what System D would deliver if some of the constraints at 
Victoria did not exist.   
 
Not all of the results were as expected, with those in italics counter-intuitive – with the 
constrained platforming working better than the unconstrained.  This appears to indicate 
that except when congestion is at its highest (am peak in the up direction) the problems 
with the model not knowing where trains are going to depart from (because as currently 
modelled they ‘appear’ in the platform 30 seconds before departure time) are greater 
than the benefits of unconstrained platforming for up services.  There was insufficient 
time in this study to investigate these results further – a logical next step would be to 
increase the ‘dwell time’ for down trains at Victoria so that the model can see platform 
occupancy further ahead. 
 
Overall however the results demonstrated that platforming constraints have a very 
serious impact on delay levels, and therefore a very important impact on the scale of 
benefits that ERTMS can generate. 
 
10.2.7 Comparison with Previously Published Results on Benefits 
of ERTMS 
 
The opportunity was taken to compare the results from the above case study with 
another study, undertaken by AEA Technology Rail using different software (a 
combination of MERIT and VISION) and for different routes, with the results set out in an 
SRA internal report (Morgan 2003).  This comparison highlighted important differences – 
in particular that the Victoria to East line did not show the large capacity benefits from 
the introduction of ERTMS that had been shown elsewhere.  Bearing in mind that routes 
out of Victoria are more congested than most in the UK, this conclusion was 
disappointing, and needed explaining. 
 
Analysis concluded that the route between Victoria and East Croydon is different from 
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those considered by AEAT in several important ways: 
· Signal sections were largely 500 yards or less already (impacting negatively on 
the benefits of ERTMS); 
· Significant terminus congestion at Victoria, which ERTMS cannot eliminate on its 
own, leading to the benefits of ERTMS being somewhat dissipated; 
· A number of important converging and diverging junctions (giving a worthwhile 
ERTMS benefit). 
 
Because of these differences comparable results should not necessarily be expected.   
 
Looking at terminal impact specifically, in the peak hours, trains queue up waiting to get 
into a platform at Victoria.  It has not been possible to reduce block lengths across the 
throat and into the platforms and, therefore, this congestion remains with ERTMS.   
 
Options for remedying this might be: 
· Advisory speed limits.  Conceptually these might improve the flow across the 
throat, if up trains did not have to stop and restart.  However, this benefit could 
be very hard to realise, as predicting when the throat block would clear would be 
difficult to do far enough in advance, with trains starting from the platforms just a 
few seconds before crossing the throat 
· Re-model the throat and approaches to seek to make the most of reduced 
ERTMS block lengths.  This idea might also be applied at East Croydon/Windmill 
Bridge Junction. 
 
The capacity utilisation vs. secondary delay relationship also helps to explain different 
results from different models. 
 
The principle that the performance of a transport network degrades as traffic volumes 
approach the theoretical maximum that the network can accommodate is well known 
(c.f. Banks, Bayliss and Glaiser, 2007).  In addition it is well understood that, at some 
point, exactly when depending on the particular features of the network, the level of 
delay that an extra unit of traffic volume causes starts to grow very rapidly (and 
ultimately exponentially). 
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A key benefit of ERTMS System D is that it can improve punctuality by making more 
capacity available by reducing effective headways and improving flow.  However in this 
model area, within the constraints placed on this study to keep the track layout as it is 
now, it has not been possible to make a big capacity improvement.  This is because 
headways at key locations (Victoria and East Croydon) have not been materially 
improved. 
 
Although this route has high capacity use at present (i.e. it is to the right hand side of the 
delay – capacity diagram shown in Figure 20 below), only a small capacity improvement 
(c1) achieved by the small average headway gains across the model area has led to 
worthwhile performance benefits (b) – but these are easily swallowed up again by a 
small increase in the number of trains. 
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Figure 20: Relationship Between Secondary Delay and % Capacity Used (Source: Author) 
 
 
Contrast this with another route where capacity utilisation is currently lower.  A bigger 
change in capacity (c2) is necessary here to get the same performance improvement 
(b).  If block sections are currently relatively long this may be achieved by shortening 
block lengths.  Relatively more trains can be added in this situation before the 
performance gain of ERTMS is used up.   
 
If it is the case that other studies show a greater opportunity for additional trains to be 
run with ERTMS installed, at comparable performance levels to now, then the 
relationship set out above may explain the different results.  A comparison of capacity 
statistics (headways, terminus throat occupancy and platform occupancy) for different 
studies would make this comparison more numerate.   
 
10.2.8 Conclusions for ERTMS 
 
It has been demonstrated through this modelling that worthwhile performance benefit 
can be achieved by the introduction of ERTMS System D on congested commuter 
routes, but that turning these performance benefits into additional train paths is 
Secondary 
Delay 
% capacity 
used 
Victoria –  
East Croydon 
 
Less congested 
route 
b 
b 
c2 
c1 
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problematic. 
 
Performance benefits (change in delay minutes over the section of route assessed) 
achieved range from 11% in the UP am peak to all-day benefits of 19%.  These figures 
relate to Selhurst Junction to Victoria and vv.  Potential ‘down side’ risks to the validity of 
these numbers in ERTMS business case work is that they may include improvements to 
performance that could be delivered by other means with existing signalling.  Also, it 
may be that benefits are not sustainable at these percentage levels when the full route to 
the south coast is modelled.  On the ‘up side’ changes to the timetable or infrastructure 
might enable greater savings to be made. 
 
Within the physical constraints of the study area and the constraints placed on the study 
due to its limited scope, only 3 additional trains each way in each 3 hour peak could be 
pathed without reducing performance with ERTMS to below current performance with 
existing signalling. 
 
A number of important factors that could possibly limit the scale of the benefits 
achievable from ERTMS System D implementation have been exposed: 
· The level of performance benefits achievable was constrained in this study area 
by the inability to easily reduce headways through the introduction of additional 
blocks because many block sections are already less than 500m and reductions 
in block lengths are also being constrained by crossovers adjacent to platform 
ends; 
· Because headways were not significantly reduced, the extra capacity created 
was relatively small (particularly at Victoria and East Croydon), meaning that just 
a few additional trains (three each way) could be added in the morning peak to 
the ERTMS model without performance deteriorating to below the level of 
performance achieved with current signalling; 
· The significance of terminus congestion in achieving benefits from ERTMS has 
been clearly demonstrated; 
· A need to amend the timetable, perhaps substantially, is apparent to get the best 
from ERTMS. 
 
These issues certainly warrant further investigation but this is outwith the scope of the 
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current investigation. 
 
10.2.9 Suggestions for Further Analysis 
 
A number of suggestions for further analysis, using either this model or others, have 
been made.  For ease of reference they are brought together here: 
 
1. Change the track layout to achieve blocks closer to 200m at Victoria and East 
Croydon; 
2. Explain whether blocks below 200m might be acceptable under certain 
circumstances; 
3. Model 200m-250m blocks throughout the model area, except where the 
existing track layout does not permit this; 
4. Extend the model to Brighton to get full ‘line of route’ assessment of ERTMS 
benefits: 
  - on existing timetable; 
  - on SRA Route Utilisation Strategy timetable; 
5. Rework the timetable to get more trains into Victoria in the peaks; 
6. Add in extra trains one by one to get an understanding of the capacity use vs 
punctuality curve; 
7. Test with different braking rate assumptions;  
8. Test with different GSM communication times; 
9. Test with different distributions of primary delay.  These could be assessed 
by understanding the likely impact of Network Rail action plans and also by 
differences in ERTMS reliability compared with current signalling; 
10. Test the impact of changes in average entry delay, say, through improved 
punctuality of up trains between Brighton and East Croydon as a result of 
implementation of ERTMS along the whole route,  Extending the model area 
to Brighton would achieve this objective and more; 
11. Test whether ERTMS has an impact on engineering access. 
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